Managing our Foreign Service

(The following article appeared in the Philippine Star last week where former foreign secretary Roberto R. Romulo writes a regular column.)

by Roberto R. Romulo

From 1989 to 1995, I was in government service as Ambassador and Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Having worked in a multinational corporation for 25 years in various management positions, I presumed that management techniques tried and proven effective in business organizations could be equally applicable in the government bureaucracy.  I am writing on this topic, using my experience in the DFA, in the spirit of constructive criticism.

Carrot and Stick

I strongly believe in the principle of the “carrot and stick.”  I let everyone know from the start that those who perform will be rewarded and those who do not won’t. Regrettably, I found out that my ability to do so was limited both ways.  

First off, for the “carrot and stick” principle to work, everyone should agree on a common standard for evaluating performance. Every year government employees undergo performance evaluation by their supervisors. This turned out to be perfunctory at best. The standards are so loosely defined – and quite subjective – such that they are susceptible to the biases of the rater.

After my first year in office, I dutifully evaluated my staff in consultation with my deputy.  He commented that my performance standards were too high. He pointed out that if I appraised people in the same way as in the private sector, my staff would suffer in comparison to others in comparable posts in the DFA. In other words, I would be punishing my staff by rating them strictly while staffs in other posts were being rated rather benignly! I was told the same thing when I became DFA Secretary, but I never agreed with this attitude.

Once, when I was on a foreign trip and was scheduled for a bilateral meeting with ministry officials of the host country, the DFA senior official accompanying me failed to appear because he overslept – a major gaffe. I thought of disciplining him, but it turned out that the most that the rules would allow me was to remove him from his then current position. The administrative bureaucracy agreed to remove him from his position but suggested that I “exile” him abroad as a deputy to a European mission.  In my naiveté, I thought that demoting him from Assistant Secretary in the Department to just a deputy in a foreign post would be considered appropriate punishment – as it would have been in the private sector. But in this case my decision became the joke of the Department.  Rather than applying the “stick” I gave him a “carrot” — a coveted foreign assignment.   
 
Applying “the carrot” to motivate performance is equally ineffective in the DFA. This is mostly because “seniority” takes precedence over performance. Even if you perform in an outstanding manner, you cannot be promoted ahead of others who are more senior. And woe to you if you break this iron rule! On the other hand, if a career Foreign Service Officer (FSO) does not die prematurely or commit a major crime where he does prison time, as sure as the sun will rise, he will become an ambassador.

Coincidence or Design

A common complaint of politically appointed ambassadors is that they unwittingly find themselves saddled with Foreign Service Officers and staff who turn out to be deadwood and habitual offenders. I recall two incidents where career officers were either cited for dereliction of duty or insubordination – and not for the first time. In both instances, they should have been sent back to the home office. Instead, they were reassigned to other desirable European posts. When I queried the senior bureaucracy about the reassignments, they gave me two explanations. For the one charged with dereliction of duty, I was told: “Kawawa naman, he/she was just assigned to Europe”. As for the one charged with insubordination, I was told: “there are always two sides and perhaps you only heard the side of the head of post”.

Was it just coincidence that they were originally assigned to posts headed by political ambassadors and were then “punished” for their transgressions by reassigning them to posts headed by other political ambassadors? Would they have been accepted for posting in places where the head of posts are insiders who know these people personally or by reputation?

Old Boys’ Network

It was only in retrospect that I realized what I was up against in applying the “carrot and stick” principle. The Foreign Service Act and others preceding it were meant to develop and protect a career Foreign Service in the belief that the best people who can do the job are those who have the aptitude for it and are trained on the job. As a result, the Foreign Service today is a separate, self-governing career service. Promotions and discipline in the Department are recommended by a board of peers whose composition changes over time and whose members are themselves subject to such peer review when they come up for promotion – or discipline.

While theoretically under the direction of the DFA Secretary and his senior staff, the career Foreign Service has in fact become a creation unique in government, an organization which is self-promoting, self- rewarding, and self-disciplining – contrary to the principles of good corporate governance. Therein lies the problem. Instead of being an oversight body, it operates to protect the interests of the Foreign Service. They take care of each other. The “old boys’ network” of senior officers who “look out for their own” reigns. This leads to a situation where for example the most important factor for career success as an FSO is to be on good terms with the senior members of the network. By the same token, any failings among its members are overlooked or just punished with a slap on the wrist even for such grave malfeasance as sexual harassment, ill treatment of subordinates and financial misdeeds.

Applying Corporate Governance Principles

I strongly believe that the career service is and should always be the cornerstone of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As Secretary, I recommended Raul Rabe, a career ambassador, to Washington, despite a long tradition of its being occupied by politically appointed ambassadors. During my time, I also recommended Domingo Siazon Jr. to Tokyo, and later as my replacement as DFA secretary. He was the first career officer to become Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

I can also cite the “best and the brightest” in DFA such as S.P. Lopez, Jose Ingles, Narciso Reyes, Luis Moreno-Salcedo, Blyke Suarez, Rodolfo Severino and many others who have retired. Clearly, the competence of our career Foreign Service is second to none, but this attitude of “defending their own” regardless of circumstances is regrettable and indefensible.

The main problem with the career Foreign Service system is the lack of effective management or oversight. No matter how well-intentioned, no agency can adequately police itself, particularly when there is a built-in conflict of interest. The Foreign Service should still maintain its own hiring, promotions and compensation scheme different from other branches of government. But I believe that there should be independent directors, as in corporations, in the Board of Foreign Service and its chair should not be from within the ranks but someone from outside. This would at least assure reasonable and consistent supervision of activities such as personnel management, including promotions and discipline, officer-rank and file relations, inspections, and cost control, all of which need outside review. With oversight control, the Board could force some of the tough management decisions – like discipline – which the DFA has not been able to make because so many of its senior management officials have a vested interest in the system.

I flag this issue now not to resurrect old grudges but to underline the need for reform. I believe that what is true in the foreign service is true as well in the entire government bureaucracy. In all bureaucracies everywhere – be it in Foggy Bottom or Quai d’Orsay or Whitehall – I am sure there is also an “old boys’ network.” The network’s actions inevitably end up protecting non-performers rather than recognizing and rewarding the deserving. This leads to a culture of self-preservation and a mediocre bureaucracy. I submit that our young foreign service officers deserve better than being sucked into this culture. Their idealism should be fed, not drained.