Former Secretary of Foreign Affairs
It seems that the situation in the South China Sea is taking a turn for the worse. The increasingly harsh rhetoric is now being backed by a display of muscle. China sent one of its most modern surveillance vessels on a run through the South China Sea from Guangzhou to Singapore. The Philippines sent its largest – and apparently only – warship, a WWII vintage destroyer, on patrol through waters it now calls the West Philippine Sea. Vietnam and China have each conducted live-fire exercises while the U.S. and ASEAN navies have just completed their annual joint naval exercise. This war of words and saber-rattling, if not handled properly, can lead to a situation that would complicate and even make it impossible for a diplomatic solution to be reached.
(With these developments, now I am terrified at the prospect at having him (Domingo Lee) represent our interest during these crucial times. I do not mean to denigrate the nominee’s intellect or age. I just think his abilities and past experience are not suited for this particular post)
One Message/One Voice
That is why it is important for the Philippines to speak with one voice and by that I mean not just one message but one person aside from the President. The cacophony of conflicting voices – some defiant and inflammatory, others clearly betraying ignorance of the nuances of international relations – from officials in the executive to the provincial level, not well versed in the art of diplomacy and geopolitics, risks escalating tensions.
Senator Ponce Enrile was right to caution the President’s subalterns from speaking on the issue and calling for the Department of Foreign Affairs to do the talking. Enrile said not only is the “tough talk” unproductive, it might paint the President in a corner, since it is now the President’s office speaking.
The President speaking on the issue, through the Foreign Secretary, is the wisest course of action to take. Fortunately, this advice is being heeded. Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario’s sober presentation of the Philippine case and of advancing a “rule of law” approach to settle the dispute is just the right tone. Getting the envoys of six ASEAN member states in Manila to issue a statement calling for a peaceful resolution of the dispute was helpful even if largely symbolic. It reinforces our call for the multilateralization of the issue. While on one level this may give us greater leverage than if we were to negotiate this bilaterally, it also makes eminent sense because there are other claimants who are ASEAN members themselves as well as non-claimants who nevertheless have significant stake in the state of affairs in this busy shipping lane through which more than a quarter of world commerce passes.
Other Stakeholders
These stakeholders include the United States, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Indonesia among others. The U.S. had declared that freedom of navigation of the South China Sea is in its national interest. Japan and Korea have their own territorial dispute with China aside from the fact that its trade with Asia and Europe go through these disputed waters. Singapore has urged China to be more open about the extent of its territorial claims in the South China Sea, saying Beijing’s ambiguity was causing international concern. As a trading nation, Singapore’s interest is in preserving freedom of navigation in these waters.
Even far away Australia has expressed its agreement with the position of the Philippines that international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), should be the basis for settling territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Indeed many countries outside the region have made it known that they have a stake in the peaceful settlement of the dispute. Each stakeholder has its national interests to promote and it would be useful to determine if there are areas where these intersect with each other. Finding such common ground can serve as the foundation for a solution to the dispute.
Track II Dialogue
These developments make it all the more imperative to have a Track II dialogue in place, such as the one being organized by the Carlos P. Romulo Foundation and the Institute of South East Asian Studies (ISEAS) in October. The goal is to give clarity to publicly stated government positions, surface the underlying issues beneath them and identify areas of common interest. From this hopefully can proceed cooperation that will lead to a win-win solution for all concerned. And even if long term solutions are not within reach, at least ground rules can be established and interim measures can be put in place.
Let me illustrate how this can be possible. The basis for each claimant’s position is one area where clarity would be helpful in showing possible pathways for eventual resolution. For example, China claims all the islands in the Spratly’s (based on a map drawn in 1947 by the then Nationalist Government of China) enclosed by undefined and unconnected nine dotted lines or bars. The legality and the precise locations indicated by those lines are not clear because there was no definition of those dotted lines, nor were their co-ordinates stated. It was not clear whether the intent was to claim just the islands or the entire South China Sea since in those days, there was no internationally recognized legitimate reason to claim waters beyond three miles offshore.
In any event, China now seems to claim the entire area but without so explicitly stating and even welcoming joint exploration and development, hinting at a possible compromise possibly as a consequence of its closer examination of international law and its desire to assure its neighbors of its commitment to its “peaceful rising”.
A greater understanding and appreciation for the underlying motives of each claimant’s position is also crucial. Looking at China again in particular, its motives are clearly economic, strategic and political in nature. It behooves all stakeholders to understand and appreciate these if they are to reach a common ground with China. The potential for marine and mineral resources are understandable.
The political maybe a little nuanced. The scheduled change of leadership in 2012, pressure from the People’s Liberation Army, domestic social issues arising from migrant workers, unequal income distribution and ethnic tensions all play a part in China’s territorial assertiveness. The strategic interest of China in control of the South China Sea is not so apparent as to strike a sympathetic chord from our side of the fence. However, they do have legitimate concerns when they view the Straits of Malacca as a potential choke point to their access to the Indian Ocean and the oil fields of the Middle East. Addressing these strategic concerns may shed light on possible cooperative action such as joint maritime security arrangements.
Discussing these issues in a formal government to government setting would be difficult and unproductive because each participant would not have had the benefit of internal discussions and would have to stick to publicly held positions. A Track II mechanism, however would serve to prime more constructive dialogue at the official level.
Qualified Philippine Ambassador
All of these developments are moving at lightning pace while we dilly dally with the appointment of our country’s ambassador to Beijing amidst doubts about his physical condition and his capability to take on such a demanding assignment. I have made no secret about my lack of confidence in the reported nominee to the post.
With these developments, now I am terrified at the prospect at having him represent our interest during these crucial times. I do not mean to denigrate the nominee’s intellect or age. I just think his abilities and past experience are not suited for this particular post. The Commission on Appointments with the likes of elder statesmen Juan Ponce Enrile and Miriam Defensor as members should be able to enlighten the rest of the members of the fitness of the nominee with just a few probing and incisive questions.
(This article is RRR’s June 22, 2001 column in the Philippine Star.)
Ellen,
You are absolutely right that seasoned Foreign Secretary should do the talking. President’s office should only step in when the going gets tough either to confirm what DFA proposes or to harden stand if situation calls for hardening of stand.
China is flexing muscles because they need to, just like us (when we deployed BRP Humabon) but such muscle flexing should not be interpreted today as a call to arms conflict. However, there is no doubt in my mind that the Chinese naval commanders in the region have been issued rules of engagement which to a certain extent includes authorisation of use of force if it came to that.
Today, there’s elbow room for maneuver: diplomacy. That said, it is important that RP shows a bit of mettle and by deploying our vessel, no matter how old it is. It’s the language that’s needed to back up our diplomatic language. People should not be unduly alarmed. It’s panic that will or might trigger a shooting war.
Our navy officers, particularly NAFORWES commander, know their job but as ever, there must be clear rules of engagement, otherwise those poor naval folks will be confused and confusion might lead to an “accident” or “incident.” Malacanang should stay focus on what it wants done and let its foreign affairs arm do the talking and the navy do the walking.
Below is the reason for China’s moves on the South China Sea:
(put three w’s here) iags.org/china.htm
China is expected to overtake Europe as the second largest consumer of oil before 2020. It will overtake the US by 2030.
At the rate of consumption, China would be 65% dependent on imports for energy. That is not a secure situation, considering the ever unstable Middle East. The insecurity will be eased if some of its energy is sourced from the Stans (Kazhakstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, etc.), or from the China sea and surrounding territories.
(three w’s here) herohedge.com/article/china-oil-demand-projected-hit-11-mmbpd-2015-25-now-will-reach-consumption-parity-us-2030
This is all about business, and can be handled diplomatically. When you know that the other guy has an entire arsenal of bigger guns, drawing your little snub-nose first will only subject you to ridicule. Bringing in Uncle Sam is even worse, because, then, you have another big guy whose interests may be opposed to yours.
When push turns to a kick or a shove, one can turn to an effective ridiculous.
The powerless will always have even a little nasty foolishness. Diplomacy is the weapon not only of the strong but also of the weak. Sometimes the weak do get hurt in the process, but the strong end up fighting the strong. A little knowledge can be dangerous even to the big knowledgeable ones.
If the Spratly islands are really ours and some big bully comes to claim it and take advantage of our inability to defend the islands, we can turn to our big friends in the free world, get into a treaty or agreement for US or UK to develop right away, pronto, the islands. Establish military bases if necessary to defend their investments.
The bilateral agreement will define whether we are giving the Spratlys to friends or fiends. Agreements profitable to some private pockets it has been claimed had been entered before for exploration of its natural wealth. In diplomacy bribery among friends may not be the standard practice. Or is it?
Alternatively, Let’s see some action from our government agencies do infrastructure and peaceful ones on the islands. PAGCOR and Tourism agencies should have a look.
Enter China. Enter the Dragon. It is the Way of the Dragon. There never was a meek dragon except Puff. As kung fu master Bruce Lee would say “Think! Do not take your eyes off your enemy even if you are bowing.”