GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City
25 October 2006
SUBJECT: Pre-Trial Investigation Report on the Enclosed Charge
Against MGEN RENATO P MIRANDA AFP et al
(For: Violations of AW 67- Attempt to Create Mutiny, etc.)
TO: Chief of Staff
Armed Forces of the Philippines
Post
THRU: SJA for CSAFP
I. Authority: OTJAG Office Orders Nr. 14-06 dtd 20 Jul 06.
II. Purpose: To conduct Pre-Trial Investigation pursuant to AW 71 and Sec 35 (a) of the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, in relation to PD 77 as amended by PD 911 in order to determine the existence of prima facie case to warrant trial by General Court-Martial against the respondent military Officers who were allegedly involved in the 23-26 February 2006 aborted plan to withdraw support from President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
The following named thirty eight (38) Philippine Marines and Army Officers stand charged for violations of the Articles of War in the Amended Charge Sheets as indicated opposite their names:
Respondent Officers of the Philippine Marine Corps
NAMES
Articles of War
1
MGEN RENATO P MIRANDA O-6728 AFP
67 & 96
2
COL ARIEL O QUERUBÍN O-7901 PN(M)
65, 67, 96 & 97
3
COL ORLANDO E DE LEON O-8600 PN(M)
67 & 96
4
COL JANUARIO G CARINGAL O-8580 PN(M)
67 & 96
5
COL ARMANDO V BAÑEZ O-8592 PN(M)
67 & 96
6
LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN O-9722 PN(M)
67 & 96
7
LTC REYNALDO C OCSAN O-8751 PN(M)
67 & 96
8
LTC VALENTINE T HIZON O-9476 PN(M)
67 & 96
9
LTC CUSTODIO J PARCON O-9702 PN(M)
67 & 96
10
LTC ROMULO L GUALDRAPA O-113766 PN(M)
67 & 96
11
LTC ACHILLES S SEGUMALIAN O-116089 PN(M)
67, 96 & 97
12
MAJ FRANCISCO DOMINGO R FERNANDEZ O-10530 PN(M)
67 & 96
13
1LT BELINDA R FERRER O-132579 PN(M)
67 & 96
Respondent Officers of the Philippine Army
NAMES
Articles of War
1
BGEN DANILO D LIM O-7665 AFP
63, 65, 67, 96 & 97
2
LTC NESTOR T FLORDELIZA O-109684 (QMS) PA
67 & 96
3
LTC EDMUNDO D MALABANJOT O-115217 (INF) PA
67 & 96
4
MAJ JASON LAUREANO Y AQUINO O-10503 (INF) PA
67 & 96
5
MAJ ORIEL L PANGCOG O-10563 (INF) PA
67 & 96
6
MAJ JOSE LEOMAR M DOCTOLERO O-10124 (INF) PA
67 & 96
7
CPT JAMES C SABABAN O-11581 (INF) PA
67 & 96
8
CPT RUBEN B GUINOLBAY O-11957 (INF) PA
67 & 96
9
CPT MONTANO B ALMODOVAR O-11572 (INF) PA
67 & 96
10
CPT JOEY T FONTIVEROS O-11713 INF) PA
67 & 96
11
CPT ISAGANI O CRISTE O-11549 (INF) PA
67 & 96
12
CPT WILLIAM F UPANO O-11876 (INF) PA
67 & 96
13
CPT DANTE D LANGKIT O-11957 (INF) PA
67 & 96
14
CPT GEORGE M MALONES O-128634 (CAV) PA
67 & 96
15
CPT ALLAN C AURINO O-128459 (FS) PA
67 & 96
16
CPT FREDERICK M SALES O-11686 (INF) PA
67 & 96
17
1LT ERVIN C DIVINAGRACIA O-12742 (INF) PA
67 & 96
18
1LT JACON S CORDERO O-13434 (INF) PA
67 & 96
19
1LT HOMER A ESTOLAS O-13449 (INF) PA
67 & 96
20
1LT SANDRO U SERENO O-131279 (INF) PA
21
1LT JERALD L REYES O-13257 (INF) PA
67 & 96
22
1LT MARIO D BAUTISTA O-13376 (INF) PA
67 & 96
23
1LT MICHAEL L CUARTEROS O-13690 (INF) PA
67 & 96
24
1LT RITCHIEMEL S CABALLES O-13686 (INF) PA
67 & 96
25
1LT ANTONIO T TIMBAL O-13782 (INF) PA
67 & 96
III. FACTUAL BACKDROP:
Pursuant to OTJAG Office Order Nr 14-06 dated 20 July 2006, a panel of Pre-Trial Investigators was created to conduct Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) of the above-named respondent military Officers. The panel is composed of COL AL I PERRERAS 0-10004 JAGS (GSC) as Chairman, MAJ ERWIN VA MACHICA III 0-131286 JAGS as member, and MAJ AGUSTIN G MATAVIA 0-133273 JAGS as member-recordeì¥Á
to appear during the said scheduled PTI. They appeared on other scheduled dates of thePTI and received their respective Charge Sheets.
The PTI proceedings on 10 August 2006 scheduled at Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal was reset due to the receipt of the panel of various motions for extension of time to file respondent Officers’ respective counter-affidavits, as required. They likewise moved to transfer venue of the PTI from the 2nd Infantry Division, PA based at Camp Capinpin, Tanay Rizal to Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City. The motion for additional time to submit counter-affidavits was granted by the panel but the move to change venue was denied.
In the scheduled PTI proceedings conducted on 141000H August 2006 at the Officers’ Clubhouse, BNS, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, all the indicted Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) Officers were present and have submitted their respective counter-affidavits, except for MGEN RENATO MIRANDA AFP, who submitted his counter affidavit on 25 August 2006. On said date, cases against respondent PMC Officers were deemed submitted for resolution.
With respect to respondent Army Officers, they submitted their respective counter-affidavits/motions and their cases had been considered submitted for resolution as of 02 October 2006, the date when the last pleading (Manifestation) filed at the instance of CPT MONTANO ALMODOVAR PA was submitted to the panel for its due consideration.
IV. THE EVIDENCE
The evidence on record is hereunder summarized as follows:
(1) LTGEN HERMOGENES C ESPERON AFP. In his Affidavit, dtd 25 May 06, he alleged, among others, that:
He was summoned together with other Major Service Commanders to proceed to the quarters of CSAFP on or about 232030H Feb 06.
Upon arrival thereat, he was informed by the CSAFP that BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN were in his office earlier and discussed their plan to lead their officers and men in joining mass protest actions on 24 Feb 06 which was supposed to be spearheaded by multi-sectoral groups including elements/leaders of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, Iglesia ni Cristo, El Shaddai and business groups. Accordingly, BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN will join in their service uniforms and bear arms but would carry their firearms with muzzles down. Thereat, BGEN LIM will come out and openly declare his withdrawal of support from PGMA.
GEN SENGA also informed him that BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN informed him (GEN SENGA) that elements from Special Action Force PNP, Phil Marines and First Scout Rangers Regiment (FSRR) will join the mass protest action. The move to join the mass protest actions has the blessings of C/SUPT MARCELINO FRANCO PNP of SAF PNP and MGEN RENATO MIRANDA AFP.
VADM MAYUGA and MGEN MIRANDA were given a situationer when they arrived on or about 2245H. When asked if he could stop his men from joining, MGEN MIRANDA replied that he is pro constitution but stated in the vernacular that “we must now listen to the people”. According to him, they have attained a critical majority and therefore their desire must be followed. He kept on saying that he is for the constitution and for the chain of command, but will follow the will of the people.
MGEN MIRANDA and C/SUPT FRANCO asked for support of their plans. When asked why they should be given support, both replied that there are already many commanders who are joining and that they do not want bloodshed.
GEN SENGA then called to the meeting, BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN who were held at OCSAFP earlier that evening. When GEN SENGA asked them to explain their plans to join the mass protest action, BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN stated that: (a) they can no longer hold their men and they have opted to join them so that they could provide leadership to them; (b) they will march with their uniforms and with their weapons’ muzzles down; (c) they will be joined by other military men when the marching groups will be en route to a rendezvous area; and, (d) BGEN LIM confirmed that he has already made a taped message to withdraw support from PGMA.
BGEN LIM tried to explain to them that they did not want bloodshed and at that time, he said in a vague manner that they could achieve their objective if GEN SENGA would join and lead them. The CSAFP was noticeably irritated, and when asked what he would do if GEN SENGA will not join them, BGEN LIM answered that they will push through with their plan just the same.
He warned BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN that if they proceed with their plans, the army will fight them or any power grabber for that matter.
While he was at the AFP War Room on or about 240330H Feb 06, BGEN LIM called him up. At first, BGEN LIM told him that they would push through with their plans but assured him that the march will be peaceful. When he told BGEN LIM that a rally cannot be peaceful when the soldiers march in battle dress attire with their firearms, BGEN LIM asked to put him under his custody. He told BGEN LIM to just stay in his quarters and desist from executing their plans.
At around 0430H, CSAFP announced in the War Room that he had taken into custody BGEN LIM upon the recommendation of MGEN MACLANG. At around 0530H, CSAFP announced that BGEN LIM et al were no longer pushing through with their plans and that signified the defeat of the destabilizers.
At noontime, GEN SENGA placed BGEN LIM under his custody. On or about 241400H Feb 06, BGEN LIM was relieved by COL REY MAPAGU PA as Regiment Comdr, FSRR.
On or about 261800H Feb 06, he was instructed by CSAFP to seal-off Fort Bonifacio from civilians or from unauthorized military reinforcements to the stand-off that was on-going at the Headquarters, Philippine Marines.
(2) LTGEN JOSE L REYES AFP – In his Affidavit dtd 03 May 06, he alleged, among others, that:
He attended a meeting with GEN SENGA on 23-24 Feb 06 at Gazebo, CSAFP’s Quarters in Camp Aguinaldo.
When he met the CSAFP on or about 232100H Feb 06, he was informed by the CSAFP that units of the Marines, Rangers and the PNP Special Action Force will be joining the mass rally on the 24th of Feb at EDSA. GEN SENGA further informed him that BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN were at his office and has revealed their plans to lead the Rangers and the Marines respectively on the mass protest.
When C/SUPT MARCELINO FRANCO of SAF PNP arrived on or about 2230H, he confirmed that SAF will be moving and that he can no longer stop his troops, particularly the junior officers.
VADM MAYUGA and MGEN MIRANDA arrived on or about 2300H and GEN SENGA then called to the meeting BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN. They were asked the same questions given to C/SUPT FRANCO, the extent of troop participation and other related matters. They all asked them to stop their plans.
BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN gave them many reasons why they should go on with their plans such as: that their men are determined to move and that all are uneasy already; that they have already signed-up and might have already reached their announcement of withdrawal of support from the President to the media; and that they wanted to save face and have to move on, to which LTGEN ESPERON retorted, “Bakit kayo lang ba ang may mukha.”
MGEN MIRANDA also stated that the Marines are ready to go and that they cannot hold them anymore, and that they will lead the troops on the planned march and will join the protest rally.
On or about 240130H Feb 06, the CSAFP gave them the final instructions, to wit, “Your plan must not push through. Tell the men of its repercussions while there is still time. If you do, I will just give you one order – GO BACK TO BARRACKS. If not, you have drawn the lines of battle.”
(3) VADM MATEO M MAYUGA AFP – In his Affidavit dtd 30 May 06, he alleged, among others, that:
On or about 231945H Feb 06, he received a call from GEN SENGA directing him to proceed to his quarters at Camp Aguinaldo for a very urgent meeting on national security matters. He requested the CSAFP that he will report to him later as he was hosting a dinner at the Admiral’s residence at Bonifacio Naval Station in honor of the Philippine Navy’s guest, Admiral Slamet Soebijanto, the Chief of Indonesian Navy, and his party. He was told by CSAFP to bring along with him MGEN MIRANDA, the Philippine Marine Commandant, who was with him at the said dinner engagement.
On or about 232300H February 2006, he and MGEN MIRANDA arrived at the Gazebo, CSAFP’s Quarters. Present thereat were CSAFP, GEN SENGA, Army Chief, LTGEN ESPERON, Air Force Chief, LTGEN REYES, C/SUPT FRANCO of the PNP and J2 Chief, BGEN MACLANG. The CSAFP informed the aforesaid military officers that BGEN DANILO LIM and COL ARIEL QUERUBIN have approached him to say that they, together with some junior officers, will be joining the mass protest rally scheduled on 24 February 2006. C/SUPT FRANCO mentioned that his junior officers at the PNP SAF were joining the rally and that he cannot stop them anymore from proceeding with their plan. CSUPT FRANCO, BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN also said that they will join their men in order to avoid bloodshed and so that they can be better organized.
BGEN LIM AFP also mentioned that he had an earlier recorded video or tape interview about his stand on the political situation and his withdrawal of support from the President, to be aired on the day of the rally. BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN also said that they foresee Oscar Orbos as the leader to replace President Arroyo after the successful conclusion of the protest march. They said that their group will bring with them their firearms (in sling with muzzles down) during the rally. At that point, MGEN MIRANDA said that he may not be able to stop COL QUERUBIN and the group from joining the protest rally and that if that happens, he will be forced to join the rally.
On or about 240130 Feb 06, after the CSAFP gave his final instructions not to push through with their plans, he told MGEN MIRANDA that he wanted to talk to the Marine Officers at the Headquarters, Philippine Marine Corps. He and MGEN MIRANDA aboard their respective staff cars left the Gazebo and proceeded to the Marine headquarters. While in transit, he received a call from CSAFP and was directed to return to Camp Aguinaldo and so he went back to his office. After they planned their actions to stop the march, he left ahead of the others present and headed again for Fort Bonifacio to talk to the Marines.
On or about 240200H Feb 06, upon arrival at the Marine Headquarters, he was met by MGEN MIRANDA and led him to the Commandant’s Office where a number of Marine Officers (all in civilian attire) were gathered. The senior officers who were present at that time were BGEN ALLAGA, COL JOHN MARTIR, COL ARIEL QUERUBIN, COL RUSTICO GUERRERO, COL JOJO DE LEON and some other 20 to 25 officers to include the Marine Sgt Major SCMS Bagorio.
COL QUERUBIN said that the junior officers with him were ready to join the protest march and this was seconded by COL JOJO DE LEON by saying that the junior officers have already drawn their firearms and are indeed ready to join the march. BGEN ALLAGA mentioned that whatever happens, the Marines should stand by the Constitution and adhere to the chain of command and that he will not support any activity directly or indirectly related to the protest march. All the time, MGEN MIRANDA was quiet. He told the Marines that as the Flag Officer-in-Command, he will stand by the Constitution and adhere to the chain of command and that whatever happens, they should remain intact as the strength of the Marines lies in their being small but one cohesive and closely united group. When he was leaving the Marine Headquarters, he told MGEN MIRANDA to call him up at HPN once they are done with the meeting and thereafter, he proceeded directly at HPN.
On or about 240500H Feb 06, when he was at his office at HPN, MGEN MIRANDA called to say that the Marines have decided to remain aboard the Headquarters Philippine Marine Corps and that no Marines will join the protest march on 24 Feb 06. In turn, he called the CSAFP to relay to him the Marine situationer.
(4) BGEN (now MGEN) NELSON N ALLAGA AFP – In his sworn statement dtd 30 Mar 06 taken by the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee at Camp Aquinaldo, he alleged, among others, that:
Before or past 12 midnight of 23 Feb 06, he was summoned by the Aide de Camp of the Commandant to go to his office for a meeting. When he arrived at the Commandant’s office, there was already a meeting going on attended by most of the staff officers and some of the unit commanders. Among the officers who were there were COL QUERUBIN, LTC SEGUMALIAN, LTC GUALDRAPA, LTC BAÑEZ, LTC HIZON, LTC CARDEL; MAJ ORDIALES, LTC VILLASAN, LTC OCSAN, LTC FERRER and COL DE LEON, their Chief of Staff.
The FOIC, PN arrived a few minutes later and he talked with the Officers. When the FOIC left, MGEN MIRANDA opened the discussions again and he heard the words move or not move and the word withdrawal. MGEN MIRANDA said something like: “I would like to ask your consensus” and he (MGEN MIRANDA) designated the Chief of Staff, PMC, COL DE LEON, to act as the moderator. He (COL DE LEON) started with the unit commanders, and when he asked the Commander of the Combat Service Support Brigade, COL MARTIR, the latter answered “NO”. When it was LTC SEGUMALIAN’s turn, the latter could not answer and was just silent. When LTC SEGUMALIAN was about to answer, he was interrupted by the other officers who were suggesting for other options. He also heard another Officer saying “Move or not move” Where will we move? What for? What is the issue?” and when MGEN MIRANDA AFP got a call from the FOIC through his cell phone, he said to them, “I am being called by the FOIC. There should be no movement” and so everybody agreed that there will be no movement.
On or about 261100H Feb 06, the FOIC, PN directed him to report to HPN at 1400H. At HPN, there was a turn-over ceremony between him and MGEN MIRANDA and thereafter, he went back to Fort Bonifacio. When he arrived at the Marine Headquarters, he was surprised because of the unusual presence of so many vehicles and a crowd of media people in front of the headquarters. He saw SEN BIAZON together with MGEN MIRANDA and other officers at the Office of the Chief of Staff, COL DE LEON and he heard MGEN MIRANDA saying: “Thank you very much for the support. Let us support Gen Allaga”. He also heard some officers ventilating their indignation for the sudden relief of MGEN MIRANDA.
During that time, he was going in and out of the room because his phone was ringing all the time and that somebody was even telling him to arrest COL QUERUBIN. There was somehow a disorderly atmosphere because he doesn’t know whom to talk to among the officers because some of them were inside the room while others were outside and some were following him wherever he goes.
When somebody was telling him to arrest COL QUERUBIN, he shouted to some of the officers, “Ipatawag nga si COL QUERUBIN at pag-reportin sa akin”. One or two of the officers responded and they looked for COL QUERUBIN. He went back to the room where everybody was already watching the television and it was noisy inside.
When he went out again because he could not talk with anybody, he saw COL QUERUBIN and the click of the lights of the media people and the crowd around him. He shouted again to some officers to tell COL QUERUBIN to report to him. When he was near COL QUERUBIN, he told him: “Ariel you report to me. I am now the new Commandant”. COL QUERUBIN answered: “Saan ang orders?” and he replied “nasa loob. Halika muna dito”. At that time, COL QUERUBIN was already surrounded by civilians and media people, but he (COL QUERUBIN) answered “Yes Sir.” When he and COL QUERUBIN were already near the main door of the building, he (COL QUERUBIN) was pulled back again by the crowd of civilians and media people and he lost him again.
He saw LTC SEGUMALIAN talking to his men and he heard him say, “Wag kayong babaril ng kapwa Marines.” However, he did not hear him say: “Ang gusto lang naming malinis ang AFP.” When he saw again LTC SEGUMALIAN talking, he shouted at him and the latter answered: “Yes Sir. I am reporting to you Sir. You are the new Commandant Sir” and that was the last time he saw LTC SEGUMALIAN went out of the building.
(5) MGEN RODRIGO F MACLANG AFP – In his sworn statement dtd 10 Apr 06, he alleged, among others, that:
On or about 231815H Feb 06, BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN reported to him on their own volition to narrate a particular development regarding the plan of some junior officers to join the mass protest action the following day (24 Feb 06). According to the two officers, the plan had been going on for several months and that they tried to stop the junior officers; that they only knew of the exact plan just recently; that the Marines will march from their headquarters on or about 240700H Feb 06 and the SAF will join them somewhere in Magallanes (Pasay City); that the whole idea is that it is a mass protest action that will be joined by bishops and several sectors of the society and that they will march to the People’s Power Monument or EDSA Shrine.
Since the plan was about to be executed at 0700H the next day and knowing that he can not do anything to stop the same, he suggested that they bring the matter to the CSAFP. They sought audience with the CSAFP where BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN presented the same thing.
At about 2345H, from the CSAFP’s Office, BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN were asked to go down to the Gazebo for more clarifications and at that time, it was in the presence of Major Service Commanders, Commandant, Philippine Marines and FOIC, PN, who arrived late since they earlier attended a party. C/SUPT FRANCO PNP SAF was also present and during the discussion, the CSAFP asked the two officers, “If you’re joining them, sino ang personalities who will be thereì¥Á
ve to do it our own and probably the CSAFP can provide the leadership.” The CSAFP replied, “I don’t think so. “Paano naman yan kung gagalaw kayo, di magkakagulo tayo?” BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN answered, “Sir, hindi tayo magkakagulo kung magkakaisa tayong lahat, the Armed Forces will join together and make the unit move under the CSAFP.” The two officers further said, “Kung magkakaisa tayo, you provide the leadership para wag tayong magkagulo” and that CSAFP replied, “Hindi naman mangyayari yon.”
With respect to the custody of BGEN LIM, the latter was placed under the custody of the CSAFP shortly before 0430H. Upon the instruction of CSAFP, he talked with BGEN LIM and asked him if wants to be placed under military custody because apparently, he was already in his quarters as reported by CG, PA surrounded by the MP. He called him up to ask of any development from the time they separated at the quarters of CSAFP and he(BGEN LIM) said that he did not go anywhere and BGEN LIM asked him that he be placed under the custody of CSAFP. At that time, they were in the AFP War Room together with Executive Secretary Ermita, CSAFP and CG, PA. When he told them about the request of BGEN LIM for his custody, the same was granted. LTGEN ESPERON said that he will give instructions to the CO of the MP at the gate near the chapel to allow him to enter and place BGEN LIM under custody.
There was no mention as to who is going to lead the march to the People’s Power Monument. MGEN MIRANDA was asked, “Sigurado ba kayong sasama lahat yon (referring to the Marines)” and he (MGEN MIRANDA) replied, “Hindi natin masisigurado yan because there are those who oppose and there are those who are favoring.”
Sometime in the afternoon of 26 Feb 06, he received a call from COL IRREBERI telling him that there is an information that COL QUERUBIN will be coming out in the afternoon and said, “magpapainterview sa media.” He immediately called up COL QUERUBIN and the latter confirmed to him that he will really coming out with a press conference questioning the way his Commandant was relieved. He immediately reported the matter to CSAFP and the latter instructed him to, “Get hold of COL QUERUBIN.” He called COL QUERUBIN and he was told, “Wala na talaga, tuloy na tuloy na talaga ito at wala ng atrasan, magpapapress-con ako.” That was the last time he talked to COL QUERUBIN.
(6) COL JONATHAN MARTIR PN (M) (GSC) – In his sworn statement dtd 11 Apr 06, he alleged, among others, that:
COL QUERUBIN approached him in the afternoon of 23 Feb 06 and said “Hawak na namin si Commandant. Susunod ka ba kung magku-coup tayo.” He then instructed his intelligence officer, MAJ FERNANDEZ, to keep his eyes and ears open.
On or about 240100H Feb 06, he went to see MGEN MIRANDA at the Office of the Commandant and thereat, he saw COL QUERUBIN and BGEN LIM together with MGEN MIRANDA and heard COL QUERUBIN saying on the phone “Wala talaga itong si ESPERON. Okey na si SENGA. Hawak na namin si SENGA dumating si ESPERON nagbago ang isip”.
He asked COL QUERUBIN what they intended to do and the latter replied that they will consolidate at the Phil Marine HQ at around 0400H, march to EDSA together with the Special Action Force of PNP, the Rangers of GEN LIM and the Ready Force with the muzzles of their firearms down but they will defend themselves if warranted by the situation and that someone will give a statement on the withdrawal of support.
MGEN MIRANDA gave a statement that they were going to move to EDSA with the troops together with the other units. MGEN MIRANDA also said that he will be there but will not force them to join him and that a decision has to be reached.
When the FOIC, PN left the Marine Headquarters after talking with the officers, the group started voting “go” or “no go” and if they will march to EDSA or not. He told the Commandant that what they are about to do is illegal and he asked him that he will talk to his people but the same was denied. He again told the Commandant that it is illegal but the latter replied: “This is not a coup. Pupunta lang tayo doon to protect the demonstrators. We are not going to overthrow the government.” and he answered him, “Sir, it is still mutiny” but the Commandant did not answer anymore.
COL DE LEON made a parting statement “Sa atin atin lang ito. Walang lalabas. Kasi ang pinagusapan natin dito puwede tayong damputin anytime” and that the conference ended at about 0500H.
On 26 February 2006, a conference was held inside the Commander’s lounge wherein the topic initially was regarding MGEN MIRANDA’s relief. Some officers wanted that MGEN MIRANDA be extended for another week but BGEN ALLAGA did not accede. Some of the junior officers started chanting withdrawal of support from the President and some of these officers were: MAJ FERNANDEZ, 1LT BELINDA FERRER, the Aide de Camp of MGEN MIRANDA, LTCOL PARCON, and COL DE LEON. The latter and LTC PARCON further stated that they are withdrawing support from BGEN ALLAGA.
During the conference, LTC PARCON said: “hindi raw tama iyong ginagawa and he is going to resign his commission” But BGEN ALLAGA said: “Of course. Sige magresign ka. I’m the Commandant now. You just give me your application, I’ll sign it now” and thereafter, LTC PARCON left. LTC SEGUMALIAN was also one of those who wanted to resign.
He was informed that COL QUERUBIN was already on the radio talking to the people and BGEN ALLAGA ordered “Pahuli ninyo na si Ariel.”
(7) LTC ROMEO C DUMAQUITA PN (M) – In his sworn statement dtd 04 May 06, he alleged, among others, that:
On 26 Feb 2006, MGEN MIRANDA informed the officers that he has been relieved because the leadership doesn’t trust him anymore. When BGEN ALLAGA said that he is now the Commandant, LTC SEGUMALIAN said, in an agitated tone – “Sir I will call my men”, thereafter, he (LTC SEGUMALIAN) went outside. As the Area Defense Force (ADF) Commander at that time, he followed LTC SEGUMALIAN to put him under control if ever he has the intention to move.
COL QUERUBIN PN (M) would not accept BGEN ALLAGA as the new Commandant of PMC because there was no order yet from the concerned authorities. As a result, BGEN ALLAGA ordered the MC-1 to release the order. When COL QUERUBIN PN (M) saw the order, he kept quiet and then he said that it is really painful to see the immediate relief of the Commandant, to which BGEN ALLAGA AFP said that “you know very well that he’s like a brother to me, we also worked with him for a long time.” The new Commandant also said that “Now that you know I am your Commandant you should have to follow my Order”, to which COL QUERUBIN PN (M) answered in the affirmative.
(8) LTC WILLIAM CARDEL PN (M) – In his sworn statement dtd 04 May 06, he alleged, among others, that:
On February 23, 2006, he was present in the conference called by the CS, PMC and presided by former Commandant MGEN MIRANDA. The officers present during that time were: MGEN MIRANDA; MGEN ALLAGA; the CS, COL DE LEON; MC1, MC2, MC3, MC4, LTC PARCON, LTC GUALDRAPA, COL ATIENZA, LTC ESTOPIN, LTC SEGUMALIAN, COL MARTIR and COL QUERUBIN. In that meeting, they were asked whether the Marines will join the mass action protest. In effect, they were asked on their stand whether to go against the constitution or not.
When COL MARTIR said that he could not decide and will have to consult with his Battalion Commanders first, COL DE LEON reacted that they should finish the consensus at once. When the Command Sgt Major said that “ayaw ng mga bata,” in effect, it means that they will not support the mass action. Thereafter, the meeting was adjourned.
(9) COL RUSTICO O GUERRERO PN (M) (GSC) – In his sworn statement dtd 09 May 06, he alleged, among others, that:
During the conference at the Commandant’s Office on the early morning of 24 Feb 06, COL QUERUBIN mentioned about “Committed na tayo dito Sir.” Implying that he was already committed to whatever plan they were thinking of, COL QUERUBIN may have meant that he had committed the Marine Corps by himself.
When COL QUERUBIN said “Committed na kasi tayo”, he was of the understanding that the said Marine Colonel was convincing the Commandant.
(10) LTC ROBERTO T FELICIANO PN(M) – In his sworn statement dtd 09 May 06, he alleged, among others, that:
He attended the conference on the evening of 26 Feb 2006 at the Brown Hall (Headquarters Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) which was chaired by BGEN ALLAGA. BGEN ALLAGA informed them that he is the new Commandant and that MGEN MIRANDA has been replaced.
There was tension outside the Brown Hall because there was a lot of confusion. It was unclear to the different officers what was going on. They were mobilized but it was unclear what directions they are taking.
There was also tension inside the Brown Hall brought about by some officers who were agitated and have expressed their opposition to the relief of MGEN MIRANDA. BGEN ALLAGA spent time to calm them down.
COL QUERUBIN, in a very agitated tone, protested the manner in which MGEN MIRANDA was relieved. Others who protested the relief of MGEN MIRANDA were COL DE LEON, LTC PARCON, LTC SEGUMALIAN and LTC FERNANDEZ.
COL QUERUBIN spoke up reiterating his protest on how MGEN MIRANDA was relieved and he called for a withdrawal of support and this was echoed by some of the officers in that meeting.
LTC PARCON concurred with COL QUERUBIN and he even said that he would resign as he also called for a withdrawal of support.
During the stand-off, he saw some civilians walking closely with COL QUERUBIN. One of them was Argee Guevarra, a lawyer who is identified with the left.
(11) LTC ELMER ESTOPIN PN (M) – In his sworn statement, dtd 09 May 06, he alleged, among others, that:
During the 23 Feb 2006 conference at the Headquarters PMC, there was talk among the staff about rumors of a destabilization move.
MGEN MIRANDA opened the meeting, saying that there is a plan for destabilization; he doesn’t know what will happen. MGEN MIRANDA said – “Ayaw kong basta isubo na lang iyong tao natin. Mapahamak, mamatay . . .”
When the FOIC arrived at the conference, the FOIC said that the PMC should be one and united. Whatever it is that the PMC wants, it should be done with unity. He further stated that the military is not trained for that, that they are soldiers.
After the FOIC left, the Commandant (MGEN MIRANDA) asked the officers present, one by one, on their feelings and sentiments on the situation at hand. He answered that if they are going out and be involved in some action, the Marines should be one and united.
He also heard COL QUERUBIN say – “Kawawa iyong mga tao. Tulungan natin”. He understood the statement uttered by the Marine Colonel to be referring to those people participating in the rally.
When asked if he can recall in particular who among the Marine officers mentioned about the withdrawal of support, he replied LTC PARCON but he is not really sure.
On 26 Feb 06, the Chief of Staff (CS), PMC, called for a conference, the CS told the officers present that MGEN MIRANDA has been relieved as Commandant. There were some officers who reacted on this, and wondered why he was relieved, what was the reason? CS, PMC and LTC PARCON, also reacted and likewise asked why he was relieved and expressed their sentiment that no one should be relieved.
Subsequently, BGEN ALLAGA was designated as the new Commandant of the PMC. On this issue, he said that there was restiveness among some of the Marine officers and that the reason for this was centered on the relief of MGEN MIRANDA, because according to these officers, there was no reason for his relief.
(12) COL NICANOR E DOLOJAN PA (GSC) (CAV) – In his sworn statement, he alleged, among others, that:
On 22 Feb 06, CPT FREDERICK SALES, MFO of SOCOM, was granted leave of absence and had reported back to Headquarters SOCOM on 250800 February 2006.
(13) LTC BERNARDO C FERRER PN (M) – In his sworn statement dtd 03 May 06, he alleged, among others, that:
In the evening of 23 Feb, he was at the office of the CS, PMC who gathered all the MC Staff and some Unit Commanders to ask questions on their functional areas and to disseminate information from the Commandant. When the Commandant arrived, the academic discussion among the group did not yet start. Upon arrival of the FOIC, they had a discussion on housing, promotion of enlisted ranks and FOIC’s investigation about the election. Before the FOIC departed, they were told to look for the welfare of their men and not to divide the Marines
The Commandant asked the group, for purposes of academic discussion, on how they were going to react if they were called by the people to join them at EDSA. There was even a voting by the raising of hands but when COL GUERRERO objected to it, it was discontinued especially when it was observed that majority were not in favor. As for him, he will not join and he maintained that he was against any destabilization attempt and always for the Chain of Command. He made this known to COL MARTIN as he knew is known to be anti-coup. He even talked to the Sgt Majors to get hold of his men because there seemed to be a confrontation among the officers who are making real of the situation which was supposedly only for academic discussion, particularly COL QUERUBIN.
One thing that he was sure of was that COL QUERUBIN was always insisting that something must be done about the problems of the Junior Officers and the Senior NCO’s. As for their Sgt Major, when asked, he opted for “no go” because he had experienced how their men suffered when similar events happened before. At midnight of 23 Feb 06, he remembered seeing BGEN LIM who was being courted down the stairs by COL QUERUBIN.
(14) LTC MACAIROG ALBERTO PA – In his Sworn Affidavit dtd 13 Apr 06, he alleged, among others, that:
In 2005, rumors were rampant regarding coup d’etat and other destabilization efforts.
BGEN LIM, Regiment Commander, would call him up to tell him that their troops will not be involved in any coup or destabilization attempts and orders him to account for the troops.
To make sure that his orders were complied with, BGEN LIM would call him up again to check
Last week of February 2006, BGEN LIM called him and told him to account for the troops and obey only legal orders and be loyal to the chain of command in view of the rumors that some elements of the military would be involved in the destabilization efforts.
(15) LTC MELQUIADES ORDIALES PN (M) – In his sworn statement dtd 03 Jul 06, he alleged, among others, that:
He was not at meeting on the morning of 24 Feb 06 because he was not a member of the Staff.
On 26 Feb 06, he was with BGEN ALLAGA inside the commander’s lounge where all the officers were having a discussion. During the meeting, he was supposed to take note of what would be agreed upon by the attendees. However, due to confusion and numerous discussions, he failed to write down what was supposed to be written as he himself made his statement
On or about 261600H Feb 06, he was at the Office of the SJS. He received numerous calls from his cellular phone asking about the MGEN MIRANDA’S relief. He said that he sought clearance with his CS, PMC, COL DE LEON and asked him re: MGEN MIRANDA’s relief. COL DE LEON confirmed that MGEN MIRANDA has indeed been relieved. He further asked if he could address the Media and COL DE LEON answered “Yes.”
When the media asked him about the reason for the relief of MGEN MIRANDA, he could not give any answer because he did not have any data. He said that according to COL DE LEON, there will be a command conference as soon as BGEN ALLAGA arrives. He told the media that he will be arranging a press briefing/conference. He said that that was the reason of the media people presence that afternoon. During the preparation, he was surprise when the media suddenly all went out from the Commander’s lounge. He didn’t know why the Media pulled out.
The next thing that happened was that there was a crowd upon the arrival of BGEN ALLAGA but he didn’t know what they were doing because he was at a distance. He later found out that it was COL QUERUBIN with the other media people.
(16) MAJ CORLETO VINLUAN PA – In his Sworn Affidavit dtd 17 Apr 06, he alleged, among others, that
In August 2005, while in Camp Aguinaldo, all the junior officers were required to attend a symposium-seminar at NDCP. More or less 200 junior officers were in attendance
He saw VICE ADMIRAL MAYUGA AFP as well as BGEN DANILO LIM AFP who was one of the speakers. He spoke about the value of the chain of command
BGEN LIM admonished the junior officers not to succumb to pressures, invitations and promises of some elements such as the Y.O.U. He was the former head of Y.O.U. and its existence was terminated in 1995. Likewise, the revolutionary character of RAM was lost and has legally become a foundation
He recalled that BGEN LIM was instrumental in convincing the Oakwood participants to give up peacefully, as he witnessed it since he was the Operation Officer of BGEN LIM at the time.
(17) CMS GENEROSO A BAGORIO PN (M) – In his Sworn Statement dtd 17 Apr 06, he alleged, among others, that:
On the 23, 24 and 26 February 2006, he was at the Marine Barracks. He heard rumors that there was going to be a movement of the Marines but no specific unit was mentioned. He said that this information was based on information passed to him by the Chief, MC2 late last year and that there was already a report of such movement even before 23-24 February 2006. He added that he heard rumors of the plans of the Marines to move and go with COL QUERUBIN. He further said that the rumors would always mention the name of COL QUERUBIN.
Sometime on the 4th quarter of last year, he received an envelope from GEN ABAT denouncing the government. He passed it on to O/MC2 personnel to have the contents of the letì¥Á
ANDA were “Ano gusto ninyo gagalaw ba tayo or kikilos ba tayo?” In reply, he said, “Simula pa noong 1989 coup walang magandang napuntahan iyong enlisted personnel,” to which MGEN MIRANDA replied, “I respect that.” He also testified that his stand was also the stand of the Unit Sergeant Majors of the Marine Battalion because they themselves know that the enlisted personnel don’t get anything from it.
COL MARTIR and COL DE LEON also said NO. When he was asked what the answer of COL QUERUBIN was, he said that: “Sinasabi nya na parang gusto niya”. He said that MC1, PIO, COL GUERRERO, and MC5 voted No. He did hear the votes of MC2, MC3, MC4, and LTC SEGUMALIAN. But in his opinion, LTC SEGUMALIAN wanted “to go”. He also observed that as to COL DE LEON; “Ang reaction niya sa nakikita ko sa kanya nahahati din iyong damdamin” The Headquarters Service Battalion, 2nd Battalion, Force Recon, PMC voted NO.
BGEN LIM was not in the meeting. After the meeting, he talked with the Unit Sergeant Majors and informed them that their stand is one in that they will not move. He saw Sen. Biazon at that time.
On or about 261500H Feb 06, BGEN ALLAGA announced that he was the new Commandant. He was present during the conference/meeting at the conference room but not in the meeting at the Commander’s lounge where BGEN ALLAGA assumed as Commandant and where the central staff and unit commanders were present.
(18) 1LT JERALD L REYES O-13257 (INF) PA – In his sworn statement dtd 09 Jun 06, he alleged, among others that:
He had met with MAJ AQUINO and other officers. The first meeting was held in the conference room of the First Scout Ranger Regiment on the 1st week of November 2005, during the happy hour of FSRR before their anniversary. MAJ AQUINO presented a Powerpoint presentation of Operation GEMSTONE and “The New Order” attended by the Company Commanders and G-Staff of the First Scout Ranger Regiment numbering twenty five (25) officers more or less with MAJ AQUINO as the most senior.
A second meeting was held in SM Pampanga together with CPT LANGKIT wherein the latter told him about the leadership of their present Battalion Commander, LTC FELIPE G ANOTADO PA, his gripes in the present leadership and government, together with the plans that CPT LANGKIT has made though they were not yet final. CPT LANGKIT said that he will have a meeting with the Battalion Operations Officer and will give information that will make S3 conduct Battalion Initiated Operation in order that the troops (Charlie Company, 24IB) can move without being noticed by the Battalion Commander.
CPT LANGKIT can still influence 24IB because he was a former member of that unit. Among the guidance or issues to which they were not in favor as to the leadership of LTC ANOTADO were the changes implemented in his company, particularly as regards the relief of the First Sergeant without first asking their opinion and comment, including all of the First Sergeants.
The third meeting was again held at SM Pampanga attended by himself, CPT LANGKIT, 1LT CUARTEROS, and 1LT BAUTISTA and they discussed the same agenda: the leadership in the AFP and the leadership in government. It was during said meeting where CPT LANGKIT instructed the Company Commanders to prepare their troops.
The fourth meeting was held at the Raven Resort, Abucay, Bataan and the attendees were himself, CPT LANGKIT, 1LT BAUTISTA, 1LT CUARTEROS and 1LT PUBLICA wherein they were required to submit the task organizations they have.
The 5th meeting was held in the rest house of CPT ALMODOVAR, located inside FSRR held on the first week of February, again presided by MAJ JASON AQUINO, and the other officers present were CPT ISAGANI CRISTE, CPT WILLIAM UPANO, CPT MONTANO ALMODOVAR, CPT JAMES SABABAN, CPT JOEY FONTIVEROS, CPT ROMMEL PAGAYON, and an unidentified civilian lady. That while at the rest house, CPT MONTANO ALMODOVAR posted on the kitchen wall a sketch/lay out of Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo (GHQ, AFP) depicting a diagram of the water system. Also posted on the wall was a copy of the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo.
CPT ALMODOVAR presented the Camp Defense Plan of CGEA. After the presentation, MAJ AQUINO asked CPT CRISTE about his tasking and the latter said it is okay. CPT FONTIVEROS suggested to MAJ AQUINO that the troops of CPT LANGKIT will be augmented by his troops Thereafter, MAJ AQUINO asked CPT ALMODOVAR how many troops does he need and the latter replied that he needed around two hundred (200) men and about fifteen (15) officers as his task consisted of taking over Camp Aguinaldo. MAJ JASON AQUINO replied that one Marine Battalion will also join them.
On said occasion, he heard CPT FONTIVEROS mention that he does not have the exact number of required troops needed yet for his task of taking over Headquarters, Philippine Army (HPA).
The civilian lady who came with CPT SABABAN brought bandoleers to be used for the plan.
Operation GEMSTONE is a twelve (12) step plan that would be their tasking for “Para as Bayan” Movement and that the effectivity of the plan was to be 16 Feb 2006 and that the D-Day would be 18 Feb 2006.
Further, he was instructed to move his troops from Bulacan to Clark, Angeles in the morning of 18 Feb 2006. CPT LANGKIT will give cellular phones and an amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (PhP 15,000.00) to be used for expenses.
He did not commit his company to Operation GEMSTONE and did not prepare task organizations because he was not assigned at 24IB and they were not sure if CPT LANGKIT will manage to initiate a battalion operation. Likewise, Alpha and Bravo Companies of 24IB did not prepare task organizations.
The Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo was discussed in the meeting and it was presented by CPT ALMODOVAR.
He has no personal knowledge of the tasking of CPT UPANO.
During all those meetings, they suspected the proposal to be fishy and illegal. As a precaution, he instructed the two (2) other Company Commanders, 1LT BAUTISTA and 1LT CUARTEROS to evaluate the proposals of CPT LANGKIT and to verify the legitimacy of the operation.
He did not report these meetings to higher headquarters, nor G2, nor to his Battalion Commander. In the meetings inside FSRR, he did not see BGEN DANILO D LIM AFP or LTC NESTOR FLORDELIZA. He only saw BGEN DANILO LIM on that occasion during the Happy Hour but not in the conference room.
MAJ JASON AQUINO informed them that there will be no civilian or political figure to be involved in the operation and further informed them that there will be a solid FSRR, Marines, including other IBs. His tasking at that time was to augment the troops of CPT ALMODOVAR in sealing all the gates of Camp Aguinaldo, GHQ. The main effort will be the Army, FSRR which will be supported by the Marines with two hundred (200) enlisted personnel and fifteen (15) officers.
It was also mentioned by MAJ JASON AQUINO that MGEN RENATO P MIRANDA AFP will be leading the Marines.
The 6th meeting was held at Campus View Restaurant at San Miguel, Bulacan, attended by himself, CPT LANGKIT, 1LT CUARTEROS and TSg Angga, the First Sgt of C Coy, 24IB.
During that meeting, names of Senior Officers were mentioned such as BGEN LIM whom they called “DAD”, MGEN MIRANDA but did not mention any codename for him, the Director of SAF, whose name he could no longer recall. The only code names that he could recall were those of CPT ISAGANI CRISTE, CPT DANTE LANGKIT and 1LT CUARTEROS. That the codename of CPT LANGKIT was “Bosses” and that code name were given to him, 1LT BAUTISTA, and 1LT CUARTEROS. His handler is MAJ DULOY.
On the third meeting, CPT LANGKIT disclosed that the entire 24IB will be tasked to secure Malacañang together with other forces. That the rendezvous area mentioned by CPT LANGKIT was at Clark, Pampanga but he (CPT LANGKIT) did not divulge the actual plan. The takeover of HPA will be performed by CPT JOEY FONTIVEROS together with one (1) Marine Company.
The objective of Operation GEMSTONE was to get PGMA, CSAFP, and C, PNP.
During the 5th meeting, MAJ AQUINO mentioned that the intended CSAFP to be installed would be MGEN MIRANDA; CG, PA will be GEN LEDESMA; C, PNP will be the Director of SAF; that the intended position for BGEN LIM would be next in command to GEN LEDESMA; no particular mention was made as to who will be the President.
In the execution of Operation Gemstone, all of the steps will be executed at the same time. MAJ AQUINO instructed them that the first step would be the takeover of the government. Next is the implementation of the new orders that will become the rules and regulations inside the AFP, PNP and the Government.
No hard copies were provided during the presentation of Operation GEMSTONE.
He has no personal knowledge of CPT MALONES from the Light Armor Brigade.
He is prepared to become a government witness. As a precautionary measure, ISG is restraining him from going outside Camp and when he goes home, he is escorted by a Security.
In his Supplemental Affidavit, dtd 11 Mar 06, he alleged, among others, that:
Sometime on the first week of Nov 05, he was invited by CPT CRISTE to attend their happy hour at FSRR Hqs. At about 0100H in the early morning of the next day, all officers who attended the happy hour were instructed to proceed to the conference room of the FSRR Hqs.
In the said conference room, MAJ AQUINO presented more or less a 2-hour presentation on the flows of the present government, the legal system of the country, the military establishment and the PNP. After which, MAJ AQUINO presented a 12-step operational plan dubbed as OPERATION GEMSTONE wherein an elaborate plan on what appears to be a power grab, including the arrest and/or ouster of PGMA, CSAFP, CG, PA, C, PNP, the take-over of vital communication installations, among others, was presented.
On the second week of Nov 06, CPT LANGKIT contacted him to meet the former at SM Pampanga purportedly for them to discuss an important matter. When they met, CPT LANGKIT expressed to him his gripes about what is happening in the chain of command and the corruption in the government.
Another meeting followed on the first week of December 2005 at SM Pampanga. 1LT CUARTEROS was also present. CPT LANGKIT instructed them to prepare their men, firearms, and ammunitions for the conduct of a battalion operation which CPT LANGKIT intends to organize. Sometime in January 2006, CPT LANGKIT contacted him and required him to submit a task organization of his troops. The next day, they met at Raven Resort, Abucay, Bataan together with 1LT CUARTEROS and 1LT BAUTISTA. CPT LANGKIT asked them of the task organization he required them to do but they did not prepare one. CPT LANGKIT told them that they should not be like 1LT SAN JUAN who brought only 4 men during the Oakwood mutiny.
On or about 031900H Feb 06, CPT ISAGANI CRISTE fetched him at his Coy TCP. They fetched MAJ JASON AQUINO and CPT ALMODOVAR at their BOQ and they all proceeded to the latter’s rest house near the so-called tower area. At the rest house, CPT ALMODOVAR posted on the wall of the kitchen a sketch/lay out of Camp General Aguinaldo depicting a diagram of the water system of the camp. CPT ALMODOVAR also posted a copy of the camp defense plan of Camp Aguinaldo. CPT UPANO also arrived thereat.
CPT ALMODOVAR presented the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and after his presentation, MAJ AQUINO then asked CPT ALMODOVAR how many troops does he need and the latter replied that he needed around 200 men and 15 officers because his task is to take over Camp Aguinaldo. CPT FONTIVEROS suggested to MAJ AQUINO that the troops of CPT LANGKIT will be augmented by his troops. 1LT REYES overheard CPT FONTIVEROS intimate to MAJ AQUINO that he does not yet has the exact number of men he needs for his HPA tasking.
(19) 1LT MICHAEL L CUARTEROS O-13690 (INF) PA – In his sworn statement dtd 13 Jun 06, he alleged, among others, that:
On 16 Feb 06, he met with CPT DANTE LANGKIT in the vicinity of Farmers Plaza, Cubao where he was asked by the latter to go with him to Dinalupihan, Bataan. After relating his sentiments, they were asked to organize for an operation, particularly to organize three (3) sections. It was not directly mentioned for what specific purpose these three (3) sections will be utilized for. CPT LANGKIT instructed them “to wait until told to go or no go”. He was asked to commit and organize one (1) section together with 1LT REYES. The exact target was not specifically disclosed. CPT LANGKIT committed that he will provide the civilian vehicle to be used for the operation and a designated pick up point in Bataan.
(20) 2LT HAROLD S CAMAZO 0-14274 (INF) PA – In his Affidavit dtd 17 Mar 06, he alleged, among others, that:
MAJ DOCTOLERO, Commandant, SRTS directed their class to be on alert because of a series of rallies in Manila and to withdraw security ammunitions from the supply room.
(21) 2LT MARK STEVE T CIMINI 0-14001 (INF) PA – In his Affidavit dtd 17 Mar 06, he alleged, among others, that:
On or about 232100H Feb 06, MAJ DOCTOLERO, through the duty NCO, directed their class (CL 161-06) to be on alert status.
(22) Cpl Dennis A Bugayong 835187 (INF) PA – In his sworn statement dtd 24 Jun 06, he alleged, among others, that:
He is assigned as Team Leader under the direct command of 1LT CORDERO.
He could not recall who his Battalion Commander was on 23 Feb 2006.
He did not know anything about the withdrawal of support by his CG.
He does not know any movement to Manila on 23 Feb 2006. On 23 Feb 2006, they were ordered to conduct a patrol at the back of the camp for the entire night.
(23) Cpl Dennis F Marzan PA – In his sworn statement dtd 24 Jun 06, he alleged, among others, that:
On or about 232300H Feb 06, LT CABALLES, their EX-O ordered them to prepare their uniform because they will go to Manila. They wore civilian clothes and LT CABALLES gave them P2, 000.00 for fare and food. They boarded a Philtranco bus but upon reaching Gumaca, Quezon, LT CABALLES sent them a text message telling them to go back to their command post. When they reached Sipocot, Camarines Sur, they were apprehended in a checkpoint by the 31st IB of 9ID and they were brought to the Headquarters of 31st IB where they were questioned.
(24) Cpl Oliver L Bautista 815113 (INF) PA – In his sworn statement dtd 24 Jun 06, he alleged, among others, that:
They were instructed by 2LT CABALLES to patrol the Camp perimeter and on or about 231700H Feb 2006, starting at the rear of the Camp of Anislag, they and other teams started patrolling the Camp perimeter and finished their duty on or about 240700H Feb 2006.
That his CO and Ex-O are 1LT CORDERO and 2LT CABALLES respectively and that he did not receive any instructions or orders from them on or before 24 Feb 06.
(25) Sgt Ronnie T Juguilon 786496 (INF) PA – In his sworn statement dtd 24 Jun 06, he alleged, among others, that:
He was asked to join by his CO, 1LT CORDERO in going to Manila on 20 Feb 06 using the Trowel jeep. He was advised that he and SSg Camat will be left at the Liaison Office while two of his companions went to Bulacan to look for Kennedy spare parts while 1LT CORDERO went to his house to attend for his son’s birthday party. He brought along sleeping essentials.
His Battalion commander is LTC MALABANJOT.
He does not know anything about the organized eight (8) teams with four (4) sections
(26) SSg Edgar M Gumpad 790514 (INF) PA – In his sworn statement dtd 23 Jun 06, he alleged, among others, that:
He and fourteen (14) others have received instructions from 1LT ESTOLAS five days before 23 Feb 2006 to stay on alert for an incoming operation.
He did not leave camp nor did he receive an amount of Two Thousand Pesos (PhP 2,000.00).
He did not conduct a head count on 23 Feb 06 and saw his fourteen (14) other companions on or about 240500H Feb 06 during reveille.
The last instruction received by them from their CO was to stay on alert.
(27) SSg Maximo R Macayanan 728574 (INF) PA – In his sworn statement dtd 23 Jun, he alleged, among others, that:
He received specific instructions from 1LT ESTOLAS to be on alert and that there will be an incoming operation. They did not leave CP from the time 1LT ESTOLAS gave them instructions on 22 February 2006.
As Section Sergeant, two (2) teams are under him. There were no instructions for troop movement nor was there a date given as to when the conduct of the incoming operation will be.
(28) SSg Reyland M Lagunero 745299 (OS) PA – In his sworn statement dtd 24 Jun 06, he alleged, among others, that:
They were instructed by 1LT CORDERO to leave CP on 21 February 2006 to go with him at Liaison Office, Fort Bonifacio, and to attend the birthday party of his son.
He, 1LT CORDERO, TSg Camat, TSg Adriano and Sgt Juguilon left in the afternoon of 21 February 2006 for Manila using a Trowel jeep in civilian clothes and without any military uniform and paraphernalia.
They arrived in the early morning of 22 Feb 2006 and stayed at the FSR Liaison office to rest. They were then apprised by 1LT CORDERO to wait for advice and that he will go home.
At around 0700H of 22 Feb 2006, TSg Adriano received a call from 1LT CORDERO that he and TSg Adriano were to proceed to Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan to get spare parts of the Kennedy Jeep.
They left at about 0800H and returned at 1600H. They did not attend the birthday party of 1LT CORDERO’s son.
On the early morning of 23 Feb 06, 1LT CORDERO called and instructed them to return to Brgy Anislag and they left at around 0700H. He did not receive any further advice. That upon their return, they met Ex-O LT Caballes and they did not see 1LT CORDERO since then.
(29) SSg Rodelio D Quilapio 789248 (INF) PA – In his sworn statement dtd 23 Jun 06, he alleged, among others, that:
His CO and Ex-O at 9th SRC in February were 1LT HOMER ESTOLAS and 1LT ANTONIO TIMBAL respectively.
Prior to 24 February 2006, CO, 9th SRC alerted all Sections and mentioned that there will be augmentation teams at 10th SR Company at FSRR Liaison Office, Fort Bonifacio, but no reason was given for the said augmentation. They were ordered to bring their BDA, beret, combat shoes, and given Two Thousand Pesos (PhP 2,000.00) each for their food by their CO.
He was not on duty on 24 February 2006.
There was one (1) section that went ahead to Tabaco City, Albay to get a bus that will be used in going to 10th SR Company. That when the bus arrived, there was already one (1) section seated and the members of his section likewise boarded. A total of thirty (30) persons were in the bus and the bus left on or about 240400H Feb 2006. But before reaching Tabaco City, they were ordered by 1LT ESTOLAS to return to their Company CP.
(30) SSg Salvador C Dacanay 790139 (INF) PA – In his sworn statement dtd 23 Jun 06, he alleged, among others, that:
On or about 232300H Feb 2006, he was at 9th SRC CP which was on red alert status and that there will be an operation as mentioned to them by 1LT ESTOLAS. He was with SSg Macayanan, SSg Quilapio, SSg Gumbad, and 1LT LIMBAD during that time.
On or about 240100H Feb 2006, they were instructed to get a bus at Tabaco City to be used in going to Fort Bonifacio to augment the 10th SRC in Fort Fonifacio.
He brought the bus to Poblacion Tiwi and informed 1LT ESTOLAS that there was already a bus available. Thereafter, they headed towards Manila but was recalled by 1LT ESTOLAS when they were about to reach Tabaco City.
1LT ESTOLAS did not mention the reason why they were recalled, and instead, they were asked to join the reveille.
They received two thousand pesos (PhP 2,000.00) for their transportation and food.
(31) TSg Gerald S Adriano 745204 (MS) PA – In his sworn statement dtd 24 Jun 06, he alleged, among others, that:
His Company Commander is 1LT JACON CORDERO and his Ex-O is 1LT CABALLES.
On 21 Feb 2006, they were instructed by 1LT CORDERO to leave CP to go with him to FSRR Liaison Office, Fort Bonifacio and to attend the birthday party of 1LT CORDERO’s son.
They left sometime in the afternoon of 21 February 2006 together with 1LT CORDERO, TSg Camat, SSg Lagunero and Sgt Juguilon using the Trowel jeep and wearing civilian attire.
At 0700H of 22 Feb 2006, he received a call from 1LT ESTOLAS that he and SSg Lagunero were to proceed to Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan to get spare parts of the Kennedy Jeep. They left at about 0800H and returned at 1600H. They did not attend the birthday party of 1LT CORDERO’s son.
In the early morning of 23 Feb 2006, 1LT CORDERO called and instructed them to return to Brgy Anislag and they left between 0700H – 0800H. That upon their return, Ex-O LT Caballes was the one they met and that he has not seen 1LT CORDERO since then.
(32) SUMMARY OF “THE FULCRUM” – A PowerPoint presentation of MGEN RENATO MIRANDA at Camp Aguinaldo on 19 January 2006).
MGEN MIRANDA presented how the AFP is perceived by the middle forces and how does the AFP respond. Public perception is shaped by the credibility of the civilian establishment and its leadership, as well as that of the AFP establishment and concurrent leadership. Responses from the field grade, middle grade and company grade are sought by the opposition coalition, leftists and civilian leadership.
As for the center of gravity, MGEN MIRANDA considers finances and personalities are concerns for civilian leadership, while grievances refer to those in the AFP leadership.
(33) Transcribed Statement given by LTC ACHILES S SEGUMALIAN – (Extracted from the breaking news of ABS-CBN)
When he was asked about his plans in front of their Headquarters at Philippine Marines and why was he there, LTC SEGUMALIAN replied “Wala po, pinapakita lang po namin na masama ang loob namin, bakit ni-relieve yung Commandant namin”.
(34) Special Report re: Unauthorized Movement of 3SRBn Elements submitted by 9th Military Intelligence Battalion, PA to CG, 9ID, PA:
This is a special report on the alleged troop movements in 9SRC based in Brgy Carayrayan, Tiwi, Albay under 1LT HOMER ESTOLAS O-13449 (INF) PA and 7SRC based in Brgy Anislag, Daraga, Albay under 1LT JAKECON CORDERO (INF) PA. CO, 93CIP was likewise directed to monitor troop movements of all organic and OPCON units within AOR especially those belonging to 3SRB, with special attention to HQs 3SRB under LTC MALABANJOT based in Camp Canuto, Sagurong, Pili, Camarines Sur.
(35) Transcript of the Interview of COL QUERUBIN WITH TV PATROL and ANC
When asked by an unidentified reporter whether they were really joining the “Kilos Protesta” that Saturday or they had plans then, COL QUERUBIN replied “Yun ang plano namin, napakiusapan lang kami. So sabi nila for us to swallow our pride, yung prinsipyo mo inano mo na lahat”.
When asked further that “So dapat sasama kayo, napakiusapan lang kayo?” He answered “Napakiusapan kami. Ang pakiusap nga ay di kami gumalaw, pero wala ring gagalawin dapat, e ginalaw nila ang Commandant namin, anong gagawin namin? Wala akong na-violate non. Hindi po totoo na nag-resign siya, kasi po bago naghiwahiwalay last time, nasabi niya na kapag ni-relieve ka, ni-relieve tayo, ni-relieve ako, mag ano tayo, we have to go. Nanawagan lang kami na eto para suportahan ninyo ang aming Commandant at Organization kasi after this pagnagwatak-watak na kami, the Marines is no longer relevant. Sibakin nila yung Commandant namin, hindi namin susuportahan, e ano na lang kami, para kaming ano. Nananawagan lang kami para suportahan ninyo ang aming Commandant at ang Organization kasi after this, kapag nagkawatak-watak na kami, the Marines is no longer relevant. Nakikiusap po ako kung may pupunta dito para mag-attend ng vigil mass, yun lang po ang gusto namin na samahan nyo kami para suportahan yung na-relieve namin na Commandant, MGEN MIRANDA.”
(36) Reported Article by Time Magazine Reporter Nelly Sindayen entitled “Dinner with Coup Plotters”, dtd 06 Mar 06.
The TIME magazine article (Annex Z of the Ad Hoc committee report) entitled “Dinner with Coup Plotters” refers to a report by Ms. Nelly Sindayen that she witnessed the meeting held at the Cojuangco residence at the invitation of Pastor Saycon, for which plans were hatched for a calling of “withdrawal of support” from President Arroyo. The meeting stretched into the early-morning hours, and she overheard Mr. Saycon phoned someone he identified as Brigadier General Danilo Lim. Over the speakerphone, Lim said it was “all systems go”. A military contingent would march to a shrine in Manila where the 20th anniversary of the People Power revolution was to be celebrated. There, the military men would meet a group of Catholic bishops, and a Philippine Marine Officer would read a statement withdrawing support from the government. The bishops made one request: that the coup is bloodless.
(37) Deposition/Statement of Nelly Sindayen addressed to the NBI dtd 28 Mar 06
In her letter to Atty Nestor M Mantaring, Officer-in-Charge of the National Bureau of Investigation, Nelly Sindayen stated the following:
I, Nelly Sindayen, understand that you wish to ask me certain questions concerning the article entitled “Emergency Rules” published by TIME Magazine on Saturday, 26th February 2006. Please take note that I stand by the article and have nothing further to add.
(38) Letter from Jose Cojuangco Jr addressed to Cong Ronaldo V. Puno dtd 27 Feb 06
While fielding the calls, Mr Saycon said that he would be making a call to a certain “Delta” who turned out to be Gen Danny Lim. Mr. Saycon turned on the speaker device of his mobile phone and the voice at the other end said that there was nothing definite but he would advise Mr. Saycon if he learned anything more. After the telephone conversation, they then discussed at length what a coup would mean, and that they concluded that it would result to an eventual military takeover. Since no more information could be gathered that evening, the visitors started to thin out and everybody decide to go home.
(39) Letter of Retired MGEN Fortunato Abat, dtd o8 Mar 05 addressed to “My Fellow Citizen” (with attached Newspaper Clippings on the Proposed Federal Government/Program for National Salvation and Proposed Revolutionary Government)
Retired MGEN Fortunato Abat made a handwritten note on his personal stationery addressed to “My fellow citizen”, with a message that he is sending the paper “to see the rationale behind the revolution, transition and the need for structural change of our system of governance.”
He stated further in the said note that “The change that this proposal could bring may be for the better or for worse. But it cannot be worse than if we continue to perpetuate the present system of almost 60 years that has brought this nation to the brink of collapse.”
Attached to his HWN are the following:
1. PHIL. STAR news article stating that then COL DANNY LIM was one among those who organized a group of young officers to help convince the mutineers led by Navy Lt. Antonio Trillanes to give themselves up before the 5:00 PM deadline set by President Arroyo.
2. Article of Max Soliven in the editorial section of the PHIL STAR, generally saying that he was one of the negotiators, together with then COL DANNY LIM, Undersecretary for Special Concerns Abraham Purugganan. Other officers also participated in the discussions that turned into negotiations to discuss the grievances of the rebels.
3. MANILA BULLETIN News Report on the statement read by BGEN DANILO LIM, “a leader of the failed coup attempt in 1989”, denouncing an anti-Arroyo Manifesto of the Young Officers Union (YOU). He stated that “I echo the AFP’s sentiment that it will not, even under extreme circumstances, participate in any extra constitutional resolution of the political turmoil”.
40. Letter of COL ARIEL O QUERUBIN dtd 10 Apr 06 addressed to the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee
The said letter is in response to the subpoena dated 05 April 06 requiring him to appear before the Committee to testify on the circumstances leading to the Feb 24-26 aborted plan of the members of the First Scout Ranger Regiment and the Philippine Marines.
Thursday, February 23, 2006, COL QUERUBIN again spoke with MGEN MIRANDA to inform him that he got wind of an intention by military officers to join a civilian-led rally set on Feb 24. He likewise informed BGEN LIM about it, and they allegedly agreed to meet MGEN RODRIGO MACLANG, J2 to discuss the matter. They then met MGEN MACLANG which purportedly led to a collective decision to elevate the matter to the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff accommodated their request to meet them and directed them to proceed to his quarters where the service commanders and MGEN MIRANDA had been gathered to discuss the matter thoroughly. After a lengthy discussion, COL QUERUBIN claims in his letter that they were directed to assist in calming the junior and senior officers in their respective units and to help keep them within the chain of command.
(41) Transcript of the Video Tape of BGEN LIM’s Withdrawal of Support.
To my fellow countrymen,
We, the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, loyal to God and country and do our duty under the constitution do hereby make the following declaration: a crisis of extreme proportions now confronts our people, the economy, the rule of law and the moral order lie in ruins. Political, judicial, economic power as well as the power of the mass media has been perverted to inflict and justify high crimes on the Filipino people. More and more among our people no longer eat while the idle rich and the corrupt live like kings. Minority rules has replaced majority rule. The three branches of government are now in disarray; the entire system has broken down thanks to a president whose legitimacy has been denied by the vast majority of our people.
Corruption has not only become a way of life among those in power it has also become the most effective means of destroying our country and people. Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has played a key role in promoting corruption to its present levels. In her mad desire for power she has promoted a policy of loot and plunders while hypocritically announcing a war against corruption. She has corrupted the justices of the Supreme Court, the entire commission on elections, the mass media, some members of the military, police and the clergy. And countless teachers who took part in the counting of the votes in the last elections.
She’s not only the most corrupt official in the country today; she is also its number 1 corruptor. We cannot stand idly by while the rule of law, the moral order and the integrity of your institutions, the very future of our country and people and our own professional careers are destroyed by this bogus president. We cannot afford to do nothing while she and her cohorts turn our government into a criminal syndicate.
We cannot allow ourselves to be used as a tool of injustice and oppression and we must act, we must act now.
Pursuant therefore to our constitutional duty as protector of the people and the state, we have today withdrawn our support from Mrs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in order to end her unconstitutional and illegal occupation of the presidency. This we have to restore the rule of law and public morality, the legitimacy and accountability of government, the integrity of our public institutions, the sanctity of our democratic processes, the trust and confidence of our people and the rest of the world.
We call on all our comrades in arms to discharge their genuine responsibilities to our people with full dedication and fervor. We call on our people to support the men and women at the forefront of this undertaking.
We call on Mrs. Arroyo to accept gracefully the formation of a new government as soldiers do not seek political powers for ourselves, but we shall not allow anyone to use political power to commit crimes against our people or to pursue their own personal agenda at the expense of the national interest.
We shall maintain law and order, prevent any group from taking advantage of the situation and protect the innocent from all possible harm.
We shall leave the actual business of governing the nation in the hands of professionally competent, morally upright, patriotic, trustworthy and self-sacrificing Filipinos whom we now invite to form a new government.
These may be our last chance to correct our past mistakes, we cannot afford to fail. We must not fail.
We appeal to everyone to give this effort a chance to succeed. We appeal to all our people to unite and extend all the support and counsel, which the new government will need from them. We pray to Almighty God to bless our efforts and to keep us pure and strong in this hour of need.
Mabuhay ang Pilipinas.
Evidence For The Respondents:
The evidence for the respondents is summarized as follows:
MGEN RENATO P MIRANDA O-6728 AFP
(MGEN MIRANDA submitted his counter-affidavit and attached as Annex “A” thereof is the letter of CSAFP, LTGEN HERMOGENES ESPERON JR AFP, when he was still the CG, PA to MGEN MIRANDA)
In his counter-affidavit, MGEN MIRANDA alleges, among others, that:
He was the Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps from 08 July 05 to 261500H Feb 06.
He denies the allegations contained in the respective affidavits of LTGEN ESPERON, LTGEN REYES, VADM MAYUGA and the sworn statements of COL MARTIR, specifically the following:
1) Affidavit of LTGEN ESPERON:
1.a “GEN SENGA also told us that as per information from BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN, elements from Special Action Force PNP, Philippine Marines and First Scout Ranger (FSRR) will join the mass protest action. The move to join the mass protest action has the blessings of C/SUPT MARCELINO FRANCO of SAF, PNP, MGEN RENATO MIRANDA AFP, commandant Philippine Marines” (Para 4, page 5)
MGEN MIRANDA denies the above statement. This is pure hearsay and therefore inadmissible as evidence
1. b. “When asked if he could stop his men from joining, MGEN MIRANDA replied that he is pro constitution but stated in the vernacular that “we must now listen to the people”. According to him they have attained a critical majority and therefore their desire must be followed. He kept on saying that he is for the constitution and for the chain of command but will follow the will of the people.” (Para 9, page 2)
MGEN MIRANDA denies the above statement. He alleges that his words were twisted as he never said the same statement in the words and tenor as quoted.
1. c. “MGEN MIRANDA and C/SUPT FRANCO asked us to support them with their plans. I asked why we should support them. The two replied that there are already many commanders who are joining and that they did not want bloodshed. xxx” (Para 10, page 2)
MGEN MIRANDA denies the above statement.
2) Affidavit of LTGEN REYES:
2. a. Miranda also stated that the Marines are on the go and that they cannot hold them anymore and that they will lead the troops on the planned march and joins the protest. (Para 5, page)
MGEN MIRANDA denies the same as he never said any statement to that effect nor did he intimate in any other manner that the Marines under his command will join any march and protest against the government.
3) Affidavit of VADM MAYUGA:
3.a. …..At this point, MGEN MIRANDA AFP said that he may not be able to stop COL QUERUBIN PN (M) and the group from joining the protest rally and if that happens he will be forced to join the rally” (Para 1, page 2)
MGEN MIRANDA denies the above statement.
4) Sworn Statement of COL MARTIR:
4. a. “Yes sir but without my knowledge. Prior to that incident in the morning of February 24, the Marine Ready Force was activated without my knowledge nor any of my staff” (Para 11, page 2)
4. b. “This is supposed to be impossible sir but it was activated by Headquarters Philippine Marine Corps without prior consultation from me.” (Para 12, page 7)
MGEN MIRANDA denies the above statements for they are gross misrepresentations of facts. COL MARTIR was supposed to know and should know that the GHQ order for red alert applies to all commands in any of the major services thus including the units under him.
4.3. “Initially sir the Commandant invited FOIC and that we waited for a time and people were still coming in. He gave a statement that we’re going to move to EDSA with the troops together with the other units.” (Para 42, p.7)
4.4. “Yes sir. While waiting for him he was giving statements. ‘My conviction is that I would like to go but I will not force that on you. We will decide here.’ That was his statement. BGEN ALLAGA was not around yet and I was quite surprised and hurt on what MGEN MIRANDA said. So I was always asking the Chief of Staff, COL DE LEON where BGEN ALLAGA was. He said, “His coming.” (Para 44, p.7)
MGEN MIRANDA denies the above statements. They are pure concoction by COL MARTIR with malicious intent and never corroborated by any other testimony.
4.5 “After FOIC left, we started voting procedures on “to go” or “no go”. If we will march off to EDSA or not. That was when the voting started. Although the voting did not finish, we did not talk about it. I asked the Commandant that it is something illegal and I would like to talk to my people at least my unit commanders regarding this proposed activity. He denied and said, “It has to be decided here. They will follow.” (Para 53, page 8)
4.6 “Sabi ko sir, it is an illegal act. He answered, “This is not a coup. Pupunta lang tayo doon to protect demonstrators. We are not going to overthrow the government. I answered, “Sir it is still mutiny”. He did not answer anymore. (Para 54, page 8)
MGEN MIRANDA denies the above statements. There was never a votation “to go” or “no go” on the alleged proposed activity to march off to EDSA. There was no such proposal. COL MARTIR was again twisting facts to suit his own malicious purpose.
All the allegations from Para 81 till the end of SS of COL MARTIR is purely expressions of his own personal opinion, personal observations and impressions which do not count for any evidentiary value.
MGEN MIRANDA adopted the sworn statement of MGEN MACLANG before the AD Hoc committee as an impartial source of what actually transpired at the gazebo (Annex “G” of the report).
Sometime on 22 or 23 Feb 06, he was unexpectedly visited by BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN. BGEN LIM intimated to him that they want to discuss some alleged grievances and issues raised by junior officers in the AFP and they would like to seek his advice on the matter. After a few minutes later, BGEN LIM told him that somebody arranged a meeting with CSAFP or something to that effect.
He was with FOIC in the early evening of 23 Feb 06. They proceeded to the Office of CSAFP and other senior officers were present. The other senior officers discussed among themselves but he did not participate in the said discussion. In the course of the discussion, BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN entered and were confronted on their reported participation in the Feb 24 06 rally.
During the meeting, he affirmed his loyalty to the Constitution and to follow the chain of command.
He was directed by CSAFP “to stop it and do everything to stop it” so he informed FOIC that there will be a meeting by officers at the Marine Headquarters. The meeting with the Marine officers was a directive from CSAFP.
The meeting with the Marine officers was to establish and provide and informal forum within the confines of the Marine Headquarters where officers and key personnel can ventilate their personal views and sentiments.
COL DE LEON, the chief of staff, served as moderator during the meeting.
During the meeting, he called the attention of the attendees on the report that some Army and Marine units would be joining the EDSA rally.
The meeting ended at 5:00 in the morning of 24 Feb 06. Thereafter, he left the Marine Headquarters and proceeded to the Office of FOIC at HPN. He reported to FOIC that the Philippine Marine Corps is one and united and that they will follow the chain of command.
From the Office of FOIC, he returned to his office and took a nap. At around 8:00 am, he was awakened by COL DE LEON who reported to him that COL MARTIR talked to his men misinforming and misleading them to believe that the meeting at the Commandant’s office was regarding the decision of the Marines to participate in the EDSA rally.
He and COL DE LEON confronted COL MARTIR and at about 11:30 AM, together with LTC FERRER, Sgt Maj Bagorio and 1LT TOLENTINO, and in the presence of COL MARTIR and COL SERA JOSE (Ret), he clarified to the men of COL MARTIR what actually transpired during the meeting. He thought, he was still able to control the damage but he was wrong.
He did not know that during the meeting, COL MARTIR was reporting the contrary to GHQ as contained in the sworn statement of COL MARTIR.
A perusal of all the statements of the other Marine officers would show that none of them corroborated the statements of COL MARTIR.
In the mid-morning of 26 Feb 06, while he was in Laguna, FOIC called him and directed him to report at HPN for a lunch meeting. During the meeting, he intimated to FOIC that he knew that he will be relieved. BGEN ALLAGA arrived and a simple turn-over of command was held.
After the turnover, he requested for leave to go to PMC at BNS to get his personal belongings and to announce to the Chief of Staff, COL DE LEON, and the other officers the change in command.
When he arrived at PMC headquarters, there was a gathering of civilians within the compound. BGEN ALLAGA arrived and in his presence, he announced his relief and he asked the officers to support the new commandant.
His unceremonious relief from his command was sudden and came as a shock to the officers and staff gathered. The officers manifested their disgust and sentiments but no intention whatsoever to defy the authority of the new commandant.
He adopted the answer of LTC GUERRERO to question no. 135 in his sworn statement which graphically described the meeting during the so called “stand off”. (Annex T of the report)
He also adopted the answer of BGEN ALLAGA to question nos. 79, 90 and 91 in his sworn statement as a proof that no one among the officers talked about a coup d’etat or withdrawal of support. (Annex E of the report)
The incidents in the evening of 26 Feb to the early hours of 27 Feb had no connection with the incidents of 23-24 Feb.
He never uttered the words “We must now listen to the people” as claimed by LTGEN ESPERON in his affidavit. What he said was, “I am for the Constitution, but we must listen to our people.” “Our people” as used in the conversation was meant to refer to the “Junior Officers” and “Marine soldiers”.
If indeed, there is truth to the allegation of LTGEN ESPERON that he and the other co-accused officers asked him and the other Major Service Commanders to support them in their plan to join the EDSA rally, then why would LTGEN ESPERON write him a personal note even delivered by his aide to his residence in Laguna expressing his endearment and personal concern for him.
His act of reporting to VADM MAYUGA that the Phil Marine Corps will not move and join the reported protest was clear and unmistakable proof of respect for legal authority and unconditional subordination to the chain of command.
The conduct of open and academic discussions on what ills the country, the issue of political instability, outright violations of human right does not constitute an overt act amounting to an attempt to create, or begin or excite or cause or join a mutiny.
The charges for violation of AW 96 have no legal and factual bases and therefore, the charge sheet must be dismissed.
Annex “A” – Letter of CSAFP, LTGEN HERMOGENES ESPERON JR AFP, when he was still the CG, PA to MGEN MIRANDA.
“MISTAH/BUNK,
I was watching you on TV this morning. MARINO KA TALAGA!
Sending you some reading materials – must reading ito.
I believe that what is most important now is your physical safety and personal wellbeing. Call me anytime if there is anything I can do.
See you…..in a month’s time? Regards to DELIA.
HERMO”
Sworn Statement of MGEN MIRANDA executed before the ADHOC Investigating Committee. He alleged, among others, that:
On the 21st or 22nd of Feb 06, COL QUERUBIN visited him about his problem as Brigade Commander. Said problem refers to the incident wherein the latter was able to capture so many firearms and there was a lot of pressure to release them. He then told COL QUERUBIN that he wanted the latter to give those firearms to Marine Forces South so the pressure would be on him (MGEN MIRANDA).
In the morning of 23 Feb 06 in the morning, he was visited by BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN but their talk was not completed because BGEN LIM had to answer a call from someone whom he called “Sir.” BGEN LIM thereafter informed him that the guy he was talking to was able to arrange a meeting with CSAFP, GEN SENGA. During that visit, COL QUERUBIN and BGEN LIM told him about their grievances, to wit: Garci tape; assignment of MGEN HABACON as SOUTHCOM and RADM DANGA as WESCOM; sentiments of the Junior Officers. Then the two left. He does not know why BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN met with CSAFP.
He had a dinner at the residence of FOIC after which they went to CSAFP. During the meeting with CSAFP, there were a lot of discussions. He also shared some of the issues he presented in the “FULCRUM”. He said that the meeting ended with no direction.
After the meeting with CSAFP, he went back to Marine Headquarters to meet his officers. The FOIC initially handled the discussion but he had to leave. The FOIC knew that it was a Marine affair so he also cannot get a decision. After the meeting, he reported to FOIC that “Sir ayos na sir, walang movement.”
On or about 260900H Feb 06 (Sunday), he received a call from FOIC to have lunch with him. While waiting for the FOIC, he learned from the news that he was relieved as the Commandant. The press texted him of his relief. So, when the FOIC arrived, he told him that he already knows that he will be relieved. He does not know why he was relieved.
After the turn-over, he went back to his office to get his things. Some officers were waiting in his office and he told them that he was relieved and for them to support BGEN ALLAGA. He stayed in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps.
He stated that he allowed himself to be interviewed by the media but without the camera.
He presented the “FULCRUM” to CSAFP, members of the J- staff and the Staff and Service Commanders including GEN CALDERON of PNP and members of the J-staff of the PNP at the war room of J-3. “FULCRUM” is the view of the whole Armed Forces.
COL ARIEL O QUERUBIN O-7901 PN (M). In his counter-affidavit, he alleged, among others, that:
He was then the Brigade Commander of the 1st Marine Brigade stationed in Marawi City at the time of the incidents of 23-26 Feb 06.
On 21 Feb 06, being on Rest and Recreation (R&R), he went to Manila from Marawi to visit his wife and children. Upon his arrival in the afternoon of 23 Feb, following military protocol, he went to see their Commandant, MGEN MIRANDA, and reported to him about the interception by the 1st Marine Battalion of firearms shipment at Matling, Malabang, and Lanao Del Sur. He also told MGEN MIRANDA that there were senior military officers and politicians interceding for the release of these firearms. Their conversation then shifted to the general problem of restiveness in the Marine Corps and in some military units and how to ease the growing tension among the middle level and junior officers who were witnesses to how the Marines were used in the election fraud in Lanao Del Sur.
On or about 221700H Feb, he called BGEN LIM and invited him to the Commandant’s office where they talked about the apparent restiveness of junior military officers and how to help diffuse the situation.
In the morning of 23 Feb 06, upon receiving a text message that junior officers have the intention to join the civilian-led march at EDSA Shrine the following day, he immediately informed MGEN MIRANDA and BGEN LIM about it.
About lunchtime of 23 Feb 06, he went to COL MARTIR’s office to follow-up his request for one (1) unit laptop computer for his brigade. Thereat, he saw CAPT VIC MARTIR PN. COL MARTIR invited him for a boodle fight at the Armor Battalion, after which, they proceeded to COL MARTIR’s office at CSSB where they had coffee and had a short conversation regarding the joining of junior officers in the civilian-led march. He asked COL MARTIR to talk to his men to know if they have plans of joining the march so as to stop the same.
On or about 231600H Feb 06, he met BGEN LIM at Rustan’s Makati and they proceeded to Camp Aguinaldo.
At about 1730H, BGEN LIM called up MGEN MACLANG, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, J2, on his cellular phone and the latter sent a vehicle to pick them up which brought them to MGEN MACLANG’s office. MGEN MACLANG advised them to bring the matter to the CSAFP. Thereafter, MGEN MACLANG called up GEN SENGA for a meeting.
At about 1900H, he, BGEN LIM, and MGEN MACLANG discussed the matter regarding the restiveness of some junior officers with CSAFP and further informed him that the junior officers will march with their firearms.
At about 2100H, GEN SENGA called for an emergency meeting with the Service Commanders for a briefing on the situation at the gazebo at CSAFP’s Quarters. He and BGEN LIM stayed at the office of the Chief of Staff.
At about 2330H, they called to CSAFP’s quarters where a lengthy discussion and a directive to talk to these junior officers was given to all those present and that to follow the chain of command. Immediately after the meeting, he and BGEN LIM returned to Fort Bonifacio aboard the staff car of MGEN MIRANDA.
On or about 240130H Feb 06, MGEN MIRANDA called all Marine officers available for a dialogue at the Office of the Commandant, where all senior officers raised their grievances. BGEN LIM left after sensing that he was out of place. Thereafter, the FOIC arrived and addressed the queries of the group regarding the Garci Tape, and thereafter, the FOIC left after giving guidance to MGEN MIRANDA.
The meeting continued with MGEN MIRANDA regarding the reports on the alleged participation of the Army and Marine units in a March rally during that day. When his opinion was asked, he simply said that they must be united and remain with the chain of command and he tried to convince the group not to pursue their intentions. Then MGEN MIRANDA told the group of his position that they will not do anything and further disallowed anybody to go to EDSA. As he was being called by the FOIC, MGEN MIRANDA stressed that there should be no movement. The conference ended when MGEN MIRANDA left.
In the morning of 24 Feb 06, there was a conference with the AFP Chief of Staff saying that he and BGEN LIM did not recruit him. Thus, he was allowed by MGEN MIRANDA to be interviewed by Channel 2 & 7 to show that he was not under arrest, nor was relieved or in hiding.
On or about 250500H Feb 06, he rested for the whole day with his family.
After attending the 1200H mass at St. Ignatius Church in Camp Aguinaldo, he and his family went back to their quarters to take their lunch. His wife asked him if it was true that BGEN ALLAGA is already the new Commandant. He tried to reach MGEN MIRANDA but the latter can not be reached, so he instead called the Marine Chief of Staff, COL ORLANDO DE LEON, but the latter informed him that there was no advice yet from the PN Headquarters. He immediately proceeded to Fort Bonifacio to verify the matter but the same was confirmed while he was on the way.
When he arrived at the Bonifacio Naval Station, the media tried to get his comment on the relief of their former Commandant. He answered questions propounded and further asked the people to attend a vigil mass to support their relieved Commandant and the Marines and to further prevent violence.
Thereafter, BGEN ALLAGA ordered him to report to him as the former is now the new Commandant. He told BGEN ALLAGA that he had not seen the Order. Since he can not gain access to the door as he was being pulled by the media, he went around. Inside the office, BGEN ALLAGA showed him the Order and it was then when he said, “I don’t have anything against you Sir. If they were able to do it to MGEN MIRANDA, then they can also do it to you. MGEN MIRANDA is like my brother thus his relief is difficult for me to accept.” However, since BGEN ALLAGA is already the new Commandant, he followed his orders.
A conference followed with the Marine Officers at the Commandant’s lounge. Sensing that no consensus could be reached, BGEN ALLAGA called the Field Brigade Commanders. Thereafter, all officers including him acceded to the chain of command. When BGEN ALLAGA went out to talk to the media announcing that the concerns of the Marine Officers were finally resolved, he followed him, but did not say a word. He went home after everything calmed down.
As the charge of violation of AW 67, he denies having violated the same as he did not publicly declare, intimate nor suggest publicly or secretly intimate any withdrawal of support. He even convinced the other officers to follow the chain of command. He and BGEN LIM went to see GEN SENGA to inform him about the restive junior officers and not to recruit him to withdraw support from the President. This was made clear by the CSAFP during the press briefing in the morning of 24 Feb 06 when he further stressed that there was no withdrawal of support. This was also supported by the statement made by MGEN MACLANG when he said that he never heard him and BGEN LIM said that they were going to withdraw their support from the President. MGEN MIRANDA’s statement before the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee even praised him for doing his homework in convincing the soldiers not to join in the Friday activity. He also denied making the statements attributed to him by COL MARTIR considering that it is unlikely that he will confide to COL MARTIR knowing him to be an anti-coup. There were also no witnesses to corroborate the statements being imputed against him by COL MARTIR.
As to violation of AW65, he never committed any disobedience when BGEN ALLAGA asked him to go inside the Headquarters, Philippine Marines. When he said, “Hindi ko pa nakikita yung order Sir,” it was not meant to defy MGEN ALLAGA’s authority as the new Commandant. He was just being circumspect and prudent considering that there was no formal announcement as to the relief of MGEN MIRANDA and the designation of MGEN ALLAGA as the new Commandant.
As to AW 96, his actions, after considering the circumstances on 23-26 Feb 06, did not seriously compromise his position as a Marine Officer nor exposed him as unworthy to remain a member of the honorable profession of arms. His action showed his effort to pacify, if not dissuade, the restive officers of the Marine Corps from pursuing their intention to join a mass protest.
The stand-off was a spontaneous and unexpected incident. He called for the civilians to pray and shield them, thereby preventing the military units from firing at each other because of the tense situation.
As to AW 97, he did not call for the media people to cover the so called stand-off nor did he give any order to any Marine personnel as they were not within his chain of command. There were already civilians as well as media people when he arrived at the Marine Headquarters. His personnel were intact at the Brigade Headquarters in Marawi City.
There were also several occasions when he personally brought to the attention of his military superiors and the President the restiveness that he had personally witnessed among the officers and men of the Philippine Marine Corps.
In his Sworn Statement executed before the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee, COL QUERUBIN alleges, among others, that:
He is now assigned with the Office of the Commandant, BGEN ALLAGA. He was previously assigned at 1st Marine Brigade Commander in Marawi City.
He and BGEN LIM AFP perceived that there was a percolating restiveness not only in the Marine Corps but also in other units of the Armed Forces. His perception was based on the text messages he had been receiving. They brought this perceived restiveness to the attention of PMC Commandant then – MGEN MIRANDA AFP – on 22 Feb 2006, who said that they should monitor the situation and try to talk with these people and calm them down.
He stated that his stand on the issue of restiveness in the military is to diffuse the situation.
On 23 Feb 2006, he met again with the MGEN MIRANDA, and informed the latter of the intention of the Officers, not only in the Marines but of other units as well, intending to join the civilian-led protest march on 24 Feb 06.
After he informed J-2, it was agreed upon that they should apprise the CSAFP. When he and BGEN LIM AFP met with the CSAFP, the other Major Service commanders were also present, namely, LTGEN JOSE REYES AFP, VADM MATEO MAYUGA AFP and LTGEN HERMOGENES ESPERON, including MGEN MACLANG, MGEN MIRANDA and the PNP-SAF Commander, C/SUPT FRANCO. He confirmed before the Major Service Commanders that there was indeed an intention of some Officers to join the rally.
With such information, the Chief of Staff reacted by saying that he should talk to these people and dissuade them from doing this. He said that he would try. The meeting with the CSAFP was concluded with the CSAFP saying: “Follow the chain of command.”
After their meeting with the CSAFP, they, MGEN MIRANDA, BGEN LIM and himself, went back to the headquarters PMC, where MGEN MIRANDA called for a conference. As the Officers were coming in, BGEN LIM sensing that he is not a Marine Officer, asked permission to go home and sleep.
During the conference, grievances and emotions were released, then MGEN MIRANDA spoke saying, “This is my position, we will not do anything and we will stay here. Nobody will go to EDSA.”
When asked if he or anyone of them came to the point of insinuating anything convincing the CSAFP to withdraw support for the Government, he answered that “It all depends on the person, what we were telling the CSAFP was the prevailing situation. Now, if in his perception, we were trying to insinuate something to that effect, he is entitled to that. The fact is, we were just informing him of the prevailing situation at that time.”
His intention was really to let somebody do something about it. He further said that he has not yet decided on what to do.
When he was asked regarding the statement made by BGEN LIM that he told the restive officers and military personnel that it would be useless to go there (EDSA) without firearms because if there will be a confrontation, what are they going to do? COL QUERUBIN PN (M) commented that probably, BGEN LIM wanted to tell them that that was an option open to the Officers.
(3) COL JANUARIO G CARINGAL O-8580 PN (M). In his counter-affidavit, he alleged, among others, that:
He was the Deputy Commander of the 2nd Marine Brigade, Philippine Marine Corps, based at Camp Ditucalan, Maria Cristina, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte
He denies having violated AW 67 by showing his whereabouts from 21-25 Feb 06 and further alleged that immediately before and after said dates, he was in Camp Ditucalan in Iligan City.
On 20 Feb 06, he was in Camp Ditucalan, Iligan City preparing for his official trip to Manila the next day to take oath as a member of the Selection Board for the promotion of junior officers in the PN. The oath taking was scheduled at 221000H Feb 06 at the AFP Officers’ Club.
On 21 Feb 06, he took a PAL flight to Manila and arrived in the afternoon of the same day proceeding directly to his home in Bonifacio Naval Station, Makati City where he spent his entire time with his family.
In the morning of 22 Feb 06, he proceeded to Camp Aguinaldo where the oath-taking took place as scheduled and where the officers present had lunch. Immediately after lunch, he went home to the Bonifacio Naval Station.
Thereafter, he proceeded to see LTCOL MARTIN VILLASAN PN (M), PMC Staff for Personnel, at his office at BNS, as ordered by COL EDUARDO DUCUSIN, his Brigade Commander at Camp Ditucalan, to follow-up their unit’s request for additional staff officers in Camp Ditucalan.
It is the practice of commanders, deputy commanders and other officers of the Philippine Marine Corps who are based in the provinces and who happen to be in Manila to go to certain offices to follow-up requests of their units which remain un-acted upon by higher military authorities. In the evening, he and his family went to see a movie and thereafter, they directly went home.
In the morning of 23 Feb 06, he drove his wife to her class at the U.P. College of Arts and Sciences in Padre Faura, Manila. After dropping her off, he spent his day at the Robinson’s Mall Manila while waiting for her wife’s class dismissed. In the afternoon, he fetched his wife and then, they went home. He spent the whole evening with his family.
On 24 Feb 06, he and his family went to Park Square One in Makati City where he bought his return ticket to Iligan City. Afterwards, they had lunch and watched a movie at the Glorietta Mall, Makati City. When they got home late in the afternoon, he decided to see LTCOL VILLASIN to check again on the status of their request for additional staff officers, and then, he spent the whole night at their home.
He left Manila on 25 Feb 06 and reached Iligan City on the same date.
On 26 Feb 06, he learned from newspaper reports regarding the stand-off at the Philippine Marine Corps Headquarters at Bonifacio Naval Station. He was no longer in Manila when the stand-off took place.
As to AW 96, he denied committing acts in violation of said article. He was unaware of the circumstances surrounding the occasion when BGEN DANILO LIM purportedly delivered the message withdrawing support from President Arroyo because he had no participation whatsoever when the said message was supposedly delivered by BGEN LIM. He further alleged that a careful examination of the transcript on the video tape of BGEN LIM’s withdrawal of support will show that his name was never mentioned therein nor was there anything to implicate him.
His explanation of his whereabouts from 20-25 Feb 06 and on the days immediately before and after these dates will reveal that he never took part in the occasion when the message was supposedly delivered by GEN LIM.
In support to his counter-affidavit, he submitted the following exhibits:
1) Radio Message re: Oath Taking of AFP Selection Board showing the name of COL CARINGAL as one of the members – Annex B (Note: No Annex A is attached to his counter-affidavit)
2) Affidavit of COL EDUARDO E DUCUSIN PN (M) GSC; Brigade Commander of 2nd Marine Brigade based at Ditucalan, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte (Annex C). He alleges that upon learning that COL CARINGAL was required to go to Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City to take his oath as a member of the Selection Board for the promotion of junior officers in the Philippine Navy, he ordered COL CARINGAL to go and see LTC VILLASAN to follow-up the request of their Brigade for additional staff officers, as soon as he shall have finished with the said oath-taking ceremony at Camp Aguinaldo.
3) Affidavit of Sharon A Caringal, wife of COL CARINGAL (Annex D). She attested to the whereabouts of her husband COL CARINGAL (as contained in her counter-affidavit) from 21 Feb to 25 Feb 06 when he left for Iligan City.
4) Affidavit of LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN PN (M) (GSC) – Personnel Officer of the Philippine Marine Corps (Annex E). He alleges that COL CARINGAL on several occasions between 22 Feb to 25 Feb 06 went to see him at his office at the PMC Headquarters for the purpose of following-up the requests of their Brigade for the assignment of additional staff officers to the 2nd Marine Brigade.
5) Mileage Activity Report of Philippine Airlines showing the dates when COL CARINGAL traveled with PAL (Annex F).
Affidavit of COL CARINGAL, dtd 12 Apr 06 submitted to the AD HOC Committee. He alleges, among others, that:
He is assigned with Headquarters, 2nd Marine Brigade Station at Ma. Cristina, Iligan City.
He was the former Commander of the Marine Security and Escort Group of the Phil Marine Corps based in Marine Barracks, Fort Bonifacio
Sometime in the 2nd week of Dec 05, BGEN LIM visited him at the headquarters and made some solicitation in connection with the latter’s unit’s activity.
During the visit, they discussed the persistent reports of a coup to be staged by some misguided junior officers of the AFP to be led by the Magdalo group and supported by civilian components.
BGEN LIM told him to discourage or dissuade junior officer of the Phil Marine Corps who might have been enticed by the Magdalo to join the group and that they should follow the chain of command.
He had been involved in the 1989 coup and that he would not want anything like that to happen again.
COL ORLANDO DE LEON O-8600 PN (M) (GSC). In his counter-affidavit, he alleges the following:
There are two separate incidents that were used as bases for the charges filed against him. The first incident was the early morning of 24 Feb 06 and the second incident was on 26 Feb 06.
He hardly said anything during the meeting on 24 Feb for as far as he could recall, he only talked twice. First, was when MGEN MIRANDA asked him to be the moderator and to voice out his observations to which he replied, “Yes Sir, but with all due respect, may I ask that we begin with the Unit Commanders?” This is corroborated by the sworn statement of BGEN ALLAGA (Annex “E” of the Ad Hoc Report dtd 30 Mar 06) where it was stated that when MGEN MIRANDA asked the consensus of the group, he asked the CS to act as a moderator prompting COL DE LEON to start with the Unit Commanders. Second was when MGEN MIRANDA winded up the discussion at about 240500H Feb 06, wherein he reminded everyone of their commitment to keep the discussion confidential. These were the full extent of his participation during the meeting. The sworn statements of LTCOL ESTOPIN (Annex “V” of the Ad Hoc Report dtd 9 May 06), CMS GENEROSO A BAGORIO (Annex “W” of the Ad Hoc Report dtd 17 Apr 06), and LTC ROMULO L GUALDRAPA (Annex “EEE” of the Ad Hoc Report dtd 5 Jul 06) attest to the fact that he did not speak during the meeting. He neither convinced nor influenced anyone about anything.
As to the statement made by RADM MAYUGA in his affidavit (Annex “D” of the Ad Hoc Report dtd 30 May 06) that COL QUERUBIN allegedly said that the junior officers were ready to join him (C) COL QUERUBIN) in the protest march, and that he purportedly confirmed the same, he strongly deny such allegations. The same was a miscommunication and that RADM MAYUGA will be able to clarify the same if called to testify. Moreover, he could not recall RADM MAYUGA discussing the protest march and as confirmed by the sworn statements, he did not say/do anything of that sort during the meeting.
As to the incident on 26 Feb 06, he could not recall saying anything inflammatory or doing anything which could be interpreted as attempting to begin a mutiny for the following reasons:
First, that on or about 261500H Feb 06, their PIO was asking him if he received queries from the media regarding the relief of MGEN MIRANDA as PMC Commandant that his guidance was for the PIO not to confirm or deny anything as they themselves did not know anything about it.
Second, that after MGEN MIRANDA announced that he had been relieved, he asked him if he wanted to talk to the men for the last time as Commandant to which the latter acceded after some hesitations; that since LTC SEGUMALIAN was the one nearest to him, as unit commander, he asked him to form his Battalion (2nd Battalion) in front of Brown Hall so that MGEN MIRANDA could say his final farewell; that he went out to look for other unit commanders but since there were civilians and media outside the building and the situation was already chaotic, the idea of MGEN MIRANDA’s addressing the troops for the last time did not push through.
Third, that he never said anything about withdrawal of support nor did he reject/resist the appointment of BGEN ALLAGA as Commandant considering that COL GUERRERO, who was sitting facing him during the meeting, never stated in his sworn statement that he chanted or said anything about the withdrawal of support. The same was supported by LTCOL ESTOPIN’s sworn statement dtd 9 May 06 wherein he said that he did not hear him / LTCOL PARCON convincing the group to withdraw support. What was being discussed was the abrupt relief of MGEN MIRANDA.
He was even awarded the Military Merit Medal by the then PMC Commandant BGEN ALLAGA for his vital role in the peaceful resolution of the stand off last 26 Feb 06.
Mutiny imports collective insubordination and necessarily includes resisting lawful military authority. However, nothing close to this definition happened on 24 Feb 06 since it was clear from several sworn statements of the officers present that there was no definite agenda during the meeting. It was an academic discussion. Many of the officers present were not even sure of what was being discussed. The discussions among the several groups revolved around withdrawal of support, protest march and attainment of “critical mass.” As per his assessment, it was a bull session, an academic and free-wheeling discussion. The officers were simply asked on their comments regarding reports on the restiveness in the military and on the alleged plan of some units in the AFP to join the protest march. As far as he was concerned, MGEN MIRANDA simply wanted to talk to his men to find out if it was true that there was restlessness in the Corps and if so, to address it. MGEN MIRANDA only wanted his men to open up and he did not give any order for his men to join any protest action or to withdraw support. In fact, in the early morning of 24 Feb 06, MGEN MIRANDA activated the PMRF and placed all forces, armored units and other assets of the Marines at the Marine Headquarters under the operational control of the PMRF under the command of COL MARTIR. Since PMRF is the principal anti-coup force of the Marines, then it follows that MGEN MIRANDA had no plan to join or tolerate any mutiny/coup. The sworn statements of LTCOL GUALDRAPA dtd 5 Jul 06; LTCOL ESTOPIN dtd 9 May 06 and LTCOL HIZON dtd 3 Jul 06 mention that he did not want to commit the Marines to any movement. While the sworn statement of LTCOL SEGUMALIAN dtd 4 May 06 states that the Commandant never proposed withdrawal of support.
Fourth, the final proof of the nature of events that early morning was that no Marine joined the protest. That was the outcome of MGEN MIRANDA’s declaration before adjourning the meeting that no one should move.
Under the circumstances, there was no attempt to begin a mutiny during the early morning meeting. There was no plan to resist lawful military authority for there was no plan to speak of considering that nobody could agree on anything as there was simply a discussion, sharing of opinions and airing of grievances. Assuming that there were discussions of joining the protest march or withdrawal of support, these were not crystallized. For the sake of argument, if some soldiers joined the protest march, this was a mere expression of one’s individual opinion which is protected by the constitution. The withdrawal of support was also vague that is why it was never taken seriously.
Events on 26 Feb 06 can not be characterized as attempt to begin a mutiny. It was just the unfortunate convergence of the spontaneous expression of disappointment of some PMC officers on the unceremonious manner of relief of their Commandant and the presence of the media in the vicinity.
Lastly, as to the “FULCRUM” power point presentation made by MGEN MIRANDA to the CSAFP, this was the outcome of the instruction of CSAFP to MGEN MIRANDA to come up with a “no-holds barred” briefing on the current situation in the country particularly on the socio-economic and politico-military conditions which had impact on the national security and on the AFP including proposals on how to address the same. MGEN MIRANDA instructed him to gather all the PMC staff and officers present to discuss the social, political, military and economic problems and how to solve these problems. After the meeting, he summarized the discussion and gave the report to MGEN MIRANDA the next day. There should be no ill motive imputed to anybody since the report was made in compliance with the instruction of the CSAFP.
In his supplemental counter-affidavit, COL DE LEON alleges, among others, that:
On or about 24530H Feb 06, immediately after the meeting held at the Commandant’s Office, he proceeded to his office to have coffee with LTCOL BAÑEZ. Thereafter, LTCOL SEGUMALIAN went to see him to inform him that an EP from the MOC asked the former if he received orders to move his unit to NCRCOM. Such order was relayed via telephone call purportedly coming from the JOC at GHQ. He immediately instructed LTCOL SEGUMALIAN not to move his unit absent any written directive/clearance from higher headquarters/NCRCOM. He immediately called up the Commandant and relayed the development to which MGEN MIRANDA instructed him not to release 2nd Marine Battalion without clearance from, GHQ. The Commandant handed the phone to the FOIC, who upon being briefed of the situation, told him to hold on while he makes a call to the CSAFP. After a minute or so, VADM MAYUGA told him that the CSAFP didn’t have any knowledge of any orders for the 2nd Marine Battalion to move to NCRCOM. Thus, he directed LTC BANEZ to hold all Marine movements.
Apparently, there was a clear attempt to mislead the Marine hierarchy wherein the Marines were almost made the unwitting pawns in some game. If it were true that MGEN MIRANDA, LTC BANEZ, LTC SEGUMALIAN or him had any intention to participate in any conspiracy/mutiny, they would not have cleared the movement of the 2nd Marine Battalion with their respective superiors/ the AFP Chain of Command.
In support to his counter-affidavit, he submitted the following exhibits:
[1] A copy of the dispatch dtd 240110H Feb 06 (Tab A of his counter-affidavit) signed By COL ARMANDO V BAÑEZ.
To prove that per order of MGEN MIRANDA directed him to activate the Phil Marine Ready Force (PMRF), which is commanded by COL MARTIR and to place all Marine Forces and armored units in the PMC Headquarters Manila under the operational control of the said unit.
[2] Affidavit of MGEN RENATO P MIRANDA (Tab B of his counter-affidavit)
When MGEN MIRANDA was already relieved as the commandant, he went to the Office of the PMC Chief of Staff, COL DE LEON where he announced his relief and that BGEN ALLAGA is the new commandant. COL DE LEON asked him if he wanted to talk to the men for the last time. MGEN MIRANDA hesitated at first but he finally acceded. He then saw COL DE LEON talk to LTC SEGUMALIAN to form his troops in front of Brown Hall. COL DE LEON also went to look for the other officers.
[3] Affidavit of COL RUSTICO O GUERRERO (Tab C of his counter-affidavit), Superintendent, Marine Corps.
He attended the conference on 240130H Feb 06 at the Office of the Commandant, PMC and COL DE LEON was one of the attendees. He does not remember COL DE LEON mentioning about the “critical mass” when that topic was discussed. Neither did he hear COL DE LEON chant any withdrawal of support from the government or the newly appointed commandant, PMC, BGEN ALLAGA.
[4] A copy of the Award of Military Merit Medal to COL ORLANDO E DE LEON (Tab D of his counter-affidavit)
The Statement of COL DE LEON taken by the ADHOC Investigating Committee.
The Statement is attached as Annex “I” of the ADHOC Committee report. COL DE LEON did not sign the statement but the same was certified by the transcriber Jedeilyn M Tolentino and subscribed before CPT ARMANDO P PAREDES. The transcript of the statement contains the following:
On 23 February 2006:
He went to the office of the commandant and saw COL QUERUBIN and MGEN MIRANDA but said that he is not a privy to what the two were talking about.
In the evening of 23 Feb 06, the Commandant called for a meeting that went on up to 4-5 in the morning of 24 Feb 06 and after the meeting, everybody went back to their normal duties.
He came to know later that MGEN MIRANDA together with the FOIC was summoned to GHQ and thereafter, they went back to the Marine Headquarters at about 10:00 -11:30 in the evening.
That all the officers and unit commanders available were called for a meeting which includes: MC1, LTC VILLASAN; MC2, LTC OCSAN, MC3 LTC BANEZ, MC4 LTC FERRER, MC5 LTC PARCON, MC6 COL RAFANAN, MC7 LTC GUALDRAPA, MFO LTC HIZON, COL MARTIR, GEN ALLAGA COL GUERRERO, LTC FERNANDEZ, LTC CARDEL. COL SEGUMALIAN, COL QUERUBIN and FOIC.
The meeting was a free willing discussion wherein they discussed about issues including the rumors of withdrawal of support from the government. MGEN MIRANDA did not ask anybody to withdraw support from the government either individually or as a corps.
On 24 February 2006:
No unusual incident that transpired.
25 February 2006:
No unusual incident that transpired.
26 February 2006:
The Deputy Commandant, BGEN ALLAGA went to his office in camouflage uniform informing him that he received a call from the FOIC. At about 5 PM, MGEN MIRANDA arrived and they were informed that he has just been relieved.
BGEN ALLAGA later on announced that he has just assumed the position of commandant which caused a lot of confusion and heightened emotions. He then told the unit commander, LTC SEGUMALIAN, to form his troops in front of the ground hall so that MGEN MIRANDA can give his last message.
He was the one who ordered the battalion commander to position the LTV’s in front of the HQ since there were already a lot of people, civilian and media outside.
He did not receive any report that a group of Marines will march to Makati City to join the civilians. All they know was that there was a contingent from the Marines and they were directed by GHQ to have a buffer crowd during the celebration.
5. COL ARMANDO V BAÑEZ O-8592 PN (M). In his counter-affidavit, he alleged, among others, that:
A week preceding 23 Feb 06, the entire AFP was on red alert on account of the heightened political activities of the civilian forces opposed to the present dispensation.
On 24 Feb 06, they were informed by PMC Chief of Staff, COL ORLANDO DE LEON, that Marine Commandant, MGEN MIRANDA, would like to see the staff officers and major unit commanders at his office. Upon his arrival from the General Headquarters, MGEN MIRANDA expressed his concern that he didn’t want to be caught unaware of the sentiments of his troops and wanted a strongly united Marine Corps. The discussion ranged from the Garci tape investigation to the almost daily conversations which the military men discuss among themselves including morale and welfare benefits. Although there were references to past coup d‘etats, these were mostly analytical in nature hence he did not sense any intention nor were there words spoken indicating, inducing or making proposal even remotely akin to rebellion/mutiny.
When the PN FOIC arrived, he gave a lengthy situation brief on the current issues faced by the country and concluded by reminding the Marine Corps to be always united in whatever they do. During the whole intercourse, he just actively listened to enable him to asses the situation well and such was attested in the Sworn Statement of MGEN ALLAGA stating that he was silent and did not participate in the course of the discussions.
When asked point blank of his opinion on the issues raised, he simply replied, “I’m for the Marines.” By this, he meant that in making proposal or presentation of their gripes to the authorities, there should always be a consensus. The Corps should always have one stand and follow the chain of command. After all, the Marine corps is known for its strong solidarity as a unit.
To address the situation feared by MGEN MIRANDA concerning the alleged reported restlessness of some officers and men in the AFP which might be taken advantage of, he was instructed to issue MC3G-0206-262 which essentially activated the PRMF (an anti-coup command under the control of COL MARTIR).
On or about 240500H Feb 06, the meeting was adjourned with MGEN MIRANDA telling the troop that there will be no movement. Shortly after the meeting, COL SEGUMALIAN approached him verifying an order which he received by phone regarding the move of his battalion to the General Headquarters. He immediately informed his staff to verify the legality of the order and also informed MGEN MIRANDA about it as he was still in the same room with him. MGEN MIRANDA, after making a call informed him that there was no such legal order given. He then went to his office and gave an instruction for the issuance of a hold order on all the scheduled movement of MBLT 2. He further instructed his men that all orders received by their office should be verified and issuing authorities identified.
On 25 Feb 06, he issued MC3-0206-272 re: Accounting of Personnel Down to the Lowest Level and MC3G-0206-125 re: Reminder to the Adherence to the Chain of Command which ensured that the unity of the Corps is secured.
On 26 Feb 06, after attending mass inside the camp, he chanced upon a Marine Officer telling him of the rumored relief of MGEN MIRANDA. He then went to the PMC CS where he saw officers inquiring as to the truthfulness of the rumor. COL DE LEON told them to wait for MGEN MIRANDA and BGEN ALLAGA. Upon arrival of MGEN MIRANDA, he informed the group of his relief and that he was succeeded by BGEN ALLAGA. The officers asked him on the reason and manner of his relief and expressed their sentiments to which MGEN MIRANDA asked them not to do anything which would indicate any desire on his part to hold on to the position. At a certain point, he also expressed his disappointment on the hasty manner of executing the relief which deprived MGEN MIRANDA of the proper farewell ceremonies.
He left the discussion as it was his duty to check on the issuance of orders and deployment of troops. When he went back to the headquarters, the discussion moved to the Officer’s lounge where there was still tension and some men were having a heated argument with MGEN ALLAGA. Such event was covered by the media and seen by civilian and political personalities who were then present. He maintained his silence, considering the precariousness of the situation which was attested to by MGEN ALLAGA in his Sworn Statement dtd 01 Aug 06.
At about 2330H, in the meeting convened by MGEN ALLAGA, the group was able to clear the issue thus, the Marine Corps was united under the leadership of MGEN ALLAGA.
His actions during the events of 23-26 Feb 06 were consistent with the demands of the code of conduct and that there was never any single act attributable to him that is contributory to an attempt to begin a mutiny/rebellion as attested by the joint affidavit of his EP dtd 07 Aug 06.
The statement of COL BAÑEZ was taken by the ADHOC Investigating Committee and the same is attached as Annex “N” of the ADHOC committee report. He signed the said statement and it contains the following:
He is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, MC3 and as such he is a member of the Battle Staff whenever a red alert is declared.
On or about 230100H Feb 06, all the officers were summoned to the Office of the Commandant for a conference. When he went to the Commandant’s Office, he saw BGEN LIM coming out from the Commandant’s Office. Present during the meeting were COL DE LEON, COL QUERUBIN, COL MARTIR, COL GUERRERO, MC1, MC2, MC4, MFO, MC6 Sgt Major, and MGEN ALLAGA. The Commandant (MGEN MIRANDA) asked everybody regarding their opinion on what’s happening around the country. When he was asked, he answered that he was for the Marine Corps meaning he didn’t want the Marine Corps to be divided like before and that the chain of command should be followed.
Other topics discussed were the possibility of some lawless elements that might disrupt the EDSA Revolution Celebration, personnel welfare, Garci tape and the present situation of the country. The insistence that the Marine Corps should be united was due to the possibility that some Marine personnel might join the other side as previously experienced by the Marines.
When the FOIC joined the group, they were asked about their problems and the issues dealt on the housing problem, morale and welfare. After the FOIC left, the meeting continued. But no talk on the coup was taken up nor was there any mention of somebody joining the rally at EDSA. 240400h Feb, the meeting ended.
As far as he was concerned, they were required by NOC, Navy to send 50 personnel and 2 officers at EDSA to serve as buffer crowd. However, such order was recalled at around 241100H Feb through radio message.
On or about 241000H Feb, the Commandant summoned the officers in his office. When COL MARTIR arrived, MGEN MIRANDA and the former discussed on what transpired on the 24th wherein he heard COL MARTIR telling the Commandant, “You almost made us follow an illegal order.” To which the Commandant replied, “Did I give you an order…/was there an order?” When they were about to discuss heatedly, he left.
On 26 Feb 06, CS, PMAR deployed the armor troops and the MBLT 2.
After hearing the unceremonious relief of MGEN MIRANDA, some officers were disgusted to the point that some of them expressed their desire to resign. COL PARCON, GUALDRAPA and he were among those who expressed their disgust.
In support of his counter-affidavit, he submitted the following exhibits:
[1] Affidavit of MGEN NELSON ALLAGA AFP (Annex “A” of the counter-affidavit)
He attended the conference at the Commandant’s Office and during said conference; COL ARMANDO V BAÑEZ was silent and did not participate in the course of the discussions.
[2] A copy of the directive numbered MC3G-0206-269 dtd 240110H Feb 06 signed by affiant (Annex “B” of the counter-affidavit)
An instruction to hold order of all the scheduled movements of MBLT 2.
[3] Chronological list of relevant events/orders (Annex “C” of the counter-affidavit)
This ensured that the unity of the Corps is secured.
[4] MC3G-0206-278 citing NOCA 0206-272 (Annex “C-1” of the counter-affidavit)
Re: Accounting of Personnel Down to the Lowest Level/Offices
[5] MC3G-0206-125 citing SCDO 0206-289 (Annex “C-2” of the counter-affidavit)
Re: Reminder on the Adherence to the Chain of Command
[6] Joint-affidavit of enlisted personnel assigned at the Office of the Asst Chief for Operations, HQSBn, PMC, PN (Annex “D” of the counter-affidavit)
They attest that they have not been, by any means, talked to, persuaded, induced or influenced by LTC BAÑEZ to destabilize or withdraw support form the government whatsoever, much more prior to and subsequent to 23 Feb 06.
LTC REYNALDO G OCSAN O-8751 PN (M). In his counter-affidavit, he alleged, among others, that:
His presence in the meeting held at the Commandant’s Office on the late evening of 23 Feb 06 until the dawn of 24 Feb 06 was not of his own liking. He did not know its purpose or agenda. His attendance was mandatory and he had no choice but to attend the same, otherwise, all the officers from the FOIC down the line who were present during the meeting should be charged.
It was VADM MAYUGA, who mentioned in general terms during the meeting on 23 Feb about the destabilization plan. None of the officers present expressed any opinion in favor of the destabilization plan. On the contrary, FOIC stressed to them that PMC should be united and that they’re not going to do anything illegal. Hence, nothing can be construed as “to begin/cause mutiny”
The words uttered by MGEN MIRANDA stating that “I don’t want to endanger or put the life of any marine on the line for something that he doesn’t know/understand” was a clear manifestation that MGEN MIRANDA was not joining any destabilization plot or any illegal actions in bringing down the government. He told MGEN MIRANDA that he doesn’t have any information that a Marine Unit or that some Marines will be joining the plot and that the Marines are one and united under his command.
He only came to know of the alleged destabilization plot in that meeting held on the evening of 23 Feb. As to the alleged withdrawal of support, he came to know of it only when the media exposed the video tape of BGEN LIM several days after 26 Feb. He neither attended any meeting with any other officer or EP to plan or discuss the alleged withdrawal of support nor did he attempt to join any protest action of the civil society and political opposition since there was never a plan by the Marines to mach out of the camp.
On 240900H Feb, with the permission and approval of the CS, PMC, he went to Dagupan City to attend the 9th day prayer of his departed brother. He returned to the Base only on the early evening of 26 Feb thus his alleged involvement in the so-called “mutiny” is totally baseless and absurd.
On 26 Feb 06, he gave orders to the intelligence officers to continue monitoring the situation and be alert on persons who might perform sabotage activity in the camp and further urged them not to withdraw support from the government.
His stand that he had never entered into or joined any conspiracy to begin/cause a mutiny by withdrawing support from the President nor induced any officer or EP to destabilize/withdraw support is confirmed by the affidavits of CPT RONALDO V. JUAN and MAJ ERIC MACAAMBAC which collectively stated that:
“We have not been, by any means, talked to, persuaded, induced or influenced by LTCOL OCSAN PN(M) (GSC), to destabilize or withdraw support from the government whatsoever, much more prior to and subsequent to 23 Feb 06.”
Furthermore, the Sworn Statements of COL MARTIR and MGEN ALLAGA merely mentioned of his presence in the meeting called by MGEN MIRANDA without any mention of his inclination for or support to any move against the government.
Even assuming that there were separate acts or statements made by other officers charged in Charges 1 and 2, the same should be treated individually and separately without involving other officers who are innocent of the charged.
Lastly, Charges 1&2 suffer serious and fatal defects that go into the merits of the cases which warrant their outright dismissal. The accuser, CPT ARMANDO PAREDES, JAGS who signed both charges doesn’t have any personal knowledge on any of the material allegations.
In support to his counter-affidavit, LTC OCSAN submitted the following exhibits:
[1] Affidavit of MAJ RENATO S DARACAN (OS) PN (M) (Annex “1” of the counter-affidavit)
Designated as Secretary General Staff, Headquarters Philippine Marine Corps. There were numerous instances when CS PMC gave him instructions to inform the MC Central Staff of Conferences to be presided by the latter. MC Corps Central Staff is composed of the MC1, MC2, MC3, MC4, MC5, MC6, MC7 and MFO. CS PMC instructed him that the conferences will be held at the latter’s office because it will just be informal conferences.
[2] Affidavit of MGEN NELSON ALLAGA AFP (Annex “2” of the counter-affidavit)
He attended the conference at the Commandant’s Office and during said conference, LTC REYNALDO F OCSAN then the Marine Corps Staff for Intelligence was silent and did not participate in the course of the discussions.
[3] Affidavit of CAPT RONALDO V JUAN PN (M) and 22 Enlisted Personnel (Annex “3” of the counter-affidavit)
They have worked with LTC OCSAN during his stint as Asst Chief of Staff for Intelligence (MC2) of the Phil Marine Corps. They attest that they have not been, by any means, talked to, persuaded, induced or influenced by LTC OCSAN to destabilize or withdraw support form the government whatsoever, much more prior to and subsequent to 23 Feb 06.
[4] Affidavit of MAJ ERIC A MACAAMBAC PN (M) (Annex “4” of the counter-affidavit)
He attests that he has not been, by any means, talked to, persuaded, induced or influenced by LTC OCSAN to destabilize or withdraw support form the government whatsoever, much more prior to and subsequent to 23 Feb 06.
LTC OCSAN gave his statement before the ADHOC Investigating Committee and the same is attached as Annex “M” of the ADHOC Committee report. LTC OCSAN signed the sworn statement. The sworn statement contains the following:
He is the Asst. Chief of Staff for Intelligence, MC2 Philippine Marine Corps whose primary function is to assist the Commandant, PMC in making decisions pertaining to intelligence.
As MC2, they received information since December last year that some of their units might join the destabilization plot. However, further clarifications have proven that those were just disinformation. As to any information about any destabilization plot prior to 23/24Feb, 06, he was not sure if these were received by their Office.
On 23 Feb 06, the AFP was on red alert but his security teams didn’t see any indications of unusual movement. In the evening, the CS instructed all MC Staff and Unit Commanders to proceed to the Commandant’s Office for a meeting. All the MC Staff, Battle Staff and Unit Commanders including COL QUERUBIN were present in the informal meeting which the Commandant presided. The Commandant mentioned about the red alert situation and information about some units in the AFP that might destabilize. When the FOIC arrived, the group ventilated their grievances and problems. The FOIC assured the group that he will work on the problems stated and further dissuaded the Marines from joining the destabilization plot before leaving. When the meeting was again convened by the Commandant, he said that he would not put the life of any Marine on line if he doesn’t know the cause. When the Commandant asked the group as to their view on the destabilization, subj O, as intelligence officer, assured him that there were no movements seen. The meeting ended at around 240400H Feb.
On 24 Feb 06, there was an instruction to the Commandant to report to FOIC on the morning of the same day. After the group went out of the Commandant’s Office, subj O asked permission from the CS to attend the 9th day prayer of his deceased brother in Dagupan City. At about 0900H, he left the Marine Barracks and headed to Dagupan City.
On 26 Feb 06 at lunchtime, he was informed by his Deputy that MGEN MIRANDA was relieved and that the Deputy Commandant will assume the Commandant’s position. Thinking that there will be a change of command ceremony, he left Dagupan at 1400H. At 1830H, he was back in the Barracks where he saw civilians in front of the Brown Hall and noticed COL QUERUBIN walking towards the Brown Hall with some civilians and media people. While he was already aware that COL QUERUBIN was calling for civilians to support the Marines, he was however unaware of the Querubin’s motive. There was also a meeting wherein the Marine Officers questioned the sudden relief of GEN MIRANDA which led some officers to decide to resign. As to subj O, he never thought of resigning. At around midnight, GEN ALLAGA called for a meeting where he tried to pacify and convince the officers not to make an issue out the sudden relief of GEN MIRANDA. After GEN ALLAGA was assured of the support of the four Major Units except the 1st Marine Brigade headed by COL QUERUBIN, he talked with the staff officers in the conference room then went out and talked to the media. During those times when GEN ALLAGA met the media, COL QUERUBIN was with him.
LTC VALENTINE T HIZON O-9476 PN (M) In his Counter-Affidavit, he alleged among others, that,
He denies the charges against him.
He only knows his co-respondents who are members of the Marines Coy. He does not know the respondents who are members of the Philippine Army. He never met them nor had dealings with them.
He never connived, confederated with, helped nor encouraged anybody to cause a mutiny or withdraw support from the Commander-in-chief or any lawfully constituted authority.
On 23 Feb 06, he was regularly reporting and performing his functions as member of the Special Staff.
He was present during the meeting in the early morning of 24 Feb 06 at the General Headquarters of the Philippine Marines. He was asked to join by MGEN MIRANDA through his aide-de camp at around 2:00 a.m.
The meeting already started when the FOIC arrived and he joined the meeting for less than 1 hour.
During the meeting, MGEN MIRANDA asked for their sentiments and opinions regarding the alleged withdrawal of support by certain element of the Scout Ranger.
No consensus to withdraw support during the meeting was reached after the opinion of those present was heard. The Marine Corps was united in their desire to follow the chain of command. He was categorical that he was not in favor of withdrawal of support and he was also against any move to join mass actions by other groups. He submitted affidavits of witnesses to confirm this.
He supported MGEN ALLAGA when he was appointed as Acting Commandant.
He did not officially report what transpired on 24 Feb 06 because all his superior officers were present at that time.
In support to his counter-affidavit, he submitted the following exhibits:
[1] Affidavit of LTC BERNARDO C FERRER PN (M) GSC (Annex “A” of the counter-affidavit)
Designated as Marine Corps Staff for Logistics. MC4. He witnessed how the arguments of LTC HIZON turned the tide of the discussion into a more logical direction and that his skillful presentation of viewpoints significantly contributed to the termination of the debate which provided the resolve for the Marine Corps to remain with and follow the Chain of Command. He attested that LTC HIZON has neither participated nor demonstrated any action linking him to the reported conspiracy to begin or to cause a mutiny against the President particularly during the series of events or dates prior, during and after the 23rd of February 06.
[2] Affidavit of COL JONATHAN C MARTIR PN (M) GSC (Annex “B” of the counter-affidavit)
During the conference at the Office of the Commandant, he had the chance to talk to personally ask the stand on the issue of LTC HIZON who told him “No sir, kalokohan yan sir, walang mangyayari diyan sir. Based on intelligence reports received and monitored by the Intelligence Division of his unit, LTC HIZON has never been implicated in any destabilization moves against the government.
[3] Affidavit of CAPT JESUS C MILLAN PN (M) GSC (Annex “C” of the counter-affidavit)
Designated Director of the Naval Management and Fiscal Office. He attested that LTC HIZON has no involvement in the reported conspiracy against the government.
[4] Affidavit of CMS GENEROSO A BAGORIO PN (M) (Annex “D” of the counter-affidavit)
Designated Command Sgt Major, Philippine Marine Corps. He attended the conference at the Commandant’s Office and during said conference, the argument of LTC HIZON on the issue of critical mass has significantly contributed to the immediate termination of the meeting.
[5] Affidavit of LTC ELMER A ESTOPIN PN (M) GSC (Annex “E” of the counter-affidavit)
He attended the conference at the Commandant’s Office and during said conference, he observed that LTC HIZON was not in favor of the insinuation of COL QUERUBIN to join the action of the critical mass at EDSA.
[6] Affidavit of MGEN NELSON ALLAGA AFP (Annex “F” of the counter-affidavit)
He attended the conference at the Commandant’s Office and during said conference, he noted that LTC HIZON was against the insinuations of destabilization moves propounded in the course of the discussions.
Statement of LTC VALENTINE HIZON PN (M) was taken by the ADHOC Investigating Committee and the same is attached as Annex YY of the Ad Hoc committee report. LTC HIZON did not sign the sworn statement but is certified by the transcriber Maria Carla R Pineda and subscribed before CPT ARMANDO PAREDES JAGS. The transcript contains the following:
He was the Director of the Marine Corps Management and Fiscal Office.
He was present during the conference at the Commandant’s Office on the morning of 24 Feb 06. What was discussed during that time was more on what will be the action of Corps with regard to some information that its only the Marine Corps from among the elite unit of the Armed Forces, that is inclined to join the move to overthrow the government through sort of withdrawal of support. Actually, the meeting already started when he arrived.
He talked during the discussion to lead the thinking of those present in an objective way or the way we should think. He never talked against or in favor of it, what he did was to guide the discussion in such a way that everybody will be able to think clearly, to get rid of the fear that other sectors of the society is implanting in the minds of the Armed Forces that the society will be drained if the leadership will be changed.
He did not hear chanting to go or no go for the withdrawal of support.
When the FOIC arrived, the FOIC was asked to clear and explain the real content of the Mayuga report regarding the cheating that apparently some of those officers were informed by their juniors.
There were some insinuations that the Scout Ranger and Special Action Force of the PNP were already on to the move of withdrawing their support. MGEN MIRANDA insisted that the issues being used by those against the administration are no longer the issue. In addition, MGEN MIRANDA was not inclined to commit the Marine Corps in such a movement.
The agenda of the meeting that night was a valid issue for discussion because the information has been going on for several months.
He cannot validate it but it has been going on and there were so many information through text that there is such move, only the specific day is not mentioned. He received text messages on these but oblivious the source. He verified some of these but found no answers.
During the relief of MGEN MIRANDA, some officers intimidated that they should not allow the relief of MGEN MIRANDA and that they should voice their sentiments formally.
As to who initiated this, LTC BIYO is in a better position to know who they are because LTC BIYO was arguing with some of these officers. He thinks it was COL QUERUBIN but it will be more specific if LTC BIYO will be asked.
When he was asked by MGEN MIRANDA on his opinion on the issue that there were some insinuation that the Marines should join the Ranger and the SAF, he answered the following:
“What is this action that we should take? Is this a coup d’etat or what?
They said it was not a coup d’etat; it’s just only a withdrawal of support.
He answered, “bakit withdrawal of support?” Anong magiging basis sa withdrawal of support?”
They said that since it is EDSA Revolution and there would be a critical mass at EDSA, then they will just join the two groups in withdrawing support, parang ganun yung grand plan.
Somebody insinuated na parang botohan because that is the style of leadership of MGEN MIRANDA. The action of the group should be the decision of the majority and not of only one man.
The way he saw it, those who were insinuating withdrawal of support could not even make a complete statement. They were just carried away by their emotions.
He told the attendees that they should stay with the chain of command and the chain of command will decide for them. It is not wise for the AFP to support a critical mass. Everybody during that time agreed. He believes the purpose of MGEN MIRANDA in calling him was to defuse the discussion and turn it against those insinuating.
MGEN MIRANDA knew that he is for a change but not for bloody means or radical means.
He however heard somebody said, “kung hindi natin magagawa ito before, wala na ito.” He said, maybe it was COL QUERUBIN or COL DE LEON.
As to the standoff, he was also surprised but he does know who led that unusual incident.
LTC CUSTODIO J PARCON O-9702 PN (M).
LTC PARCON avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
The three exhibits attached to the Charge Sheet namely, Sworn Statement given to Ad Hoc Investigation Committee, and Sworn Statements of MGEN MIRANDA and LTCOL CARDEL.
For AW 67:
MGEN MIRANDA never mentioned him in his Sworn Statement and that LTCOL CARDEL only mentioned him once when he was seen by the said officer in the meeting called by MGEN MIRANDA on the midnight of 24 Feb. Neither did they mention any role he played that can be construed as attempting to join or start a mutiny.
He went to the meeting on 23 Feb as this was called by the Commandant. During the free-flowing discussion, he was merely asked, like all the officers present, to express his opinion. Besides, it was made clear that there would be no troop movements, including participation in any protest action. There were no overt acts that could remotely give rise to such action.
Neither did he try to persuade any Marine Personnel or officer or any soldier to stage a mutiny, rebellion or unlawful action against the government prior to, during, and after the incidents that took place on 23-26 Feb 06 at the PMC Headquarters. This could be attested by the joint affidavit of his MC5 staff.
For AW 96:
He again stressed that the Sworn Statements of MGEN MIRANDA and LTCOL CARDEL did not mention anything about any action he made or role he played during the meeting. If his mere presence in the meeting was the basis of his having violated AW 96, it must be recalled that he went to the meeting as instructed by then Commandant MGEN MIRANDA. It was his duty to obey his instruction
There was no omission on his part to make an official report of the events which transpired from 23-26 Feb 06 since it was not his duty to do the same. It’s MC-3’s duty to make the official report. Besides, there was clearly no need to make the same because all the senior officers were present during those events which transpired last 23-26 Feb 06. However, had he been instructed to make the report, then he should have gladly abided by it.
His Sworn Statement was taken in violation of his constitutional rights as a person under interrogation, thus, it should be excluded and considered inadmissible in evidence. On 4 May 06, he was summoned before an Ad hoc Committee wherein the said committee apprised him of his constitutional rights. However, he stressed that no member of the committee asked him if he ever wanted to have a counsel of his own choice. More importantly, he was not asked if he was waiving his right to counsel during the interrogation. The interrogation and investigation conducted by the committee created an atmosphere very similar to that under a custodial investigation. Because from the time he was summoned by the committee, he was already eyed as one of those involved or one of the suspects. When the process of interrogation tends to elicit incriminating statements, effectively, a custodial investigation occurs. Such incriminating questions were asked from him for an offense which he is suspected to have committed. Assuming that the investigation conducted was not in the nature of a custodial investigation, Article III, Sec 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution still extends to suspects not yet in custody as in the present case.
Lastly, CPT ARMANDO PAREDES does not have the appropriate authority and legal standing, as required by law, to stand as accuser before a GCM. Therefore, it also follows that Charge Sheet is legally defective. In view of the foregoing, there is no prima facie evidence to proceed with the trial, otherwise, his right to due process would be violated.
In support to his counter-affidavit, he submitted a joint-affidavit of his witnesses:
[1] Joint Affidavit of Officers and EP assigned at the Office of the Asst Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, MC5, HqBn, PMC, Phil Navy stationed at Marine Barracks Manila, Taguig City (Annex “1” of the counter-affidavit)
They worked with LTC PARCON during his stint as Asst Chief of Staff for Plans and Program (MC5) of the Phil Marine Corps from 16 Nov 05 to 24 July 06. During the entire period that LTC PARCON was the AC of S for Plans and Programs, he never discussed with any of them anything about withdrawal of support from the Commander-in-chief or government. Neither did he ask any of them at any point in time about their sentiments on any issue or scandal in the government. He only discusses with them issues and concerns involving management, operation and implementation of the plans and programs under their office.
Statement of LTC PARCON was taken by the ADHOC Committee and the same is attached as Annex “P” of the ADHOC Committee report. Signed by LTC PARCON and subscribed before CPT ARMANDO P PAREDES. He stated the following in his sworn statement:
He is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs of PMC.
On 23 Feb 06, early morning, he just came from Singapore, thus, he was busy preparing his report to the Commandant. He reported back for work and from time to time, they were called by CS regarding the present situation. At about midnight, a meeting was called by the Commandant where all the Staff, COL MARTIR, MGEN ALLAGA, COL QUERUBIN, and the rest of the Commanders were present. The FOIC also attended the meeting but stayed for only 30 minutes. He saw BGEN LIM leaving the Commandant’s office.
The FOIC was there and one of the problems discussed was the housing problem. The discussion focused on promotions, housing and other trivial matters and most of the Commanders and Senior Officers were given the chance to talk. When he was asked for his opinion, he voiced out that if for example, the Commandant says that the CS will withdraw support from the government and the other Major Service Commanders will also withdraw support, then he would also withdraw his support regardless of the legality or illegality of the withdrawal of support. His belief was in line with the chain of command.
As the meeting was on going, the Commandant solicited the bond of the Marines with the guidance that the MC should abide by the Chain of command. For him, if the Commandant did not that, the Corps had a tendency to disintegrate. The Commandant did not say much for it was the Senior Officers and Staff who were busy discussing. The withdrawal of support might have been discussed but the same was not the center of the discussion.
On 26 Feb 06, he and his family went to church in the morning then he returned to the MBPB at around 1500H because the CS, PMC called for a meeting. He arrived at MBPB past 1600H. The Staff were gathered in the Office of the CS, PMC when MGEN MIRANDA and MGEN ALLAGA arrived from HPN. Only then was he informed of the relief of MGEN MIRANDA. As for him, he felt that MGEN MIRANDA was relieved dishonorably and unceremoniously because it was hastily done on a Sunday and without a formal turnover ceremony. Those present asked the wisdom of the dishonorable removal of the Commandant. He is of the view that if the Commandant could be dishonorably removed without reason, then the same could be easily done to them. In the midst of all these, he thought of resigning from the military service. Lastly, he perceived the act of COL QUERUBIN in calling the civil society to protect the Marine Corps as inappropriate.
LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN O-9722 PN (M).
LTC VILLASAN avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
His alleged involvement in the so-called Attempting to Begin/create Mutiny on 23 Feb 06 appears to be based solely on presence in the meeting called by their then Commandant MGEN MIRANDA.
He attended such meeting in obedience to a directive sent to him by the SGS before midnight of 23 Feb. It was not done out of own volition. Such meeting was attended by other staff and senior officers of PMC and was also attended by the FOIC of the Philippine navy. This clearly shows that he had no intention of attending any meeting or action that is illegal or against the government. The notice to attend such meeting is confirmed in the affidavit of MAJ RENATO DARACAN dtd 1 Aug 06.
When he proceeded to the Commandant’s office, he had neither idea nor knowledge of the purpose of the meeting. Since it was mandatory for him to comply with the directive from their Commandant especially so that FOIC of the PN was also set to attend said meeting, he had to attend even if he was already at home in Marikina City with his family.
Nothing illegal or violative of the Articles of War was discussed during the very informal and freewheeling meeting and that there was no definite plan arrived at for the Marines to withdraw support from Pres. Arroyo. Since the Commandant did not express any conviction to join any mass protest actions against the government, he just kept silent. FOIC also enjoined the Marine Corps to be united and not to do anything illegal. Their commandant, before leaving, again stressed that there should be no movement.
In the Sworn statement of COL JONATHAN MARTIR dtd 11 Apr 06, there was no mention of his name as an active participant/supporter of the alleged Mutiny. COL MARTIR’S affidavit dtd 31 Jul 06, stated that:
“Based on the Intelligence Report received and monitored by the Intelligence division of his unit, which was monitoring destabilization activities against the government, he has never been implicated in any destabilization moves against the government prior, during or after 24 and 26 Feb 06 events at the Phil Marines Corps headquarters.
Even the Sworn Statement of BGEN ALLAGA and LTC WILLIAM CARDEL dtd 30 Mar 06 and 4 May 06 respectively, only mentioned of his passive presence in the meeting called by MGEN MIRANDA. They never mentioned any statement uttered by him that would indicate his support in any Mutiny/destabilization move.
MGEN ALLAGA’S affidavit dtd 01 Aug 06 stated that: “During the conference, LTC VILLASAN did not participate in the course of the discussion.” ; “To my personal knowledge, he is against any destabilization efforts as he has avoided being influenced after the conference”
Affidavits of MAJOR GENERALE JR dtd 2 Aug 06, ILT KRISTINE B SALON, et al dtd 31 Jul 06, and civilian employee MS Mercedita S Laurente dtd 31 Jul 06 affirmed his lack of sympathy to a Mutiny.
His implication with the supposed illegal acts of the other officers mentioned in the two charges, particularly those coming from the PA is totally false for he did not personally know any of the Army Officers presently charged nor had he any contact with them especially regarding destabilization plot.
Assuming that there were overt acts done or words uttered by any of the other officers charged, such should be treated individually and separately.
Charge 1 and 2 suffer serious and fatal defects that go into the merits of the cases that warrant their outright dismissal. The accuser, CPT ARMANDO P PAREDES JAGS, who signed both charges, has no personal knowledge on any of the material allegations thereof which is contrary to what was placed in the charges.
In support to his counter-affidavit, he submitted the following exhibits:
[1] Affidavit of MAJ RENATO S DARACAN – Secretary General Staff, Headquarters Phil Marine Corps (Annex 1 of the counter affidavit)
[2] Affidavit of COL JONATHAN C MARTIR – assigned with Combat and Service Group Brigade, Phil Marine Corps (Annex 2 of the counter affidavit)
[3] Affidavit of MGEN NELSON L ALLAGA – Commandant, Phil Marine Corps (Annex 3 of the counter affidavit)
[4] Affidavit of MAJ SERGIO A GENERALE JR – Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, Phil Marine Corps (Annex 4 of the counter affidavit)
[5] Affidavit of 1LT KRISTINE B SALON – assigned at the Office of the Asst Chief of Staff for Personnel, HQSBn, PMC (Annex 5 of the counter affidavit)
[6] Affidavit of Mercedita S Laurente – Acting Chief, Civilian Affairs Branch, PMC (Annex 6 of the counter affidavit)
Statement of LTC VILLASAN executed before the ADHOC Investigating Committee and the same is attached as Annex “L” of the ADHOC committee report. He signed the sworn statement. The sworn statement contains the following:
Presently the Asst CS for personnel of the Marine Corps.
He was the Platoon Commander in MBLT 4 when his unit was involved in the failed coup last 1989. COL QUERUBIN was also one of the leaders. Both got back in the military service when they were given amnesty.
As MC1, he’s in charge of the career management of officers and EP including promotion, assignment and to sustain the morale of the Marine Corps Personnel. The request for Brigade Commander’s movement, passes/leave from their area to Metro Manila also passes through his office.
As to COL QUERUBIN, he saw the said officer a day or two days from 24 Feb 06 and that the presence of the latter in Manila is with the authority of the Commandant.
On 23 Feb 06, the military was on red alert. As the MC1, he is part of the battle staff of the Commandant.
On 26 Feb 06 at around lunchtime, he was advised by the SGS to report to the HPMC where the battle staff convened.
In the evening of 23 Feb 06, upon arrival of the Commandant from the conference in GHQ, he summoned through the SGS, all officers of Marine Barracks to his office. Upon his arrival at the Commandant’s Office, he saw BGEN LIM coming out and it was his presumption that BGEN LIM was convincing the Commandant to join him in withdrawing support from the gov’t. Such presumption was based on succeeding events and status of the general. The officers present were COL MARTIR, COL QUERUBIN, Marine Corps Staff, and other Commanders in Marine Barracks.
The Commandant, in the meeting, said that he will not allow any Marine to get involved in anything which they have no knowledge about and he would not go to the extent of sacrificing lives. He never uttered a word not because he already knew of the plan to withdraw support but because he already learned his lesson during the 1989 coup and that there was no open discussion that night. Later on, he learned that FOIC was arriving and it was then his impression that since it was with the guidance of FOIC, everything which follows will be in accordance with the chain of command because the arrival of the FOIC implies that he’s on top of the situation.
When FOIC arrived, he stated that he will do everything to address their needs. During the meeting, somebody from the group made a comment that there were already civilians marching on the streets and they were waiting for the Marines to join them, but BGEN ALLAGA reacted casually that the civilians were supporters of politicians so the Marines have nothing to do with them. Chief of Staff COL DE LEON also cautioned everybody not to say anything on what had been discussed in that meeting. He was of the impression that the same was said by COL DE LEON because it was a purely academic discussion considering that they were assessing different political situations and has nothing to do with conspiracy to commit mutiny.
In the early morning of 24 Feb 06, he went home around 0700H to change clothes and to take a rest and never returned to the Headquarters because he was ill for two days.
On 25 Feb 06, at about 1400H/1500H, he reported to the Headquarters as he was directed by the Commandant to draft a letter addressed to the FOIC assuring him that everything is well in the Marine Corps and are abiding with the chain of command and that COL QUERUBIN is in Manila. The letter, as per report of the Aide de Camp, was forwarded to the office of the FOIC after it was signed by the Commandant.
On 26 Feb 06, a text message from the SGS at around 1300H/1400H, directed him to proceed to the Marine Corps. Upon arrival at that place, he went to his office where he learned that there was a turn over of command at HPN. He also saw civilians, media and COL QUERUBIN in front of the brown hall discussing something. When BGEN ALLAGA and MGEN MIRANDA arrived, they all proceeded to the CS’s office. Later on, Sen Biazon and the other Commandants arrived. Then he went back to his office to go through some papers when he and other officers present were again called to gather at the Commander’s lounge. Thereafter, BGEN ALLAGA made a press release to put a stop to everything.
LTC ROMULO L GUALDRAPA O-113766 PN (M).
LTC GUALDRAPA avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He denies the charges against him.
On or before midnight of 23 February 2006, he was informed by the Secretary of the General Staff, MAJ RENATO S DARACAN to report to the Commandant’s Office.
When he arrived at the Commandant’s Office, MGEN MIRANDA, BGEN ALLAGA and other Marine Officers were inside the office.
He was oblivious of the actual purpose and nature of the assembly. He could hardly follow the flow of discussion as all sorts of comments, remarks, conversations and opinions filled the room.
He did not participate in the discussion and he settled as a mere spectator in the entire proceedings. The assembly was only a spectacle of speculating men. These men, however, shared a common ground to follow the chain of command and respect the rule of law.
It is highly inconceivable for him to participate in any form of lawlessness, as he is due for retirement in Nov 06 and he learned his lessons the hard way when he was incarcerated in Phil. Marine Brig for 21 months in connection with the aborted coup d’etat in 1989.
He fully supported the appt. of MGEN ALLAGA as Acting Commandant on 26 Feb 06. He even conducted reservists training in Ternate, Cavite in support of MGEN ALLAGA’s program to strengthen the reserve force.
In support to his counter-affidavit, he submitted the following exhibits:
[1] Affidavit of MAJ RENATO S DARACAN (OS) PN (M) (Annex “A” of the counter-affidavit)
Designated as Secretary General Staff, Headquarters Philippine Marine Corps. There were numerous instances when CS PMC gave him instructions to inform the MC Central Staff of Conferences to be presided by the latter. MC Corps Central Staff is composed of the MC1, MC2, MC3, MC4, MC5, MC6, MC7 and MFO. CS PMC instructed him that the conferences will be held at the latter’s office because it will just be informal conferences.
[2] Affidavit of MGEN NELSON ALLAGA AFP (Annex “B” of the counter-affidavit)
He attended the conference at the Commandant’s Office and during said conference, LTC ROMULO L GUALDRAPA was silent and did not participate in the course of the discussions.
[3] Affidavit of LTC ELMER A ESTOPIN PN (M) GSC (Annex “C” of the counter-affidavit)
He attended the conference at the Commandant’s Office and during said conference, LTC ROMULO L GUALDRAPA was silent and was confused with the conduct of the discussion. LTC GUALDRAPA was seated near me.
[4] Counter-Affidavit of LTC ROMEO C DUMAQUITA PN (M) GSC (Annex “D” of the counter-affidavit)
He attended the conference at the Commandant’s Office and during said conference, LTC ROMULO L GUALDRAPA was silent during the course of the meeting.
The statement of LTC GUALDRAPA was taken by the ADHOC Committee and the same is attached as “Annex EEE” of the Ad Hoc Committee report. He did not sign the statement but the same is certified by the transcriber Jedielyn M Tolentino and subscribed before CPT ARMANDO PAREDES JAGS. The transcript contains the following:
He was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reservist and Reserve Force Development, Philippine Marine Corps.
On the evening of 24 Feb 06, they were instructed by the secretary of Chief of Staff to assemble at the Chief of Staff for instruction of the Commandant. MGEN MIRANDA apprised them that there will be a destabilization action that will be going on the next day. And MGEN MIRANDA told them that, “ayokong ipahamak and Marines. Kung kailangan magbuo tayo…” Ganoon and pagkakasabi niya.
The discussion during the conference was confusing. He just remembered that at the end there was a consensus to support, go or no go. But he could not understand why go or not go. He stayed in the conference for about 2 hours, from 12 o’clock to 2 o’clock.
He came to understand the discussion in the evening only the next day. The discussion was whether to support the movement outside or not. His opinion on the matter was not asked during the conference.
On 26 Feb 06, another conference was held at the Office of the Chief of Staff. It was there that BGEN ALLAGA told them that he is now the Commandant.
Some officers were surprised and another discussion ensued.
He could not recall the other occurrences during the conference. He just maintained his silence. He already has a bad experience during the 1989 coup d’etat so he does not want a repeat of the same.
LTC ACHILLES S SEGUMALIAN O-116089 PN (M)
LTC SEGUMALIAN avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
His presence in the conference called by MGEN RENATO MIRANDA in the early morning of 24 Feb 06 is in compliance with a directive from the Office of the Commandant. His personal perception of that proceedings with the commandant was that the Commandant was trying to get direct information from his staff, unit commanders and other officers as to their sentiments on current issues and to open up on their grievances with the end in view of arriving at a proper handling of the problem/arriving at the proper decision. He further emphasized that nobody in the conference made any proposal to commit a crime. A sentiment raised was not necessarily an overt act to commit mutiny.
His whereabouts starting from the early morning of 24 Feb until the evening of 26 Feb 06 can be accounted for and his whereabouts negate any contact/movement which could be interpreted as attempt/beginning mutiny.
At midnight of 24 Feb 06, he attended a conference called by CPMC at his office which ended at 250500H Feb 06. After the conference, he proceeded to COL BAÑEZ office to have coffee where an EP office staff asked if he received orders to move his unit to NCRCOM. He immediately went to see MC3 COL ARMANDO BAÑEZ to confirm the matter but the latter was at the Office of COL DE LEON. Upon reaching the office of COL DE LEON, he immediately informed them about the matter. COL BAÑEZ and COL DE LEON advised him not to move his unit in the absence of any directive or clearance from them or from higher headquarters of from NCRCOM. Thereafter, he went to his office at H2MB to take his breakfast.
At about 0830H, he attended PMRF conference after receiving instruction by phone. The conference was presided by COL H\JONATHAN MARTIR at the CSSB conference room. At 09830H, the conference ended and he returned to his office where he stayed until evening.
The whole day of 25 Feb 06, he alleged that there were no unusual incident in the 2nd Marine Battalion Barracks.
At about 260500H Feb 06, he woke up and went jogging around the camp until 0630H. At around 0800H, he changed to his BDA uniform as prescribed during red alert. At 1000H, he went to the BNS transient officers’ quarters to get some personal things. At 1030H, he dropped by at the office of COL DE LEON to have coffee and to have a chat with him and the other officers present, including BGEN ALLAGA. The latter brought with him rice wine which he shared with the others. At 1130H, he went back to and Marine Battalion barrack for his lunch and thereafter had an afternoon nap. At 1530H, he was awakened by a phone call from COL DE LEON instructing him to proceed to his Office where he was told that there was unofficial information that MGEN MIRANDA will be relieved as Commandant. At 1630H, while he was still at the office of COL DE LEON, he received a phone call from COL MARTIR, instructing him to proceed to his office. He was at COL MARTIR’s office when he received a phone call informing him that MGEN MIRANDA and BGEN ALLAGA were already at the Brown Hall, HPMC, so he, COL MARTIR and LTC ASIDAO proceeded to the office of COL DE LEON where MGEN MIRANDA was conversing with a group pf Marine Officers. Then BGEN ALLAGA entered the room and there were further conversations among them but he did not participate in the conversation.
Some officers ventilated their objection to the unceremonious relief of MGEN MIRANDA but were later dissipated when MGEN MIRANDA explained that he was the one who requested for his relief.
Before he went to COL DE LEON’s office, he heard COL MARTIR ordering the deployment of the Force Recon Battalion outside the Brown Hall and a few minutes thereafter, he received an order from COL DE LEON to form his unit in front of Brown Hall. Force Recon Battalion arrived first followed by the 2nd Marine Battalion and a few minutes later, two more companies of the 2nd Marines Battalion arrived but no hostilities happened.
Thereafter, he joined BGEN ALLAGA in going out of the Brown hall to face the media and announce that the confusion is cleared and that there is no problem with the Chain of Command. After the announcement, a command conference was presided by BGEN ALLAGA at the HPMC conference room. After which, at around midnight, the formed marine units marched back to their respective barracks without any untoward incident.
He refutes the statement made by COL MARTIR that he voted to wait for a critical mass because he never made such statement or vote. He likewise refutes the statement of COL MARTIR that he wanted to resign and that he joined COL QUERUBIN in hatching a since he is unaware of any plan.
The statement of LTC SEGUMALIAN was taken by the ADHOC Investigating Committee and the same is attached as Annex “R” of the ADHOC Committee report. LTC SEGUMALIAN signed the sworn statement. The sworn statement contains the following:
He was the Commanding Officer of 2nd Marine Battalion.
In the early morning of 24 Feb, he was called to the Brown Hall where he joined a lot of officers gathered in the Commandant’s Office. The discussion dwelled on the withdrawal of support until the FOIC arrived. The discussion shifted to the housing problem at the PN Village and on the alleged cheating during the election in Lanao. FOIC left after telling the Marines to remain united.
Then the discussion, presided by MGEN MIRANDA, went back to the withdrawal of support. Individual preferences of those present were taken wherein some opposed while others were of the opinion that it would push through provided that the critical mass could be reached. When asked of his opinion, he said he was for the Commandant.
He learned of the change of command only when MGEN MIRANDA and MGEN ALLAGA arrived at the MBFB sometime 261700H Feb. It was in the office of the CS where MGEN MIRANDA told the Marine Officers present that he was already relieved so when MGEN ALLAGA arrived, some officers were still asking for the reason for his unceremonious relief. That was why some were asking MGEN ALLAGA if he could possibly decline the position in the absence of an explanation from higher headquarters. For some, such act was a form of disrespect to the organization as a whole, thus, others opted to resign. One by one, the group started to move out and while he was going out, he learned that COL MARTIR gave instructions to bring the Force Recon Battalion in front of the Brown Hall. Then COL DE LEON told him to bring the Battalion in front of Brown Hall. As ordered by COL DE LEON, he complied. The elements of the Recon Battalion arrived first followed by his unit while his other two companies arrived late for they were allegedly stopped by COL MARTIR and MAJ HERNANDEZ.
He was surprised when he saw civilians and media people together with COL QUERUBIN gathered outside the Brown Hall. He was encircled together with COL QUERUBIN but he was able to move out.
MAJ FRANCISCO DOMINGO R FERNANDEZ O-10530 PN (M)
MAJ FERNANDEZ avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He vehemently denies having violated AW 67 & 96 as he remained steadfast and committed to his oath of loyalty to the Republic, Philippine Constitution, and the duly established Chain of Command in the AFP and continues to remain so.
The amended Charge Sheet fails to attribute any specific act on his part to constitute a violation of the said AWs, hence, his inability to ascertain the charges hurled against him.
On or about 261500H Feb 06, while at SM, Sta Rosa with his family, he received a text message from his personnel to proceed to the Bonifacio Naval Station due to a developing situation at the Headquarters MC. He immediately went to the Bonifacio Naval Station and reported to his commander, COL RUSTICO GUERRERO.
On or about 262200H Feb 06, he attended a meeting of the officers’ corps of the PM who were onboard Marine Base Manila, Bonifacio Naval Station, Fort Bonifacio, upon order of the newly installed Commandant, BGEN ALLAGA. There were more than 60 marine officers present and the discussion revolved solely around the relief of the former Commandant, MGEN MIRANDA. The meeting presided by BGEN ALLAGA adjourned with the end in view that the Marine Corps shall remain united and will adhere to the chain of command. Subj O interpreted and believed this to mean that all the officers present recognized the authority of the newly installed Commandant.
He attended the meeting since he was summoned by their Commandant, BGEN MIRANDA. If indeed the meeting was illegal and was organized for the purpose of beginning/causing a mutiny, then the purpose should be explained by those who organized the same.
His adherence to the chain of command was readily shown when he reported to his immediate superior, COL GUERRERO, in compliance with the directive issued by BGEN ALLAGA to proceed to the commander’s lounge for a meeting.
After the meeting called by BGEN ALLAGA, he returned to his office to discharge his duties as Director, Research and Doctrine Development Center, Marine Corps Training Center until his assignment as Operations Officer of the 10th Marine Battalion Landing Team deployed in Palawan.
He never attended any meeting during the period as stated in the Charge Sheet or any period for that matter other than that called by BGEN ALLAGA on 262200H Feb 06.
MAJ FERNANDEZ gave his statement before the ADHOC Investigating Committee which is marked as Annex “AAA” of the ADHOC report. He did not sign the statement but the same is certified by the transcriber Maria Carla R Pineda and subscribed before CPT ARMANDO P PAREDES. The transcript of the statement contains the following:
He is currently the Operations officer of MBLT10 assigned in Tinigaban, Puerto Princesa, Palawan City. When he was investigated, he was the Director of Research and Doctrine Development under the Marine Corps Training Center.
The day after the FOIC visited the Marine Corps, he was tasked to come up with an action plan on how to stop politicizing the military and was further tasked to meet USEC RODELIO SANTOS and RAFAEL SANTOS to discuss the agenda which he submitted to the FOIC .
In the afternoon of 25 Feb 06, MGEN MIRANDA called him up for his opinion or feedback on his decision of not giving in to some suggestions that the Marine Corps should act. He however qualified that the act was not really established, for it was not clear if it is the act of marching to EDSA or whatever. He just replied that it was the right thing to do considering the contention of MGEN MIRANDA that he was not willing to sacrifice any life for any action that would be tantamount to having an armed uprising against the government.
He was present in the meeting called by MGEN MIRANDA on 26 Feb 06. Although he was not one of the officers who were for the withdrawal of support, he admitted that in his own understanding, that was the message being conveyed by some officers to the entire Marine Officers present in the meeting. The withdrawal of support can not however be established if such withdrawal is to the chain of command, to the designated commandant or to the government. What they were only saying was “We should withdraw.” Other than that, there was no mention of its intent.
During the meeting, he voiced out his opinion regarding the sudden relief of MGEN MIRANDA. He went on to say that if the officers don’t know the reason behind the relief, then BGEN ALLAGA should explain why some officers were trying to divide the Marine Corps. He felt that all the disinformation going around were meant to make them believe that they’re going to move or fight. The point which he was trying to raise to BGEN ALLAGA was that the Marine Corps was one and united but they should also voice out that an injustice was done. Injustice in the sense that MGEN MIRANDA was not accorded due process when relieved. He also wanted the Marine Corps to make a statement that the Marine Corps deserved respect and that they should not be bastardized.
Some officers in the meeting were also arguing because some officers viewed COL QUERUBIN and LTC SEGUMALIAN’s actions to have gone overboard or “masyadong showbiz.” Such was made when the two officers called the media. Some officers were even pacified when they were about to kick and punch another officer. There was also an agitation when COL QUERUBIN said, “Binastos na tayo, dapat gumalaw na tayo.” However, he cannot ascertain if such was for the withdrawal of support from the government.
They were confined inside the Commander’s lounge, the information was accessible only to fellow Marine Officers. He stated that the conference was purely an academic discussion. When he says academic, its means how the Marines sometimes talk to each other while drinking together or even just having coffee. They don’t really mind the rank, position. They talked as brothers, anybody can speak his mind and say his opinion without it being taken against him.
1LT BELINDA R FERRER O-132579 PN (M)
1LT FERRER avers the following in her counter-affidavit:
She denies the allegations against her.
On the period mentioned in the Amended Charge Sheet, she was the aide-de-camp of MGEN MIRANDA. The amended charge sheet fails to attribute any specific act or omission on her part constituting a violation of the 67th article of war.
On or about 1500H of 26 Feb 06, she received an information from 1LT ALLAN ANGELO TOLENTINO that MGEN MIRANDA was relieved.
In the evening of 26 Feb 06, a discussion among Marine Officers with regard to the relief of MGEN MIRANDA took place at the commander’s lounge. As MGEN MIRANDA was there, she was also there as his aide-de-camp.
Discussions were going on and she was of the impression that the issue revolved solely around the relief of MGEN MIRANDA. The discussion presided by BGEN ALLAGA came to a conclusion that the Marine Corps shall remain united and will adhere to the established chain of command.
If the Armed Forces of the Philippines are of the opinion that the afore-stated meeting was illegal and was organized for the purpose of beginning or causing a mutiny, she believes that the purpose for calling the meeting should be explained by those who organized it.
After the said meeting, she continued to discharge her duties and responsibilities as aide-de-camp of the new commandant until her assignment as liaison officer at Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG).
The statement of 1LT FERRER was taken by the ADHOC Committee which is attached as “Annex CCC” of the ADHOC Committee report. She did not sign the statement. She did not sign the sworn statement but it is certified by the transcriber Jedielyn M Tolentino and subscribed before CPT ARMANDO PAREDES JAGS. The transcript of the sworn statement contains the following:
Presently the Aide de Camp of BGEN ALLAGA. She also served as aide de camp for MGEN MIRANDA.
She knew the meeting that was held on the early morning of either 24 or 25 Feb 06.
She was not allowed to participate in the said meeting since she was just an Aide so she just stayed outside the conference room.
On the so called Marine standoff, she was aboard Marine Barracks Manila. The night that BGEN ALLAGA announced that he is the new Commandant, she was with MGEN MIRANDA accepting all incoming calls for MGEN MIRANDA.
She stated that she was not aware that some junior officers were chanting withdrawal of support in front of BGEN ALLAGA nor was she aware that officers were instigating withdrawal of support against BGEN ALLAGA or against the government.
On 26 Feb 06, when MGEN MIRANDA arrived at the office, she was instructed to fix his things and MGEN MIRANDA went down to the Office of the Chief of Staff.
In the presence of former Commandants, they announced a meeting at the Commander’s Lounge with other Officers. Confused with the situation, she managed to ask permission to make a statement, and she asked “what’s the issue” which was addressed to all but no one answered her query. So she continued with the statement “di ba iyong issue why we are here Sir is dahil na relieve si MGEN MIRANDA. Wala ng ibang issue”. Then she went back to MGEN MIRANDA and continued answering phone calls for the General.
She said that she was not aware that there was chanting of withdrawal of support because for her the issue at that time was the relief of MGEN MIRANDA.
When she was informed that some witnesses: LTC Fernandez, LTC Parcon, Col De Leon have identified her to be one of those who chanted withdrawal of support, she denied the same and said that she hope that they have recorded it for them to find out if she is really the one who shouted the alleged withdrawal.
She testified that BGEN LIM also made a call to the Commandant but prior to Feb 23.
She affirmed that COL QUERUBIN and BGEN LIM visited MGEN MIRANDA on separate dates.
Respondents For The Philippine Army:
BGEN DANILO D LIM O-7665 AFP.
BGEN LIM avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
On or about 221000H Feb 06, he was in Manila to attend the wake of his cousin, Antonio Tan, in Funeraria Paz, Recto Ave., Manila.
At about 1700H – he received a call from Col Ariel Querubin PN(M), informing him that MGEN RENATO MIRANDA, Commandant of Philippine Marines, wanted to meet him to compare notes on the restiveness of some junior officers from the Marines and PNP SAF.
At about 1800H – he went to the headquarters of the Marines where he met Gen Miranda and Col Querubin and all of them decided to talk to the Junior Officers and dissuade them from doing anything outside the chain of command.
At about 2200H – he and his wife went to the wake of his cousin and stayed there until 230200H Feb 06
23 Feb 06
A about 0800H – he attended the funeral mass and interment which lasted until 1100H at the Chinese Cemetery, Rizal Ave., Manila. After the burial, he drove his wife to the office of former Congressman Harry Angpin at Bayview International Tower II, Roxas Blvd., Manila. While in the office, he received a text message from COL QUERUBIN informing him about the plan of some troops to join a protest march the next day, Friday.
At about 1500H – he and Col Querubin met at Rustan’s Supermarket Yumyum Tree Coffee shop in Gloriettta, Makati where they decided to see MGEN RODRIGO MACLANG, then J2 Chief and GEN GENEROSO SENGA, Chief of Staff at that time if possible.
At about 1800H – they arrived at the office of MGEN MACLANG and apprised him of the situation. Then they went to see GEN SENGA to inform the latter about the plan of some troops to join the march on that Friday. They all discussed the possible moves they could make, then GEN SENGA ordered the service Commanders to report to GHQ immediately and upon arrival, they retired to the CSAFP quarters.
Thereafter, he and COL QUERUBIN were called to proceed to the gazebo in the CSAFP‘s quarters. There, they saw the major services commanders such as LTGEN ESPERON, PN VADM MAYUGA and PAF LTGEN REYES. Also present were MGEN MACLANG, MGEN MIRANDA and C/Supt FRANCO of PNP SAF. All the officers present discussed the restiveness of the soldiers, their clamors and grievances and possible actions to be taken. CSAFP ordered the officers to talk to the restive junior officers to dissuade them from proceeding with their plan.
Before he left camp Aguinaldo, he received text messages and calls informing him of alleged reports heard over the radio that he has withdrawn support from the President.
After talking with his officers to close ranks and to account for every single member of the Regiment, he went home to his quarters in Fort Bonifacio.
In the early morning of 24 Feb 06 , GEN MACLANG called him up to inform him that CSAFP might keep him under his custody in view of false reports that he had withdrawn from the chain of command. He voluntarily went to CSAFP to submit himself to his charge to prove that he did not withdraw support from the President and he adheres to the chain of command.
Since then, he had been restricted to his quarters under guard, until 11 Jul 06 when he was transferred to Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal where he’s presently confined.
As to the charges for violation of AW67 and AW96, he went to see then CSAFP for a noble or patriotic purpose to inform him of the plan of disgruntled officers and soldiers of PN (M) and SAF and to ask him to help stop it. He adopted a clipping of a news report in the Phil Daily Inquirer dtd 01 Mar 06 downloaded from its website news.inq7.net where the then CSAFP stated: There is no coup xxx but there is an attempt by some soldiers to join the people in the protest rallies.” (Annex 4 of the CA)
Moreover, in the same news item, it was stated that: “Senga yesterday cleared Lim and Querubin of involvement in a military attempt to unseat Ms Arroyo.” (Annexes 4-a and 4-b of the CA)
He also denied urging GEN SENGA to withdraw support from the President, since GEN SENGA himself confirmed in an interview with Dona Pazzibugan of Phil Daily Inquirer re: “He (GEN SENGA) admitted that they talked about restiveness within their ranks, but insisted that LIM never tried to convince me to join a coup attempt.” (Annex 5 of the CA)
As to the charge for viol of AW 63 in relation to AW 96, the same must be dismissed for he did not authorize ABS CBN to broadcast the video tape nor its release to any person/entity thus, it is illegally obtained evidence which may not be used against him. As he explained to the NBI, the tape had lost its significance when its airing was aborted upon mutual agreement between him, CSAFP and the other service commanders.
The tape did not incite or encourage any soldier, much less the citizenry to rise against the government but in fact, as reported in a national daily,”….defused a potentially bloody confrontation between rebel soldiers and forces loyal to Ms Arroyo.”
Since he did not authorize the release or broadcast of the tape, it is an illegally obtained material and may not be used against him. He asked the NBI to investigate, identify and arrest the person or persons who supplied the tape to ABS CBN. No reply yet from the NBI on his request.
As to the charge for violation of AW 64 in relation to AW 97: he did not by-pass his superiors in SOCOM and PA when he accompanied COL QUERUBIN to report to GEN SENGA. He believes that since the troops involved were not of PSA, the CS was the proper officer to be informed of the march especially that part of the group, SAF, belonged to the civilian section under the DILG. GEN SENGA’s position allowed him protocol access to the DILG to relate the problem about SAF. The then CS was able to ask SAF C/Supt FRANCO to go to the gazebo in the evening of 23 Feb where they discussed about the problem.
Moreover, he denied having ordered MAJ ORIEL PANGCOG to send troops to Manila without coordinating with higher headquarters. It was his former Chief of Staff LTC NESTOR FLORDELIZA who, by authority of an HPA directive to organize 10th SRC issued last Nov 05, ordered MAJ PANGCOG to send troops to FSRR Liason Office in Fort Bonifacio to fill up the 10th SRC. They were tasked by higher headquarters to organize the company and its men and materials would come form the realignment of personnel and equipment from the line units.
The order came from HPA last Nov 05.
In closing, he stated that last 25 Feb 06, the President was scheduled to visit the housing project of FSRR in San Miguel, Bulacan. The property was adjacent to Camp Tecson of FSSR. If he had the intention to topple down the government, the President’s visit would be an opportune occasion. But he never entertained the thought for he is a professional soldier loyal to his oath.
In support to his counter-affidavit, he submitted the following exhibits:
[1] Affidavit of LTC ALLEN A CAPUYAN PA (Annex 1)
Presently the Battalion Commander of FSRR based in Calinog Iloilo. He attended lectures where BGEN LIM delivered a speech where he emphasized to his officers and men that he will not allow any member of his unit to join any destabilization plot or coup d’etat. He warned his personnel to always follow the chain of command. On 23 Feb 06 at 12 midnight, BGEN LIM called him and advised him to ignore the rumors that he is withdrawing support to the duly constituted government and the rumors that he is joining a coup d’etat.
[2] Affidavit of LTC MACAIROG S ALBERTO O-9568 (GSC) INF PA (Annex 2)
In 2005 and early this year, rumors of coup d’etat and other destabilization efforts were branded about almost regularly causing alarm not only to the civilian populace but also to the military sector. Whenever there were rumors of this kind, BGEN LIM would call him up and tell him that their troops would not be involved in any coup or destabilization attempts and he would order him to account for his troops. Sometime on the last week of Feb, BGEN LIM called him and told him that if rumors reached him that some elements of the military would be involved in destabilization efforts or anti-government activities, he should account for and tell his men that their regiment would not be involved in it.
[3] Sworn Statement of COL EDMUNDO MALABANJOT (Annex 3)
He stated that he received a call from BGEN LIM on 23 Feb 06 regarding the rumors in Metro Manila that the latter has already withdrawn support from the President and the latter informed him that he is committed to the chain of command. (Annex KK of the Ad Hoc committee report)
[4] Printed copy of news clipping entitled “Gazmin Gringo” and “Survey favorite” downloaded from news.inq7.net (Annex 4)
The news clipping consists of 3 articles.
Lim first met with the anti-Arroyo critics in July at the peak of the “Hello Garci” controversy involving alleged rigging of the 2004 presidential election results. He was reportedly sympathetic to their cause, but refused to lead any move to oust Ms Arroyo. But like the retired generals, Lim didn’t want to have Ms Arroyo removed by a bloody military uprising, Seneres said.
Like former Sen and ex-army Col Gregorio Honasan, who was once detailed in Fort Magsaysay, Lim and Gazmin are well regarded by the members of the 7th Infantry Battalion in Nueva Ecija. The two officers kept quiet after Aquino reiterated that she would not support any coup against Ms Arroyo.
In October, Lim reportedly agreed to support the anti-Arroyo forces, provided that these forces take to the streets first before they abandon their command. The Constabulary generals welcomed Lim’s statement, but continued to persuade him to take a more active role.
Senga yesterday cleared Lim and Querubin of involvement in a military attempt to unseat Ms Arroyo (Annex 4-a)
“There is no coup,” Senga said. “But there is an attempt by some soldiers to join the people in the protest rallies,” he said (Annex 4-b)
[5] Printed copy of The Nation/Stories re: “Senga denies discussing withdrawal of support” downloaded from news.inq7.net (Annex 5)
Senga relieved Lim as head of the Army’s 1st Scout Rangers Regiment and placed him “under custody’ late Thursday night after their meeting. Senga would not divulge what “issues affecting the Armed Forces’ he discussed with Lim and Marine Col Ariel Querubin.
He admitted they talked about “restiveness within their ranks”, but insisted Lim “never tried to convince me to join a coup attempt.” (Annex 5-a)
[6] Reply Letter of BGEN Lim dtd 11 July 06 to Atty Reynaldo O Esmeralda of the NBI re: video tape of withdrawal of support aired on Channel 2 (Annex 6)
He conveyed that the airing of the tape on Channel 2 was not authorized by him and he asked NBI to identify arrest and investigate the person or persons who supplied the tape to ABS-CBN.
[7] Sworn Statement of COL REYNALDO ORDOÑEZ o-7670, CAV (GSC) PA (Annex 7)
BGEN LIM attended a symposium in Camp Aguinaldo sometime in the first week of August 2005 where BGEN LIM told them that: “we could not do justice to the peace agreement if YOU continued to exist” and that peace and progress should only be achieved by peaceful means.
[8] Sworn Statement of MAJ CORLETO VINLUAN PA (Annex 8)
BGEN LIM attended a symposium in Camp Aguinaldo sometime in the first week of August 2005 where BGEN LIM spoke about the value of the chain of command. He admonished the junior officers not to succumb to pressures, invitations and promises of some elements of the AFP who were trying to recruit officers and men for their sinister plans.
[9] Joint statement of LTC NESTOR FLORDELIZA with other officers (Annex 9)
Annex “XX” of the Ad Hoc committee report
They stated that they all belong to the 1st Scout Ranger Regiment under the command of BGEN LIM. During their staff conferences, BGEN LIM has always advised them not be misled by those who advocated violence as means of change. BGEN LIM also told them that all grievances could be brought to and addressed by the AFP chain of command in a peaceful and rational way. BGEN LIM barred outsiders from recruiting members of the Regiment. He discouraged his officers and men from talking to these outsiders even if they once belonged to their unit.
The statement of BGEN LIM was taken by the ADHOC Investigating Committee and the same is attached as Annex “H” of the ADHOC Committee Report. BGEN LIM signed the sworn statement. The sworn statement contains the following:
He used to be the Regimental Commander of the First Scout Ranger Regiment.
His conviction is never to be involved in any violent act again as he has done in the events of December 1989 and the same may be attested to by persons executing affidavits to that effect.
He came down from Bulacan on 22 Feb 2006 to attend the wake/interment of his cousin.
He admitted that he went to Tanay sometime on 14 February to visit his lot which he has acquired from a subdivision intended for Army officers and he also briefly visited GEN YANO.
He has never talked to former President Estrada in his entire life.
He admitted that his unit received funds in the amount of Four Million Pesos (PhP 4,000,000.00) for the Scout Ranger Multi Purpose Cooperative from the Kawal Foundation for the benefit of its members and their families who are really in need of funds instead of going to loan sharks.
He admitted that he went to the office of MGEN RENATO MIRANDA in the afternoon of the 22nd had some wine and exchanged notes. Thereafter, he received a call from COL ARIEL QUERUBIN to visit CSAFP. They have coordinated this with CSAFP and thought it proper to push with the Intelligence Staff of AFP. They called and texted J2 and therewith reported that on the 24 Feb 06 there will be people in the streets and some men from the Marines and the SAF who will join the March, rally and demonstration. Basically the scenario is for some members of the military and police to come out in the streets and join the civilian participants in the anniversary celebration.
He said that the Marines will be marching along EDSA to join the people and it will be civilians and military coming together.
Thereafter, MGEN RODRIGO MACLANG advised them to go to the office of CSAFP.
With the CSAFP, they talked about other issues affecting the military such as the electoral exercise in 2004, the alleged cheating and the people’s wait for the investigation report, including the cooperative, the housing, and the upliftment of the conditions of soldiers and on what he has been doing with FSRR.
That he received this report from COL ARIEL QUERUBIN and treated it very seriously and he suggested that they go to CSAFP to report the same and that nothing will be lost if they report the matter. His unit in Camp Tecson and other headquarters were intact with his standing order to close ranks and not to entertain invitations and ideas of coup.
They reported the matter to J2 because he is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and deemed it proper that reports of this nature should reach the proper staff.
That while he was in the Office of Congressman Angping, COL ARIEL QUERUBIN texted him about the matter and decided to meet at Rustan’s Makati and got the report from the latter. That the only source of that information on the participation of some junior officers to join the march was exclusively from COL ARIEL QUERUBIN and that no other reports came from any other source. That he has only heard of two (2) units that will participate, namely, the Philippine Marines and the PNP SAF. That it was about the restiveness among the junior ranks and that on 24 February 2006 being the day that people were expected to merge in EDSA and that some junior officers were planning to join said march.
He would never allow his unit to join. He has not heard that some of his men were joining the march but would not be surprised if junior officers from the Marines, SAF and even from the regions, but, he believe it would impossible for the Rangers to join the march since they are in Bulacan.
No officer or enlisted men inform him that they wish to join the march except some who asked whether it was true that he has withdrawn support from the President and he replied in the negative. Neither has he granted any interview as reported by the media that he went on air and that he has withdrawn support.
He categorically denies issuing a statement of withdrawing support.
On 22 February 2006, he was at the Headquarters, PMC at the office of the Commandant and met COL ARIEL QUERUBIN at the lobby of PMC HQ; there were other personnel where identities are not known to him. COL MARTIR was not there.
After comparing notes with MGEN RENATO MIRANDA, they agreed that indeed there is restiveness among junior officers and they agreed that something should be done about it, that they should talk to these officers and dissuade them from doing anything that would break the chain of command.
On three to five occasions, he has informed CG, PA as early as December and January that if there are units to be watched, it should be the Philippine Marines and the PNP SAF, because these units are already in Metro Manila. That whenever he visits GEN ESPERON, to sit down and talk about the possibilities of destabilization, he tells GEN ESPERON that, “Sir ang mga babantayan ninyo ay iyong mga intact units. These are already in Metro Manila.”. He did not inform CG, PA that he met with MGEN RENATO MIRANDA, and COL ARIEL QUERUBIN because the planned march has not yet come out and that it only came out about the afternoon of the next day when they decided to go to GEN MACLANG and Chief of Staff. Furthermore, he did not see CG, PA because no Army officer or soldier was involved as he was only helping COL ARIEL QUERUBIN with the problem.
During the discussion on the planned march, there were names mentioned in particular and the discussion was merely in general terms. During the meeting with the Chief of Staff, the line he raised was “Sir as the Chief of Staff it is incumbent on you to act on this. To ensure that nothing violent, no untoward incident happens.” He reported the matter to the CSAFP so that he can act to preempt any untoward incident. After the CSAFP called for the Major Service Commanders, they stayed at the Office of the Chief of Staff and was recalled at or about 2200H or almost 2300H. He did not have knowledge on what the Major Service Commanders and the Chief of Staff talked about. The Major Service Commanders made comments such as “Baka pakana lang nang kaliwa yan. O baka may sasakay diyan na iba. O baka makinabang diyan are the left. What if may magsabotahe, may mga mag pasabog diyan.” He denies having offered leadership to the Chief of Staff and that the same is only what is reported in the papers.
He knows a certain MAJ JASON AQUINO as his former Operations Officer in the FSRR who was relieved from the regiment as early as the middle of last year 2005 and is no longer under him. MAJ JASON AQUINO was not communicating with him. He does not remember having received any text or calls from MAJ AQUINO on 23 Feb 2006, neither did he send the text messages “Not yet.” and “Nag usap na kami. Maganda.”
The only staff officer he knew who was in Manila at that time was LTC NESTOR FLORDELIZA as the latter was working on his retirement which was due late this year. That he confirms asking LTC NESTOR FLORDELIZA to bring his black suit since the President was scheduled to go to Camp Tecson where there will be a ceremony about a housing project.
After the meeting with the Major Service Commanders, he went back to Fort Bonifacio. He stayed there and went to sleep until he got a call from MGEN MACLANG.
The guidance was not to entertain anymore thoughts of some people that the military is joining the rally and that as far as he was concerned that was it.
He denies having raised the idea to withdraw support from the leadership and that as far as he was concerned he reported it as part of the academic discussion from his perspective. The idea of withdrawal of support never crossed their minds and was never a topic. That in the meeting with COL ARIEL QUERUBIN in the afternoon of 23 Feb 2006, he did not mention too much in detail as he was talking about plans in general and from what he understood it was the units of the Marines and the Special Action Force. COL ARIEL QUERUBIN did not mention any organization outside the government that the latter coordinated with.
He was not aware of any unauthorized movement of the FSRR personnel as he did not give orders for the Rangers to move and the same may be attested to by COL GAUDENCIO PANGILINAN. He learned of the movements of FSRR from COL GAUDENCIO PANGILINAN.
He received a call from GEN IBRADO who mentioned to him that some of his men were to go to the media and issue statements because of the news that he was detained. That he replied to GEN IBRADO saying that “Sir, I’ll call them individually and tell them to stop it,” and in fact did it. He called CG, PA to prove that he was obeying every instruction and order given to him and to let everybody know that he was just there in his quarters and prove the reports that he has withdrawn support from the President.
When CG, PA was asked to be placed under custody, he remembered CG, PA saying “Diyan ka lang. Huwag kang lalabas diyan.” He did not ask J2 and Chief of Staff to put him in custody.
That MGEN RODRIGO MACLANG called him saying, “Danny what do you think? The Chief of Staff is intending taking you to custody,” and he replied, “E di Sir eh di kuhanin ninyo ako. Nandito lang naman ako sa bahay. Susunod ako. You pick me up here. Dito lang naman ako sa bahay,” He agreed to the plan of having him put to custody not because he was a suspect but to prove that there was no reason to make me a suspect.
He personally knows COL ARIEL QUERUBIN and that it is no secret that they were both involved in the ’89 coup, they are close friends and were both together in the RAM. The cause of the restiveness of the Marine Corps was brought about by the alleged cheating during the last presidential elections where the Marines were allegedly used to manipulate the elections. COL ARIEL QUERUBIN’s basis for sharing the information was that he was disturbed and he needed somebody he can trust to talk about it.
The money given by the Kawel Foundation was accepted by the Sergeant Major of the Ranger Regiment and the project manager of the cooperative. The money was offered by civilian personal friends and he did not ask for it. The amounts cannot be used in a destabilization plot as it is recorded in the books of the cooperative until now. That the cooperative is registered with the Cooperative Development Authority and its membership is almost the entire Ranger Regiment.
He admits having met Senator Biazon and COL ARIEL QUERUBIN sometime last year after the Garci Tape came out and agreed that they would not want the AFP as an institution to be dragged and affected with the issue which was the reason he prompted Senator Biazon as head of the Committee on National Defense to initiate an investigation to determine the truth.
That LTC NESTOR FLORDELIZA is the Chief of Staff of the Regiment while MAJ ORIEL PANGCOG is the G3. He only found out from LTC FLORDELIZA that they were tasked by higher headquarters to organize a 10th SR Company. The he knows of the movements and gave the orders but as to the time of departure will depend upon the urgency of organizing 10th SRC. He was not aware that upon the instruction of G3, FSRR, the instructions were to bring uniforms, combat boots to be used as identification paraphernalia at EDSA. The 10th SR Company was formed as a reaction force and was even organized even before 23 or 24 Feb and the company was already ordered by Headquarters, Philippine Army to report to Fort Bonifacio to be deployed. He does not know of the plans of the Philippines Army, and as he understood it, they will stay at the Headquarters, Philippine Army in case of necessity and contingencies, they are there.
It is LTC MALABANJOT who can explain as to the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (PhP 2,000.00) given to each member to be used as food allowance.
He denies having talked to Pastor “Boy” Saycon.
LTC NESTOR T FLORDELIZA O-109684 PA (QMS).
In lieu of a counter-affidavit, he submitted a consolidated motion, manifestation and statements. The arguments are as follows:
The PTI proceeding is null and void for violating the constitutional rights of the respondents. The AFP initiated this proceeding on the basis of written statements that respondents were coerced to make. These statements were also made without the assistance of counsel.
Sec 17 of the Art 3 of the constitution states that: “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself”. This right is not only available in criminal prosecutions but also on all other government proceedings including administrative investigations. (CRUZ, Constitutional Law p. 302; also Brown vs. Walker, 161 US 951).
There was no valid waiver of such constitutional rights. These rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Respondents were directed to appear before a fact finding committee investigating an alleged coup attempt. They were instructed to submit written statements. It is submitted that under RA 7438, custodial investigation has been defined by law as to include the practice of issuing an “invitation” to a person in connection with an offense that he is suspected to have committed. Thus, the investigation conducted by the Lopez committee was, in fact, a custodial investigation.
The charge sheets in the instant cases were the direct result of the findings made by the Lopez committee. And since the proceeding before the Lopez committee was constitutionally flawed, it is only but logical that the fruit of that committee (charge sheets) is equally infirm. The fruit of a poisonous tree is equally poisonous.
The first charge under AW67 includes the element of conspiracy. Thus, for all intents and purposes, evidence against one of the respondents will eventually be offered against all of the respondents. The flawed statements that respondents were coerced into making, by themselves, may not be used to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy must be proved by other evidence aliunde.
A case before the Supreme Court will soon be filed once no favorable action is taken by this Office with respect to this pleading.
Respondents maintain that their constitutional rights were violated and that these cases should therefore be dismissed.
LTC EDMUNDO D MALABANJOT O-115217 PA (INF).
In lieu of a counter-affidavit, he submitted a consolidated motion, manifestation and statements. The arguments are as follows:
The PTI proceeding is null and void for violating the constitutional rights of the respondents. The AFP initiated this proceeding on the basis of written statements that respondents were coerced to make. These statements were also made without the assistance of counsel.
Sec 17 of the Art 3 of the constitution states that: “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself”. This right is not only available in criminal prosecutions but also on all other government proceedings including administrative investigations. (CRUZ, Constitutional Law p. 302; also Brown vs. Walker, 161 US 951).
There was no valid waiver of such constitutional rights. These rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Respondents were directed to appear before a fact finding committee investigating an alleged coup attempt. They were instructed to submit written statements. It is submitted that under RA 7438, custodial investigation has been defined by law as to include the practice of issuing an “invitation” to a person in connection with an offense that he is suspected to have committed. Thus, the investigation conducted by the Lopez committee was, in fact, a custodial investigation.
The charge sheets in the instant cases were the direct result of the findings made by the Lopez committee. And since the proceeding before the Lopez committee was constitutionally flawed, it is only but logical that the fruit of that committee (charge sheets) is equally infirm. The fruit of a poisonous tree is equally poisonous.
The first charge under AW67 includes the element of conspiracy. Thus, for all intents and purposes, evidence against one of the respondents will eventually be offered against all of the respondents. The flawed statements that respondents were coerced into making, by themselves, may not be used to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy must be proved by other evidence aliunde.
A case before the Supreme Court will soon be filed once no favorable action is taken by this Office with respect to this pleading.
Respondent maintain that their constitutional his were violated and that these cases should therefore be dismissed.
MAJ LEOMAR JOSE M DOCTOLERO O-10124 PA (INF).
MAJ DOCTOLERO avers in his counter-affidavit the following:
At the onset, the Pre-trial Investigation on the charges against him should be dismissed outright. It is crystal clear that there is no legal or factual basis to subject him to the Pre-trial Investigation.
The exhibits attached to the charge sheet vis-à-vis the charges contained therein palpably lack the quantum of evidence required to sustain a finding of probable cause.
Exhibit “1” which is his allegedly sworn statement given to AHIC is of dubious admissibility. He was never given the chance to read the said document and he was never asked to appear before the investigation committee to affirm the same by signing it. This alone is sufficient ground to expunge “Exhibit1” from the records of the case.
The act of attaching the sworn statement in the charge sheet is a patent violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Exhibit “2” which is the affidavit of 2LT Harold S Camazo does not in any way incriminate him.
Exhibit “3” which is the affidavit of 2LT Mark Steve T Cimini likewise does not incriminate him.
Nowhere in the affidavits of the witnesses would indicate that the order of putting them on alert status and the withdrawal of security ammunitions is for the “possible utilization in EDSA, Manila during the protest mass action.” Hence, the same has no evidentiary value.
Moreover, the charge sheet is apparently defective, if not totally useless, since the accuser CPT ARMANDO P PAREDES JAGS explicitly averred and subscribed under oath that he has personal knowledge of the matters set forth in the specifications of the Charge Sheet. The accuser is not a member of the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSSR). As such, there can be no way that he will have personal knowledge on the activities being undertaken by their unit.
From March 2005 until the date when he was relieved from his post on 23 Mar 06, he was the commandant of the SRTS at Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan. During the last week of Feb 06, he was in Camp Tecson conducting training to the Scout Ranger students.
He vehemently denies the accusation against him that he connived, confederated and mutually helped the other respondents in attempting to begin or cause a mutiny. During that time, he was busy training Scout Ranger students while attending to his family who came all the way from Baguio.
The charge (charge 1) merely makes a general allegation of conspiracy. The attached exhibits do not support the allegation of conspiracy. “Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of conviction must always be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. (PP vs. Mandao)
He vehemently denies the accusation that he participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by planning how to breach the camp defense plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, PA at the rest house of CPT ALMODOVAR at Camp Tecson, San Miguel , Bulacan on or about 03 Feb 06.
From Feb 1-6, 2006, he was in Baguio City with his family for the 12th birthday of his daughter. Thus, it is impossible for him to be present at the alleged meeting at camp Tecson, Bulacan. There is no evidence that he was present on the said meeting.
As regards the allegation that he ordered the students to withdraw ammunition, he indeed ordered the students of the SRTS Class 161-06 to withdraw ammunition as they already have their firearms. This was pursuant to the alert order of their G3.
As early as 18 Jan 06, their G3 received a radio message from CG SOCOM directing them to organize and prepare two companies to form part of the contingency/reaction force due to the prevailing security situation. A copy of the radio message is attached as annex “E” of the counter-affidavit.
On 22 Feb 06, he was informed that the 1st and 2nd Special operations Battalion were already activated and deployed. As such, he was ordered by G3 to put his men on alert status for activation of the 3rd Special Operations Battalion as they were the next to be activated and deployed. As a consequence of being on alert status, it has been the practice to withdraw ammunitions from the supply room.
Ordering the students to withdraw ammunitions is not a violation of the 96th Article of War. Since he was ordered to put his men on alert status for possible deployment, as the Battalion Commander of the 3rd Special Operations Battalion, there is already a valid basis for him to make such an order.
In support to his counter-affidavit, he submitted the following exhibits:
[1] Photocopy of the Birth Certificate of his daughter (Annex A of the counter-affidavit)
To prove the birth date of his daughter (Feb 01). He claims that he was in Baguio from Feb 1-6, 2006 for the 12th b-day of his daughter.
[2] Photocopy of the affidavit of Maxima P Cables; one of the teachers of his children at SPED Center in Baguio (Annex B of the counter-affidavit)
While in Baguio, he talked to the affiant when he fetched his children from their class.
[3] Affidavit of Edward Baguio (Annex C of the counter-affidavit)
His longtime friend. They met at Session Road, Baguio City on the night of 03 Feb 06.
[4] Affidavit of LTC RENE GLEN O PAJE PA (GSC) (Annex D of the counter-affidavit)
In the morning of 04 Feb 06, he visited LTC PAJE at the Phil Military Academy, Baguio City where he asked for some gasoline for his trip back to Camp Tecson.
[5] Copy of the Radio Message received by their G3 from CG SOCOM (Annex E of the counter-affidavit)
The radio message directed them to organize and prepare two companies to form part of the Contingency/Reaction Force due to the prevailing situation.
[6] Copy of the Task Organization issued by their G3 (Annex F, F-1, F-2 and F-3 of the counter-affidavit)
He was designated as the battalion commander.
The statement of MAJ DOCTOLERO was taken by the ADHOC Investigating Committee and the same is attached as Annex “LL” of the ADHOC Committee report. He did not sign the statement but certified by the transcriber Jedielyn M Tolentino and subscribed before CPT ARMANDO P PAREDES JAGS. The transcript of the statement contains the following:
He was the former Commander of the Scout Ranger Training School.
Sometime in 22 Feb06, he was advised by their G3, Maj Oriel Pangcog, to put his men on red alert status for the activation of the 3rd Special Operations Battalion for contingency force of the Scout Rangers.
On the 23 March 06, he was relieved of his position and was put on a floating status.
He knew BGEN LIM because he was then the G8 when BGEN LIM assumed as deputy commander of FSRR.
On 08 March 05, he was replaced by Maj Aquino as G3 when he was designated as the commandant of SRTS. He testified that he did not attend the presentation by Maj Aquino in the conference room of FSRR. He also testified that “Para sa Bayan” is not an organization but it is used as a class motto of SRTS class 156 and that he is not a member thereof.
He recently became a member of GUARDIAN and he does not know that GUARDIAN brotherhood was outlawed by AFP.
MAJ JASON LAUREANO Y AQUINO O-10503 PA (INF).
MAJ AQUINO avers in his counter-affidavit the following:
He was placed in solitary confinement while inside the ISG Maximum security detention cell. Thereafter, he was interrogated by military officers pertaining to his alleged involvement in the attempted coup d’etat last 24 Feb 06.
He was given a document purporting to be his affidavit and he was ordered to sign the document. He vehemently refused at first but due to fear for his life and his family, he was forced to sign the document against his will. This affidavit falsely, maliciously and recklessly accused BGEN LIM and GEN SENGA and other ranking officers of involvement in the alleged coup d’etat.
He vehemently denies the contents of the affidavit dtd 28 Feb 06. He was deliberately misquoted by the military officials that prepared the purported affidavit. He was mentally and emotionally coerced to sign the affidavit. He also denies the misquoted statements he purportedly gave to the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee in Camp Aguinaldo.
Sometime in July 2005, he was relieved as G3 of FSRR, SOCOM, PA and was put on floating status at HHSG, PA. Since then, he was never assigned to any station nor was he given any mission order.
On 26 Feb 06, he received a text message from an unknown number informing him to report to HHSG PA. He presumed that it was an order from an officer at HHSG. On 27 Feb 06, he reported to OCG, HHS, PA and as instructed to report to MAJ BALUYAN for debriefing regarding his AWOL.
Thereafter, he was fetched by military officials and was brought to ISG maximum security detention cell. Since then, he has been in solitary confinement until he was transferred to another maximum security detention center at Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal.
He is not a member of any organization that is seeking to overthrow the government. The only organization he is a member of is the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Association. He did not recruit any AFP personnel for any organization.
However, like most officers, he too received rumors of restiveness of some junior officers from the Marines and other units of the AFP. As an officer, he was concerned about the situation, so he inquired from BGEN LIM about these rumors.
BGEN LIM confirmed that such restiveness was true and told him that they should calm the troops and keep them under the chain of command. BGEN LIM further told him that if the situation gets worse, he will consult with GEN SENGA regarding the possible moves to be taken to pacify these disgruntled military officers.
On 23 Feb 06, he sent a text message to BGEN LIM if he had already talked to CSAFP. He replied, “not yet”. Thereafter, he received another text message from BGEN LIM, “Nag-usap kami, maganda.”
On the morning of 24 Feb 06, he was at home with his family and he was surprised by the news report that BGEN LIM had withdrawn his support form the chain of command. He immediately sent a text message to BGEN LIM inquiring on the truthfulness of the news reports. BGEN LIM told him that the news reports are false and that they should all remain loyal to the chain of command.
He has never committed any crime at all and yet he has been detained under solitary confinement without any charge since 27 Feb 06, which is in clear violation of his rights under the Constitution.
With regard to the supplemental affidavit of 1LT JERALD L REYES, he denies the allegations accusing him of involvement in an elaborate plan to grab power from the present government known as “operation gemstone.”
As far as he knows, 1LT REYES was also detained at the Intelligence Service Group maximum security detention cell, the same time he was there. While detained at ISG, 1LT REYES executed an affidavit that explained his whereabouts and limited knowledge of the alleged coup d’etat. MAJ AQUINO was not mentioned at all in this affidavit.
Surprisingly, after just a few days of detention in the ISG, 1LT REYES was suddenly released and was later given a ranking post in the AFP. Apparently, in exchange for his release and new assignment in the AFP, 1LT REYES executed a supplemental affidavit this time alleging that MAJ AQUINO presented an elaborate plan code named “Operation Gemstone”, to take over Camp Aguinaldo, arrest and oust Pre Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, CSAFP, CG, PA and Chief PNP.
He denies having presented such plan or any other similar plan for that matter, to several junior officers. He was present during the birthday of COL DANTES but no plan was ever discussed. If such plan was true, they would not have included strangers like 1LT REYES for obvious security reasons. It is absurd for a non-organic ranger like 1LT REYES to fabricate such false and malicious stories, destroy their military careers, if he was not offered something in return for all these lies that he is now peddling.
Finally, CPT ARMANDO P PAREDES was admittedly not present in all the alleged meetings, subject of the charges and specifications against him, it is therefore definitely perjurious for him to claim that he has personal knowledge of all these facts as his accuser.
It is perfectly clear that these fabricated charges were filed merely because of his refusal to admit all the lies that were imputed against him and not to seek redress for a crime that was never committed.
MAJ AQUINO executed an affidavit dated 28 Feb 06 subscribed before COL LEMY R MAGLAYA at Fort Bonifacio. (One of the annexes of the Ad Hoc committee report)
He attests that he was the former G3 of FSRR, SOCOM PA stationed at Camp Tecson, San Miguel Bulacan. He further attests that he is neither a member of “Para SA Bayan” nor any other group except PMAAA.
He denies the allegations that he had at any time distributed pamphlets called “The New Order” in 2002 for “Para as Bayan.” Due to said report he was relieved on July 2005 as G3 of FSRR, SOCOM PA and was placed attached/unassigned at HHSG, PA.
He denies having actively supported BGEN LIM’s pronouncement of withdrawal of support from the chain of command.
He explains as to what transpired on the following dates;
a. 231600H Feb 06, he received a call from CG HHSG PA, BGEN ALFONSO BERNATE AFP. The latter told him that they should talk; however, it did not push through because BGEN BERNATE hanged up on him.
b. 241200H Feb 06, affiant sent a text message to BGEN BERNATE telling the latter that he will go to him but there were plenty of barriers (referring to the rallyists outside Camp Aguinaldo). BGEN BERNATE replied “K.”
c. 25 Feb 06, affiant was at his residence with his family. He never received any call/text ordering him to report to HSG.
d. In the afternoon of 26 Feb 06, while he was on his way to the hospital with his daughter, he received a text message from someone whom he presumed to be a person from HHSG, PA, informing him to report to said Office. He asked if he could report the following day because he was on his way to the hospital, but that person suggested that he call CPT FERDINAND ESPEJO, CO of the Holding Center of HHSG, PA. CPT ESPEJO then told him that there is a report to declare him on AWOL. He received the same text message from AU personnel to which he felt irritated and told him that “there is no need, he will just resign.”
e. On or about 270800H Feb 06, he reported to OCG, HHSG, PA but was instructed by COL VIRGILIO ESPINELI to report to MAJ BALUYAN, the G2, HHSG, PA for debriefing re: his AWOL. He was then fetched by MAJ ZARAGOZA, MAJ MARIANO, and MAJ CANIESO and was thereafter detained at ISG maximum security detention cell.
He denies the report that he contacted some of his men to join the call of BGEN LIM to withdraw support because he was on floating status for 7 months and as such, he has no men to speak of.
Further, affiant attests that BGEN LIM told him that withdrawal of support should be the whole of AFP, and on 24 Feb 2006, he texted BGEN LIM and asked if the latter had talked with CSAFP. BGEN LIM’s reply was “Nag- usap na kami, maganda”. Late evening on the same day, someone texted him, “OK na si GEN SENGA.” He then texted BGEN LIM to confirm and the latter replied “OK”. He imagined another EDSA II.
He confirms that there were several occasions (during birthdays and other social gatherings) while he was at FSRR, the idea about withdrawal of support by CSAFP was brought about in a casual manner. However, there was never any plan or any serious proposal about said matter.
He also attests that in an effort to arrest to what appears to them as a threat to the sustainability and existence of FSRR, they submitted two (2) position papers signed by then COL LIM to the then AIG, BGEN FROILAN MAGLAYA and BGEN BONIFACIO with the request that the same be forwarded to then CG, PA for his consideration.
On 09 June 06, the statement of MAJ AQUINO was taken by the ADHOC Investigating Committee and the same is attached as annex “CC” of the ADHOC Committee report. He did not sign the statement but certified by the transcriber Jedielyn M Tolentino and subscribed before CPT ARMANDO P PAREDES JAGS. The transcript of the statement contains the following:
He was relieved as Chief Operations of the First Scout ranger Regiment sometime in July (2005). He was investigated by the Army Provost Marshal and after which, he was placed a/u HSG, PA.
From November 2005 onwards, he stayed within Metro Manila and Bulacan area.
He went to visit FSRR during their anniversary, Christmas party and on the birthday of the Headquarters Commandant.
BGEN LIM told him that CG, PA will go and the Chief of Staff will declare first. This statement of BGEN LIM refers to the declaration of support by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to be led by the Chief of Staff. He stated that the talk regarding the withdrawal of support have been going on for sometime.
BGEN LIM told him about these matters sometimes in the “text messages” or when he visits him in his house. After his relief from FSRR, he continued to communicate with BGEN LIM.
He admitted that he was relieved from FSRR because of the distribution of the New Order pamphlet which was made at the height of the Garci tape incident. During his detention at ISG, PA, MAJ DELOS SANTOS told him that they were not able to find any irregularity about the New Order.
Somebody texted him “Okey na si SENGA.” And then he texted BGEN LIM to confirm this and the latter replied “Okey”. He is not sure if it was MAJ DOCTOLERO who texted him the message.
He explained that OPERATION GEMSTONE is an interpretation of the book authored by Edward Luther about the coup d’etat. They would casually discuss this since this is not a big deal for them.
He admitted that he presented this before the officers of FSRR sometime in November last year. He explained that it was a mere interpretation and these are also the result of his study. He insisted that it was just a presentation, an idea. If it was a plan, there should have been a tasking but there was none. It was merely a theory.
How could he designate tasking when he is not already an organic of FSRR and he does not have the blessings of the Regiment Commander, and BGEN LIM is against it.
Nobody authorized him to present the OPERATION GEMSTONE as there was not intent of a coup d’etat. They just talked about it.
Present during the presentation were: G1, GUINOLBAY; G2, SABABAN; G3, ALMODOVAR; G4, GOLDOFAR and CPT CRISTE. There were other officers who are not organic of FSRR.
The word GEMSTONE is just his own idea.
He admitted that he communicated with CPT LANGKIT. They discussed issues and he also inquired on the condition of the detained Magdalo group.
He was at FSRR on 3 Feb 06 during the birthday party of COL DANTES at the tower, headquarters commandant rest house. He denied that there was a presentation on the lay-out of Camp Aguinaldo. Maybe, they just talked about it. They talked about a lot of things while they were drinking.
He stated that he had been communicating with COL QUERUBIN and on Feb 06, he was invited to meet BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN at a hotel in Manila near Harrizon Plaza. There were less then 10 people in the meeting. The conversation was about their plan to talk to GEN SENGA.
MAJ ORIEL L PANGCOG O-10563 PA (INF).
In lieu of counter-affidavit, MAJ PANGCOG submitted an omnibus motion. His arguments are as follows:
The statements made by MAJ PANGCOG are inadmissible in evidence against him under Sec 12(3), Art III of the 1987 Constitution and must, perforce, be stricken off the record in that:
The statements of MAJ PANGCOG were taken in violation of his Constitutional right to competent and independent counsel under Sec 12(1), Art III of the 1987 Constitution. In PP vs. Javar, the Supreme Court was clear in pronouncing that any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
In PP vs. Gomez, citing PP vs. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution requires the assistance of counsel to a person under custody even when he waives the right to counsel.
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that the statement of MAJ PANGCOG was made without the assistance of counsel while he was under investigation. Indeed, he was apprised of his right to counsel during the opening statements by RADM LOPEZ, JR and CPT PAREDES.
The oral waiver by MAJ PANGCOG of his right to counsel made before the investigating committee is invalid under the Constitution and settled jurisprudence. An oral waiver is invalid, more so if made without the assistance of counsel.
The statements of MAJ PANGCOG were taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination. Sec 17, Art III of the 1987 Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In sum, the affidavit dtd 28 Feb 06, the Supplemental Affidavit dtd 4 Mar 06 and the sworn statement taken on 13 June 06 cannot be used in evidence against MAJ PANGCOG and must be stricken off the record, having been taken in violation of his rights under the Constitution and Manual for Courts-Martial.
Respondent is invoking his right under the Constitution and the Manual for courts-Martial, of which he has been deprived thus far, to cross examine any and all witnesses against him and to produce evidence in his behalf. Hence, request is made for the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum for the attendance and examination of witnesses for and against MAJ PANGCOG.
In Kapunan, Jr vs. De Villa, the Supreme Court held that, in the charge for mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, the petitioners in that case should have requested MAJ BALDONADO, the officer in charge of the pre-trial investigation, to subpoena the witnesses against them so that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in accordance with PD No 77, as amended by PD No 911.
a) Request is therefore hereby made for the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum for the following persons to testify for MAJ PANGCOG, to wit: a. BGEN LIM; B. LTC FLORDELIZA; and c. LTC MALABANJOT.
Motion is made for the immediate transfer of venue of the pre-trial investigation and place of detention of MAJ PANGCOG to San Miguel, Bulacan for the reason that:
The instant case is for the alleged commission of a criminal offense, hence venue is jurisdictional. A tribunal, such as the pre-trial investigating panel in the present case, must hear the case where the alleged crime took place.
Moreover, under Para 20, Chapter V of the Manual for Courts-Martial, citing Art 70 of the Articles of War, “any person placed under arrest under the provisions of AW 70 shall thereby be restricted to his barracks, quarters, or tents, unless such limits shall be enlarged by proper authority.
MAJ PANGCOG is detained and the conduct of PTI is at Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal. However, his barracks or quarters is located at San Miguel, Bulacan. Indeed, the alleged orders he gave upon instructions of LTC FLORDELIZA for the augmentation of 10SRC was made in San Miguel, Bulacan.
In support to his counter-affidavit, MAJ PANGCOG submitted the following exhibits:
[1] Affidavit of MAJ ORIEL L PANGCOG (Annex A of the counter-affidavit)
1)He executed this at the Office of the Regiment Provost marshal, FSRR, SOCOM, PA, Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan.
2) He has no knowledge of the plan to utilize the members of the First Scout Rangers Regiment to join the protest march on 24 Feb 06. No one asked him to join the said march to show sympathy to BGEN LIM.
[2] Supplemental Affidavit executed by MAJ PANGCOG at the Office of the Army Inspector General, Fort Bonifacio (Annex B of the counter-affidavit)
1) On 23 Feb o6, he was directed by LTC NESTOR FLORDELIZA to generate available personnel that will augment 10SRC.
2) He advised LTC FLORDELIZA that the nearest available personnel are from 3SRB in Bicol.
3) He immediately informed LTC EDMUNDO MALABANJOT, CO, 3SRB of the instruction of LTC FLORDELIZA and further informed to instruct the joining personnel to report to the liaison office in Fort Bonifacio not later than 241000 Feb 06 for further instruction.
4) He was informed by LTC MALABANJOT that the joining personnel will be in civilian attire since their firearms will be left behind and they will be utilizing civilian vehicle to facilitate immediate movement.
5) The mission of the personnel was not to join the protest rally at EDSA but to join 10SRC as contingency forces.
[3] Statement of MAJ PANGCOG taken by the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee (Annex C of the counter-affidavit)
Annex JJ of the Ad Hoc committee report
The ADHOC Committee took the statement of MAJ PANGCOG which is marked as Annex “JJ” of the ADHOC Committee report. He did not sign the sworn statement but it is certified by the transcriber Jedielyn M Tolentino and subscribed before CPT ARMANDO P PAREDES JAGS. The sworn statement contains the following:
He was assigned at FSRR as the Asst Chief of staff for Operations, G3.
He executed a sworn statement at Army Inspector General and later executed a supplemental affidavit.
He mentioned in his affidavit that LTCOL FLORDELIZA advised him to generate personnel that will augment 10th SRC. He drafted a message and informed the Battalion Commander of said order of the Chief of Staff.
He stated that 10th SR moved from Camp Tecson to Fort Bonifacio but was later on informed that they were preparing to augment forces in Malacañang.
Upon receiving a message from LTC FLORDELIZA, he called and instructed LTC MALABANJOT to inquire on the troops that will augment 10th SRC in Fort Bonifacio.
He stated that he did not specify as to what the troops will be bringing with them but the troops will be moving in civilian attire and without firearms since he believed that there are firearms allotted for them at Fort Bonifacio.
He remembered that there was a party during the Anniversary of FSRR but he was not aware that there was happy hour or that MAJ AQUINO presented in power point about OPLAN GEMSTONE in the conference room of FSRR.
With regard to the movement of the troops, he stated that he did not confirm it with G4 but he still complied with the orders of LT COL FLORDELIZA on the movement of the augmentation of troops.
That he did not support the pronouncement of BGEN LIM, if there are any, and that he is not aware of the plan of BGEN LIM to see the CSAFP.
Finally, He stated that he did not in any way contribute anything to the 24th Feb event against the government, but he only performed what has been ordered for him to do through the chain of command
CPT RUBEN B GUINOLBAY O-11675 PA (INF).
CPT GUINOLBAY avers the following in his counter-affidavit and supplemental counter-affidavit:
I. Counter-affidavit
Mutiny is defined as a resistance to military authority. The specifications against him state that the alleged mutinous act consists of the withdrawal of support from the President of the Philippines, there is no crime of mutiny, as the President represents civilian authority. Nor is the act of urging the Chief of Staff of the AFP and other officers and personnel to withdraw support from the President an act of resisting military authority as there is no insubordination in such as act of “urging”. There is also no indication of which order has been disobeyed so that such an act of “urging” could be considered as insubordination.
There is no offense of “attempting to begin a mutiny”. The Manual for Courts Martial indicates the following offenses under AW 67: (a) attempting to create a mutiny or sedition, (b) beginning or joining in a mutiny or sedition and (c) causing or exciting a mutiny or sedition. ‘Attempting to begin a mutiny” is not found in this article and therefore does not exist in either fact or law.
Even assuming arguendo that there is a crime of “attempting to begin a mutiny” the facts alleged in the specifications are insufficient to constitute the same.
The specifications do not allege a specific overt act attributable to him. There is no act of insubordination mentioned in the specifications and there is no allegation that he was the first or among the first to commit an act of mutiny. Nor is there an indication that he was present at the scene where the alleged withdrawal of support from the President was made or where the Chief of Staff and other personnel were urged to withdraw their support. In fact, the evidence attached to the specifications is clear that he was not present with BGEN LIM in Fort Bonifacio when he spoke to GEN SENGA.
The specifications do not state acts I may have done with the specific intent to commit mutiny. In truth, the specifications do not contain any overt acts that would tend to indicate a mutiny. The alleged acts of withdrawing support for the President, urging the Chief of Staff and other personnel and enlisted men to withdraw their support for the president, and attempting to join protest actions are not overt acts of insubordination.
Insubordination is understood to be a disobedience to a lawful order. There is no order indicated in the specifications, and therefore no order could be disobeyed.
On 22 Feb 06, he left Camp Tecson for Fort Bonifacio to facilitate the ongoing construction of the retiree’s transient quarters. He had letter orders submitted to IG attesting to the official nature of his business there. Such was previously submitted to the investigating committee.
On the afternoon of the same date, he went home to his in-laws in Marikina to take care of his son. Attached as annex A is the medical certificate attesting to the foregoing.
On 23 Feb 06, he attended a meeting in the Seoul Restaurant in Libis, Quezon City, where he discussed the Bantay Laya ‘94/FSRR Shootfest. He did not stay long in the meeting as he was fetched from the place by a friend, Atty Levi Baligod. The affidavit of Atty Baligod is attached as annex B.
On 24 Feb 06, early in the morning, he and his wife, Marianne A Guinolbay ate at Pancake House, Marikina. In the afternoon of the same, he and his wife went to their boarding house in Pasay City to prepare the place where they would transfer. Attached as Annex E is the joint affidavit of their landlords.
When they returned to their in-laws’ house in the evening, he received a phone call from Maj Cristobal Perez who inquired to his whereabouts.
On 25 Feb 06, he returned to Camp Tecson.
He denies the specifications for the violation of AW96. The meeting on 23 Feb 06 was a class meeting of the PMA Class of 1994. It was attended by a number of his classmates where they discussed fundraising activities of the class.
There was no discussion of any form or withdrawal of support, or if there was one, he was not privy to the same and he has no knowledge of it.
Assuming without conceding that mere presence in a discussion regarding withdrawal of support is sufficient to hold one for violation of AW 96 and he was a privy to the same, it taxes credulity that, of about forty (40) persons who attended the said class meeting, only 3 of members of the class of 1994 are charged with being present there.
The charge of violating AW96 is so vague; it violates his right to be duly informed of the charges against him.
II. Supplemental Counter-Affidavit. CPT GUINOLBAY, alleges that:
One of the evidence presented against him is the affidavit of MAJ JASON LAUREANO AQUINO which is irrelevant to the charges against him. It does not mention him specifically nor allude to any acts he committed in pursuant to the specifications.
One also of the evidence against him is the sworn statement of MAJ AQUINO which is in the nature of extra-judicial confession, there being no showing that the same was made with the assistance of counsel.
MAJ AQUINO’s extra-judicial confession may not be used against him since it is invalid by itself and it is admissible by the fact that the same is hearsay.
MAJ AQUINO mentioned him only once in his alleged sworn statement. In the said sworn statement, he mentions an alleged presentation he made, allegedly to the Officers of the Scout Ranger Regiment. When asked who these officers were, he mentioned him along with other officers.
He denies being present at the said presentation. However, assuming without conceding that he was present at the said presentation, the same cannot lead to a conclusion that he was part of a mutiny. Even assuming that the same constitutes a circumstance that indirectly proves a fact or issue, it is a single circumstance. Thus, it contradicts the Supreme Court’s requisite that there should be more than one circumstance.
The circumstantial evidence presented against him for the charge of attempted, consummated or attempting to begin a mutiny falls short of the evidentiary requirements even for a showing of probable cause.
He prays that the instant case be dismissed against him for being bereft of any evidence and jurisdiction, the latter for being in violation of his constitutional rights.
In support to his counter-affidavit, CPT GUINOLBAY submitted the following exhibits:
[1] Medical certificate of the son of CPT Guinolbay dtd 11 Aug 06 (Annex A of the Counter-affidavit)
To certify that his son was treated at the clinic of Dr Del Mundo on 24 Feb 06.
[2] Affidavit of Levito D Baligod (Annex B of the Counter-affidavit)
He had lunch with CPT GUINOLBAY at Seoul Restaurant on 23 Feb 04. Likewise present were the classmates of CPT GUINOLBAY gathered in a long table.
[3] Affidavit of Irene Tomas Sarmiento – house help of CPT GUINOLBAY (Annex C of the Counter-affidavit)
The nanny of the son of CPT GUINOLBAY who attested that she went home on 23 Feb 06 to visit her sick mother.
[4] Affidavit of Lilibeth Francisco – employee of Gerry’s Grill (Annex D of the Counter-affidavit)
She was a crew of Pancake House and attested that CPT GUINOLBAY and his family ate at Pancake House at about 7am of 24 Feb 06.
[5] Logbook entry at Pancake house, Marikina branch (Annex D-1 of the Counter-affidavit)
[6] Joint-affidavit of Eduard Matias and Ma Luisa Vigila – landlords of spouses Guinolbay (Annex E of the Counter-affidavit)
On 24 Feb 06, CPT GUINOLBAY and his wife arrived at their house in preparation for their transfer.
CPT GUINOLBAY executed an affidavit dtd 01 Mar 06. (Attached as one of the annexes of the ADHOC Committee report). He alleges, among others, that:
He attests that he is not a member of PARA SA BAYAN. He has no knowledge of the formation and movement of FSRR personnel from Camp Tecson to Manila on 23 Feb 2006 nor the movements of 3SRBn, 7SRC and 9SRC.
He explained his whereabouts from 22 – 25 Feb 2006, to wit;
a. On or about 221300H February 2006, he left Camp Tecson for Manila to attend admin matters at their liaison office in Fort Bonifacio.
b. In the afternoon of 22 February 2006, he went home to Marikina.
c. On 23 February 2006, he attended a meeting with his classmates CPT TOLENTINO, CPT DAIZ, CPT ROSALES, CPT CABARLOC and several others at the Seoul restaurant along Eastwood, Katipunan road, Quezon City. They talked about the upcoming Bantay laya 94’/FSSR Shootfest;
d. On or about 231600 February 2006, he went home to Marikina.
e. On 24 February 2006, he accompanied his wife (Atty. Marian A. Guinolbay) to their boarding house in Pasay City. After cleaning said boarding house, they went home to Marikina.
f. On or about 251600H February 2006, he was informed that he has to report to the Headquarters FSRR for accounting purposes and because they had a new Commander.
g. On or about 251830H February 2006, he arrived at HFSRR and never left camp
CPT JOEY T FONTIVEROS O-11713 PA (INF).
CPT FONTIVEROS avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He denies the allegations contained in the supplemental affidavit of 1LT JERALD REYES (Annex “NN” of the Ad Hoc committee report).
The story of 1LT REYES is totally absurd and preposterous. He (CPT FONTIVEROS) is just a middle-ranked military officer commanding a small unit Scout Rangers.
On 03 Feb 06, he attended the birthday celebration of COL DANTES, held at the latter’s residence at Camp Tecson.
He is not sure if 1LT REYES was really present during the gathering. What he is certain is that no meeting purposely to plan the take-over of Camp Aguinaldo was held. He cannot even remember the rest house of CPT ALMODOVAR as there is no known rest house owned by any military official inside Camp Tecson.
The story of 1LT REYES is not corroborated by other witnesses. The fact that no single witness corroborated the story of 1LT REYES casts serious doubts on his credibility.
There are other facts or circumstances which would reveal that 1LT REYES’ story is totally fabricated. It is a known fact that 1LT REYES was also arrested by the members of the ISG and was detained under solitary confinement inside Fort Bonifacio. Surprisingly, after a few days, he was released from solitary confinement and was given a position in the ISG, as a member of the K-9 Division Unit. After his release, he submitted a supplemental affidavit which is attached to his charge sheet.
From then on, his military handlers have accorded him all the preferential treatment he can possibly get. The preferential treatment given to 1LT REYES is clear indications that his story was fabricated.
All the Scout Rangers-respondents were immediately relieved from their military position after the start of the investigation. However, 1LT REYES was even assigned in K-9 Unit of the ISG right after he executed the said affidavit. Clearly, this is the handsome reward received by 1LT REYES in exchange for his made-up stories.
The supplemental affidavit is a mere afterthought crafted to concoct a story that never transpired because if 1LT REYES is telling the truth, the allegation that several scout rangers held a meeting on 03 Feb 06 to plan the take-over of Campo Aguinaldo, such fact should have been included in the principal affidavit considering that the same is too significant to be ignored.
The pieces of evidence filed against him are all fabricated and therefore prays for the outright dismissal of the charges.
In support to his counter-affidavit, he submitted the affidavit of LTC DANTES.
[1] Affidavit of LTC FAUSTINO S DANTES (RET) PA (Annex “A” of the Supplemental Affidavit)
He attested that CPT FONTIVEROS was present on 03 Feb to 04 Feb 06 at The Tower Area, Camp Tecson, Bulacan.
CPT ISAGANI O CRISTE O-11549 PA (INF).
CPT CRISTE avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
There is no higher measure of LOYALTY to one’s country than risking your life and limb against the enemy of the state which he have done numerous number of times.
He denies the charges against him.
On the first week of November 2005, during the FSSR anniversary Happy Hour which in layman’s parlance means drinking session held after finishing their duties in the camp.
On or about 031900H Feb 06, at the quarters of the Headquarters’ commandant, another drinking session transpired and as what normally happens in drinking sessions with other officers present namely CPT ALMODOVAR, CPT FONTIVEROS, MAJ AQUINO and others whose name he cannot recall in which the effect of alcohol tends to loosen inhibition, academic and or intellectual discussion covering far ranging topics from political governance to prevailing economic conditions in the country are done with matching fervor and zeal but such discussion never touched upon any attempt to commit individual acts towards a common design or purpose to begin or cause a mutiny by withdrawing support from Pres Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
At the said occasion on 031900 Feb 06, he was never asked by MAJ AQUINO or anybody else about a particular tasking and that after downing several bottles of beer, he excused himself from the group.
Those above acts do not constitute a violation of the 67th Article of War.
On or about the 24th of February 06, in the early morning, he was awakened by a phone call from LTGEN ESPERON and was informed of the prevailing situation and gave me instruction to account for the officers and troops and not allow any authorized movement and which instruction I immediately relayed to our Deputy Regiment Commander Col Ramones and he assisted him in implementing the order of LTGEN ESPERON.
On or about 23 Feb 06 or on dates prior or subsequent thereto, he was in Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan doing his duty and task as the Training Director of the SOCOM candidate soldier course concurrently as Chief of the training branch of FSSR.
The only motive he can attribute to 1LT JERALD REYES in implicating him in such an incredible plot to attempt to begin and create a mutiny in conspiracy with other officer of the AFP is the hardship which 1LT REYES might have experienced in the Ranger Course in which he was his Course Director wherein he gave him a failing mark and this would be his way of getting back at him.
Also sometime in the month of June 2006, he had a chance to talk to 1LT REYES when they were playing basketball and when he ask him why he implicated him in his affidavit, 1LT REYES said that he was not able to withstood the pressure exerted upon him and he was forced to execute such an affidavit.
He is retracting all his previous affidavits all done without the assistance of counsel.
CPT DANTE D LANGKIT O-11957 PA (INF).
CPT LANGKIT avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He has been in detention (bartolina) at the ISG detention center, Fort Bonifacio since 05 April 06.
Before his detention, he was the assistant for operations, underG3 of SOCOM. There were also occasions when he was assigned in G2 and was also a company commander of SOCOM’s Probationary Battalion, a reaction force usually activated to augment security forces in Metro Manila area.
A careful reading of the statements of LT CUARTEROS and LT REYES indubitably proves that the allegations of these two officers do not support the charge and specification against him. At the time material in the specification, he was never in the places – Camp Aguinaldo and Fort Bonifacio, mentioned in the specification. Neither do their statements show that he did commit or try to commit the acts of (1) withdrawing support from the President, (2) urging the Chief of Staff of the AFP and other officers and enlisted personnel to likewise withdraw their support form the President, or attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called society groups and political oppositions calling for the President’s resignation, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority while in Camp Aguinaldo and Fort Bonifacio, or elsewhere.
He cannot be held liable under AW96 because he did not attempt to begin or create mutiny, that is, allegedly by advising 1LT REYES, CUARTEROS and Sgt Angga to form or organize three (3) section each for the deployment to Manila.
Assuming for the sake of argument that indeed he advised LT REYES, LT CUARTEROS and Sgt Angga to organize men for deployment to Manila, such act is not mutinous. Mutiny is defined as concerted insubordination, or concerted opposition, defiance or, or resistance to lawful military authority by two or more persons subject to such authority, with the intent to usurp, subvert or override such authority or neutralize it for the time being ( Gloria, Phil Military Law, 2nd ed.,p.223, citing Dig. Op., USA, 1940, par 424).
Thus, it cannot, by no stretch of the imagination, be inferred that advising some officers to organize soldiers for deployment in a certain place as an act of mutiny or an attempt to begin or create a mutiny absent any clear showing of the purpose of such alleged deployment, which purpose must be to defy or resist lawful military. Sgt Angga has no affidavit.
By the very own admissions of the witnesses against him, they did not know the purpose or reason for his meeting with them and they did not believe in whatever it was that he allegedly tried to impart to them, to wit:
LT REYES testified:
37. Q- What about the task organization that you have prepared?
A – I did not prepare any task organization
38. Q – Why?
A – CPT LANGKIT was telling me that he will be the one to initiate battalion operation in 24IB that in fact he was not actually assigned in 24IB. We are not sure how CPT LANGKIT can manage to initiate a battalion operation, sir.
39. Q – Did you and other Company in 24IB prepares a task organization?
A – Our companies together with the Alpha and Bravo Company in 24IB did not prepare task organization we don’t have any task organization of the said movement sir.
LT CUARTEROS said:
53.Q – But your intention actually is to organize o hindi naman?
A – Hindi naman.
54.Q – You make him believe that you are going to organize but actually hindi naman talaga kayo mag-oorganize?
A – Yes, maam.
Again, assuming for the sake of argument that he had the intention to launch a mutiny with LT REYES, LT CUARTEROS and Sgt Angga, such intention was not carried out by overt act and therefore mutiny was not committed. While the intent indicated is essential to the offense, the latter is not completed unless the opposition or resistance is manifested by some overt act or acts, or specific conduct. Mere intention however deliberate and fixed, or conspiracy however unanimous will fail to constitute mutiny. Words, alone, unaccompanied by acts, will not suffice.
In their statements, LT REYES and LT CUARTEROS did not mention his name as among those present in that alleged November-2005 meeting when GEMSTONE was purportedly presented and discussed.
Sometime in the last quarter of 2005, he was sent to Australia to attend a seminar on counter-terrorism. Had he been a threat to the country, he would not been given these assignments and sent abroad.
CPT ALLAN C AURINO O-128459 PA (FS).
CPT AURINO avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He was the EX-O, Civilian Military Operations Officer, Disbursing Officer and Special Disbursing Officer of the 3rd Scout Ranger Battalion, Camp Canto, Sugaring, Pile, Camarines Sur.
He disbursed the amount of P30, 000.00 to 1LT HOMER ESTOLAS representing cash advance for MOOE because he was ordered by his battalion commander LTC EDMUNDO MALABANJOT to disburse said amount. He asked 1LT ESTOLAS to sign the petty cash voucher (Annex 1).
He had no knowledge of any conversations that transpired between LTC MALABANJOT and 1LT ESTOLAS because he was out of the camp. He went out of the camp at around 1630H of 23 Feb 06 with Noel Felimon O Ipo to the quarry site of the latter. (Affidavit of Mr Ipo attached to the CA)
On or about 240030H Feb 06, LTC MALABANJOT woke him up and told him to instruct the troops, 7th SR Company to move to Fort Bonifacio to augment 10th SR Company. LTC MALABANJOT further told him that he instructed the troops not to bring their service firearms, only their uniform. He thought the augmentation refers to the radio message from higher headquarters of the RDF of SOLCOM (Annex 3) due to the prevailing situation in NCR at that time.
On or about 240300H 0300H 24 Feb 06, LT CORDERO, commanding officer of the 7th company arrived and he told him what LTC MALABANJOT relayed to him. 1LT CORDERO left and proceeded to his company post at Anislag, Daraga, Albay. At around 0500H of the same day, his battalion commander (LTC MALABANJOT) called him and instructed him to contact the commanding officer of the 7th company to return his men to their company post. He then contacted 1LT CORDERO and relayed the order of LTC MALABANJOT.
He learned of the movement of the troops in the news on TV. He had no knowledge of any intention to commit mutiny by withdrawing support from the President.
In support to his counter-affidavit, he submitted the following exhibits:
[1] Petty Cash Voucher with the amount P30, 000.00 dtd 23 Feb 06 signed by H ESTOLAS in the “received payment” portion (Annex 1 of the counter-affidavit)
CPT AURINO was ordered by LTC MALABANJOT to disburse said amount and he asked 1LT ESTOLAS to sign the same.
[2] Spot Report signed by 1LT SERENO, 1LT RAPI and CPT AURINO dtd 231900 Feb 06 (Annex 2 of the counter-affidavit)
Spot report on the encounter of the 8th company in Rosario, Mauban, Quezon.
[3] Transcript of the radio message (Annex 3 of the counter-affidavit)
The radio message came from headquarters of the RDF of SOLCOM re: in view of the obtaining internal security situation in NCR and other parts of the country, red alert status was declared eff 171700H Feb 06
[4] Affidavit of MAJ ERNEST MARC P ROSAL (INF) PA (Annex 4 of the counter-affidavit)
Assigned with 9th Military Intelligence Battalion, 9th Infantry (Spear) Division, PA.
He went to the Hqs, 3rd Scout Ranger Battalion, FSRR, Special Operations Command stationed at Camp Canuto, Brgy Sagurong, Pili, Camarines Sur on 240630 Feb 06 to check and verify on the reported unauthorized troop movements of several elements of the said unit. He was met by Acting Battalion EX-O CPT AURINO with 1LT RAPI. From his personal observation, CPT AURINO did not leave the Bn Hqs.
[5] Affidavit of Noel Felimon O Ipo (Annex 5 of the counter-affidavit)
Sometime on 23 Feb 06, at around 4:30 in the afternoon, he, being the contractor of the Forward Base went to Camp Canuto, Sagurong, Pili, Camarines Sur to inspect the on-going construction of the Forward base. He invited CPT AURINO at around 4:55 pm to visit his quarry site at Brgy Sibobo, Calabanga, Camarines Sur and Cpt AURINO returned to Camp Canuto at around 10:30 pm.
CPT JAMES C SABABAN O-11581 PA (INF).
CPT SABABAN avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He denies the charges against him.
He does not know his accuser who claimed that he has personal knowledge of the acts stated in the amended charge sheet, particularly the specification for AW67 & 96. It is impossible for CPT PAREDES to have personal knowledge of the alleged acts stated in the amended charge sheet because they do not belong to the same unit, perforce, he was not able to personally observe, perceive and witness the said acts that constitute the violations of the Articles of War imputed against him. Clearly, he committed perjury and must be the one who should be charged accordingly before military and civilian courts.
Except for the facts that MAJ AQUINO served as G3 of the FSRR and his membership with the Phil Military Academy Alumni Association, he denies any knowledge of the facts narrated in the statement of MAJ AQUINO dtd 28 Feb 06 for the reason that he was not present to observe said incidents when they happened. Particularly in that portion where he stated that there was a presentation of a certain Operation Gemstone in the conference room of the FSRR in Nov 05.
There was no instance that their regimental commander. BGEN LIM discussed with them or any body for that matter about the staging of a coup de d’etat or a withdrawal of support from the chain of command and the duly constituted officials of the Republic of the Philippines.
There is nothing in the supplemental affidavit of 1LT JERALD REYES that speaks of any actions that he committed which will make violations of AW67 and AW96. His name was not even mentioned in the said statement.
He was at home in Caloocan City on 23-24 Feb 06. The only time he left their house was when he was ordered to report to Camp Tecson immediately. In the early morning of 24 Feb 06, he was already in the premises of Camp Tecson.
The charge and specification for the violation of AW67 and 96 be dismissed for utter lack of merit.
CPT MONTANO B ALMODOVAR O-11572 PA (INF)
CPT ALMODOVAR avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He denies the allegations contained in the supplemental affidavit of 1LT REYES that he laid out a map of Camp Aguinaldo and participated in the discussion of the alleged breach of the camp defense plan of the said military installation on 03 Feb 06 inside his rest house. The truth of the matter is that he attended the birthday celebration of COL DANTES at the watch tower area which is close to the rest house where he stays at Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan. Furthermore, he cannot remember seeing 1LT REYES during the said party because he is not a member of their unit.
From 22 to 24 Feb 06, he was in Manila attending to some official matters for the First Scout Ranger Regiment and social gathering like the gathering of the PMA class 94 which was held at a Korean restaurant near Eastwood City in Libis, Quezon City.
Per Travel Order, LO Nr 10 FSRR dtd 22 Feb 06, as the logistics officer of his regiment, he proceeded to Manila to check on the status of the logistics and equipment of the newly formed 10th Scout Ranger Company stationed at Camp Tecson.
On 23 Feb 06, he attended the meeting with his classmates at Libis to discuss the shooting competition which their regiment will be hosting on April 2006. Thereafter, he went to the GHQ, AFP, Camp Aguinaldo to coordinate the flight schedule of C130 planes from Mindanao in order to arrange the shipping of firearms to Manila that will be used by the elements of the 10th Scout Ranger Company. He met CPT SALES at the soldier’s mall inside the camp for dinner.
When he was already home in Laguna, he received a message from another fellow officer that certain developments have happened in Manila, particularly with high-ranking military officers. He rushed back to their liaison office in fort Bonifacio to await further orders from his superiors.
After several hours, without any orders form his superiors, he decided to go home to Laguna and retired for the day.
He did not commit the alleged acts constitutive of violations of AW 67 and 96. Contrary to the allegations in the amended charge sheet, he was in Manila on 23 Feb to 24, 2006, specifically in Fort Bonifacio, Makati City and Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City on official business.
On 03 Feb 06, he was with his fellow officers celebrating the birthday of COL DANTES at the watchtower area in Camp Tecson and not inside his rest house discussing a putative plan to breach the General Headquarters.
In support to his counter-affidavit, he submitted the following exhibits:
[1] Letter Order No 10 dtd 22 Feb 06 (Attached to the counter-affidavit)
Travel Order of CPT ALMODOVAR directing him to proceed from Camp Tecson to Fort Bonifacio eff 22 Feb 06.
[2] Affidavit of LTC FAUSTINO S DANTES dtd 13 Sep 06 (Attached as “Annex A” of the manifestation)
On 03 Feb 06, a simple gathering was held at the Tower Area, Camp Tecson, Bulacan attended by almost all the officers belonging to the FSRR stationed at Camp Tecson.
He attests that CPT JOEY T FONTIVEROS was present during the said gathering and stayed until 3:00 am of 04 Feb 06.
The sworn statement of CPT ALMODOVAR was taken by the ADHOC Committee and marked as Annex DD of the ADHOC Committee report. He did not sign the statement. The transcript of the statement contains the following:
Assigned at ISG, PA but previously assigned at First Scout Ranger Regiment since 1995. Belong to PMA class 94
MAJ AQUINO is his upper classman, class 1991. Both were assigned at FSRR. He has respect for him as his upper class and as officer. He knows that MAJ AQUINO was relieved from FSRR sometime in July last year because he was implicated for distributing the Para sa Bayan or the New Order leaflets.
When CPT AQUINO was already relieved, he would still visit Camp Tecson, especially during the birthday of COL DANTES but there was no power point presentation of Operation Gemstone.
He received a text message from CPT FONTIVEROS that the Chief of Staff has already withdrawn support from the Commander in Chief and hurriedly went back to the liaison office at Fort Bonifacio and waited for instructions. He tried to call his commander but since he cannot contact him, he just stayed at the liaison and waited for instructions.
Since there was no instruction, he stayed in the Liaison Office. He was ordered to report back to Camp Tecson on the 24th. He is not sure whether it was their Chief of Staff or their G3 who instructed them to report back. He was just informed either by CPT FONTIVEROS or CPT CRISTE or CPT CORDOVA. They are his classmates.
He was already in Manila on the 22nd or 23rd Feb to attend to some logistical requirements re: transfer of firearms from field units to Manila because of the 200 candidate soldier training at that time at the 10th Scout Ranger Company.
He is not aware that some elements of 7th SR Company are to augment 10th SRC. Firearms were taken from different units per radio message to consolidate firearms needed in HQ and facilitate special flight for C130 for the firearms.
When he was the course director in SRTS, he used the slogan Para sa Bayan in his class (SR Class 156) to motivate the students to be committed to their operations.
He did not prepare a camp defense plan. He just made a scenario with his students on how to take over the 7th Division. It was coordinated with the G2, 7th Division. No exercise was made in Camp Aguinaldo
He heard of the Operation Gemstone from MAJ DELOS SANTOS during his interview at IG.
He asked permission from COL RABONZA to go to Manila on the 23rd where he attended a meeting in Libis with classmates.
During the birthday of COL DANTES, present were officers of FSRR, MAJ AQUINO, his classmates, LT REYES, CPT FONTIVEROS. There was no discussion about taking over the camp. They just aired their gripes. The birthday was at the rest house of COL DANTES at the tower. ILT REYES could have misinterpreted their discussions. They just discussed about New Order and Para sa Bayan but there was no topic about coup d’etat or take over.
A power point presentation was conducted by MAJ AQUINO about New Order but it was even before 2003, 2005. It was not about Operation Gemstone.
He has no knowledge about a power point presentation re Operation Gemstone even if MAJ AQUINO admitted to it. If ever there was one, he will take the consequence. However, he is not saying that he has done something wrong.
CPT SABABAN is his classmate. He was present when the New Order was presented. His assignment was as G2.
Personally, if FSSR is a threat, he is willing to have the Scout Ranger be abolished if there is no longer any trust in the Rangers.
CPT WILLIAM F UPANO O-11876 (INF) PA.
CPT UPANO avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He was the supply officer (S4) of the Scout Ranger Training School (SRTS), First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR), PA.
It is crystal clear that there is no legal or factual basis for the instant Pre-Trial Investigation to proceed against him. It is very patent that the exhibit against him cannot legally substantiate the charges as well as the specifications constituting the violations of AW67 and 96.
The charge sheet is defective, if not totally useless, since the accuser CPT ARMANDO P PAREDES explicitly averred and subscribed under oath that he has personal knowledge of the matters set forth in the specifications of the charge sheet. The accuser is not a member of the FSRR. As such, there can be no way that he will have personal knowledge about the activities being undertaken by their unit.
During the last week of Feb 06, his wife was with him at SRTS. He could not have conspired with anybody as alleged in the charge sheet since that would also put his wife’s safety at risk.
On 03 Feb 06, LTC DANTES celebrated his birthday and at the same time his despedida party at his residence at the tower area, Camp Tecson, Bulacan, As he was the one who will replace him, he attended the party to personally talk to him regarding the turn-over.
A careful perusal of the specifications of Charge 1 for violation of Aw67 would reveal that the allegation of conspiracy dos not have any legal ground to stand on. The charge merely makes a general allegation of conspiracy. Even the attached exhibit does not support the allegation of conspiracy.
In PP vs. Mandao, criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy and a judgment of conviction must always be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. No evidence can be deduced that he have connived, confederated or helped anyone in attempting to begin or cause a mutiny. Thus, Charge 1 for the violation of AW67 must be dismissed for utter lack of legal and factual merit.
There is no showing that he have acted or exhibited a character that would show moral unfitness on his part. Charge 2 for violation of AW96 must be dismissed for utter lack of legal and factual merit.
In support to his counter-affidavit, he submitted the following exhibits:
[1] Affidavit of CPT UPANO dtd 17 Mar 06 (Annex “A” of the counter-affidavit)
Submitted to Army Inspector General. He stated that he was the supply officer, S4 of SRTS, FSRR, SOCOM, PA stationed at Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan. He did not attend the happy hour on the first week of Nov 2005 at FSRR Headquarters. He has no knowledge regarding OPN GEMSTONE nor did he attend any meeting on the same. He is not a member or supporter of Para Sa Bayan nor does he have any knowledge of such organization. He supports the chain of command and the current administration.
[2] Copy of the General Order No. 29 dtd 01 Feb 06 (Annex “B” of the counter-affidavit)
The GO ordered the relief of LTC FAUSTINO S DANTES as Commanding Officer, HHSC, FSSR, SOCOM, PA eff 31 Jan 06 and designated CPT UPANO as the Commanding Officer.
CPT GEORGE M MALONES O-128634 PA (CAV).
CPT MALONES avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He denies the charges against him.
Contrary to the allegations in charge 1, he was never in Camp Aguinaldo or Fort Bonifacio on 23 Feb 06 or on dates prior or subsequent thereto.
Contrary to the allegations in charge 2, he never on or about the 4th quarter of 2005 and on 23 Feb 06, met with COL REYNALDO CABAUATAN, PN (Ret) and 1LT DIVINAGRACIA for the purpose of discussing the plan of some elements of the Scout Rangers, Marines and PNP-SAF to withdraw support from Pres Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
He has known COL CABAUATAN as early as his cadet days at UST, Reserve Officers Training Corps Unit. COL CABAUATAN is also a graduate of the same ROTC Unit.
During the 4th quarter of 2005, he had the chance to meet COL CABAUATAN again when members of the UST ROTC Alumni Association met to attend the wake of their late fellow alumnus MAJ PABLITO R RODRIGUEZ. Attached as “annex 1” of his counter-affidavit is the affidavit of Patrick Joseph M Ignacio attesting to the foregoing facts.
He met COL CABAUATAN again once at the Chowking Restaurant and at Starbucks Café, Cubao. During those meetings, COL CABAUATAN raised his sentiments against the present government. Treating it as an academic discussion, he allowed him to continue. COL CABAUATAN also made mention that something will happen on or before Christmas 2005. He did not elaborate on it. Alarmed by the information, he immediately informed his Commanding Officer. However, COL CABAUATAN informed him later thru a test message that the plan did push through due to unavailability of funds. Again, he relayed this to his Commanding Officer.
Sometime in Feb 06, COL CABAUATAN again asked for a meeting. COL CABAUATAN informed him that the scout Ranger, Philippine Marines, PNP-Special Action Force and the Navy SPOW are withdrawing their support from the present administration. CPT MALONES emphasized to him that he remains loyal to the chain of command and the duly constituted authority. Again, he informed his Commanding Officer of this development.
On 22 Feb 06, he had a call from COL CABAUATAN informing him that a certain “Shock” wanted to talk to him. “Shock” called and informed him that a certain “Paris” will talk to him. He learned later that “Paris” was Major Sarap. Again, he informed his Commanding officer of this development.
On the evening of 23 Feb 06, he met Maj Sarap at the Fort Bonifacio General Hospital where Maj Sarap introduced him to a certain 1LT DIVINAGRACIA. 1LT DIVINAGRACIA mentioned to him that CSAFP, and CG, PA are withdrawing support from the President. He manifested to them that he will remain loyal to the chain of command. He reported the information to his Commanding Officer later.
He has no particular involvement in any activity of any group attempting to withdraw their support from the Commander-in-Chief. He was merely informed of the development.
The accusation against him is a surprise. His accusers are not logical about all these.
The evidence against him which are in his affidavit and sworn statement (also annex 2 and 3 of his CA) are honest narration of the true facts on what transpired from the 4th quarter of 2005 until 23 Feb 06. From this evidence, it is manifest that he remained a loyal soldier of the Republic.
When he reported the vital pieces of information he gathered, it became evident that and without doubt that his sworn duty as a soldier came first than his association with a fellow alumnus COL CABAUATAN. His Commanding Officer even considered him as a candidate for Battalion S-2.
If indeed, he participated in the planning of the alleged withdrawal of support, he should have participated in a more discreet manner and not in restaurants, beer houses and malls. Military experience dictates that plans such as this should be made in secret.
If indeed he was persuaded or influenced by the plotter and COL CABAUATAN, he could have recruited from the ranks of the LABde to join him in the exercise given the fact that as early as 4th quarter, they have already planned for this action.
Finally and most importantly, if indeed he participated in all these activities, he could have used his position as S-3 of the 1st MIB on 23 Feb 06 to create and a vantage point for those who participated in this plot. He was tasked to supervise the deployment of the fire-power of the 14th MIC at that time. He had at that time eight (8) tanks at his disposal. He could have easily used them to further the intentions of the plotters and even use them for destroying key military installations and stations. Or at least, he could have positioned these tanks to weaken the defense of Fort Bonifacio, HPA and the NCR Command. This is simple in military tactics. Yet, as a loyal soldier to the Republic, the Constitution and Commander-in-Chief, he did his job as instructed. He never deviated from the plans for the security and defense of Fort Bonifacio, HPA and NCR Command. To attest to the truthfulness of the foregoing facts is the affidavit of COL EDGAR L LABITORIA, Commanding Officer, 4th MIB, LABde, PA as “annex 4” of his counter-affidavit.
In support to his counter-affidavit, he submitted the following exhibits:
[1] Affidavit of Joseph Patrick Mendoza Ignacio, the National Commander of the UST Advance ROTC Alumni Association from 01 April 03 to 31 Mar 06 (Annex 1 of the counter-affidavit)
CPT MALONES and his wife were with them during the burial of Ret MAJ PABLITO R RODRIGUEZ on 04 Nov 05 from 1930H to 0000H 05 Nov 05.
[2] Affidavit of CPT MALONES -one of the annexes of the AHIC report (Annex 2 of the counter-affidavit)
He adopted it as one of his evidence.
[3] Sworn statement of CPT MALONES – Annex “MM” of the AHIC (Annex 3 of the counter-affidavit)
He adopted it as one of his evidence.
[4] Affidavit of LTC EDGAR L LABITORIA (CAV) PA, Commanding Officer of 1st Mechanized Infantry Battalion, Light Armor Brigade, PA (Annex 4 of the counter-affidavit)
On or about 222300H Feb 06, after attending a conference at AOC, G3 PA, he instructed CPT MALONES, Bn S3 to supervise the deployment of 14th Mechanized Infantry company under CPT NADALA, its Commanding Officer, at vicinity HPA compound to form part of the defense of HPA.
CPT MALONES executed the following:
Sworn Statement (attached as Annex “MM” of the Ad Hoc committee report)
Affidavit submitted to Army IG. (attached as one of the annexes of the Ad Hoc committee report)
Assigned as Battalion S3 at Headquarters 1st Mechanized Infantry Battalion, Light Armor Brigade, PA eff 16 Sep 05.
He met COL REYNALDO CABAUATAN PN (M) (Ret) sometime in the 4th quarter of 2005. Other meetings followed where COL CABAUATAN talked about his sentiments against the present government. During one of the meetings, COL CABAUATAN mentioned that something will happen on or before Christmas but he did not elaborate on it. He was informed later by COL CABAUATAN that the activity did not push through due to unavailability of funds.
Sometime in Feb 06, COL CABAUATAN informed him that the rangers, Marines, SAF and SPOW will withdraw support from the current administration.
On 22 Feb 06, COL CABAUATAN called him and told him that a certain ‘SHOCK’ wants to talk to him. “SHOCK” called up and said a certain “Paris” will come for him. He later learned that Paris was MAJ SARAP.
On the evening of 23 Feb 06, MAJ SARAP introduced him to a certain 1LT DIVINAGRACIA. 1LT DIVINAGRACIA mentioned to him that CSAFP, and CG, PA will withdraw their support from the government.
His Commanding Officer was LTC EDGARDO LABITORIA.
He knows COL REYNALDO CABAUATAN PC (Ret). He constantly met with COL REYNALDO CABAUATAN who asked him the pulse of the armor units to which he replied that the armor is loyal to the government. He met with COL CABAUATAN at Starbucks around November or December of 2005;
MAJ SARAP was formerly an armor officer who frequently visited the armor unit at Fort Bonifacio. In one of the visits of MAJ SARAP, they met together with CPT ADALA, and MAJ ROXAS. He does not have any knowledge of MAJ SARAP’s involvement in previous coup attempt. MAJ SARAP is PARIS. His other codename is DELICIOUS
He does know who is “SHOCK” but “SHOCK” was the one whom COL CABAUATAN mentioned who wants to talk to him. That he was able to talk to SHOCK through cell phone and did not come to know him in person;
He believes that the codename “MILAN” is the name of 1LT GAY’s girlfriend.
COL CABAUATAN at one time invited him for a drink where the former mentioned that the Rangers, the Marines, and SPOW are withdrawing support from the government sometime days before 23 Feb 2006, probably the second week. COL CABAUATAN did not mention to him the details or the manner by which the Rangers or the Marines will withdraw support
He informed his Commanding Officer, 1st Mechanized, LTC LABITORIA of the information gathered right after the meeting. On 22 Feb 2006, COL CABAUATAN called him and mentioned that a certain PARIS will call and he will meet PARIS at Fort Bonifacio. He deferred the meeting with PARIS because he was busy deploying armor vehicles.
He talked to PARIS at the hospital and was told that 1LT DIVINAGRACIA will tell him something. When he met 1LT DIVINAGRACIA, the latter mentioned to him that Chief of Staff, AFP and CG, PA will withdraw support. At the time he met 1LT DIVINAGRACIA, he was in civilian clothes, he was good looking, fair complexioned, slim and taller than him and introduced himself as 1LT DIVINAGRACIA. That meeting with 1LT DIVINAGRACIA was the first and the last. He learned that 1LT DIVINAGRACIA works at the Liaison Office, FSRR from the Army IG.
He denies having any role in the coup attempt. He suspected something when he was frequently contacted by COL CABAUATAN, which was the reason he reported the same to his CO, including the pamphlet given by COL CABAUATAN sometime 4th Quarter 2005 which illustrated a transition government.
The pamphlet is of newsprint type, around six (6) pages folded, authored by a civilian. It also had some illustrations and caricatures. The pamphlet was given to his CO, LTC EDGARDO LABITORIA, and Battalion S2, MAJ ROXAS.
He only agreed to meet COL CABAUATAN because he was a senior officer.
He was always being contacted by COL CABAUATAN. That in the event that charges may be filed against COL CABAUATAN, he is willing to stand by his statements and testify against COL REYNALDO CABAUATAN, including the persons mentioned in his affidavit.
Mr Chris Quintana, a businessman who was very close to military officers, was known to him when he was still CO, 21st LABde at General Santos, Saranggani. He believes that 1LT GAY and Mr Chris Quintana were friends because 1LT GAY has a family at General Santos.
He learned about the statement given by 1LT GAY on the television on the 24th during the Marine Stand-Off where he was surprised that 1LT GAY’s name came out where 1LT GAY claimed membership with MKP.
No other Ranger officer contacted him except for 1LT DIVINAGRACIA
CPT FREDERICK M SALES O-11686 PA (INF).
CPT SALES avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
His counter-affidavit starts with the words: “Mahal ko ang ating bayan. Sinikap kong makapag-aral sa Philippine Military Acadamy at maging isang ganap na sundalo. After graduation, I and other members of Class ’94 were deployed in Mindanao, particularly in Basilan, Jolo, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao and parts of Luzon to fight the MILF, Abu Ssayaf and the NPA.”
He is surprised that he is now indicted for ‘Attempted Mutiny’ (AW 67) and ‘Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman’ (AW 96).
He vehemently denies the accusations against him, he did not commit the crimes charged and is innocent of such offenses.
He did not make any resistance or conspire for any unlawful resistance against the Commander-in-Chief or to any superior officers. Neither did he raise or join any commotion, rally or disturbance against the government or its duly constituted authorities. He was not involved in any coup plot to bring down the government.
He does not belong to the Magdalo. He did not join or attend meetings of any group or organization which have for its purpose the toppling down of government or the commission of seditious acts.
On 18 Feb 06, he, his wife, children and family members went to Baguio City to attend the PMA Alumni Homecoming and to celebrate his wife’s birthday the next day. That the same is supported by a police report which he had due to a vehicular accident involving his vehicle in Baguio City.
On 23 Feb 06, he, his wife and two children went to GSIS in Pasay City to sign documents and issue checks for their housing loan and thereafter coordinated with V-Luna doctors for the schedule of their son’s operation.
That also on 23 Feb 06 at about 1:00 pm, he and some of his PMA Classmates gathered in Seoul Restaurant in Libis, Quezon City, not for the purpose of planning a mutiny or withdrawal of support from the chain of command, but for the purpose of coordinating their “Shoot Fest” project among class ’94 and the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR). In that gathering they never discussed or plan any mutiny, coup or withdrawal of support from the chain of command. That in the eventuality that the NPA, Abussayaf and some terrorist groups will create disturbance against the government or its duly constituted authorities and attack any of the State’s facilities and institutions, they will suppress them and repel the aggressors.
That he was not among those troops of COL ARIEL QUERUBIN in protecting the relief of Philippine Marine Corps Commander Miranda on 25 Feb 06.
He notes that there was no swift attack committed by them (junior officers and enlisted men) anywhere in the Philippine on any date in Feb 06 or prior and subsequent thereto.
There was no violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth directly or indirectly against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic or any of its facilities or installations for the purpose of seizing or diminishing State’s power.
There is no prima facie evidence against them and are moving for the dismissal of these cases.
He is retracting and withdrawing his affidavit dated 01 Mar 06 because the same was not voluntarily and freely given. His constitutional rights have been violated: the right to counsel of his own choice; the right to remain silent and the right against self-incrimination have been violated.
He is executing this affidavit (Counter-Affidavit) in lieu of his previous affidavit.
The statement of CPT SALES was taken by the ADHOC Investigating Committee and attached as “Annex EE” of the ADHOC Committee Report. He did not sign the statement. Attached also as one of the annexes of the Ad Hoc committee report is his affidavit which he executed at Fort Magsaysay. The statements contain the following:
Presently assigned at ISG, PA but previously assigned with the FSRR as MFO Special Operations Command
He was informed to be on standby because there is a rumor that the Chief of Staff will withdraw support. He cannot recall who informed him that he should be on standby.
He attended a class meeting in Libis with regard to the plan for a shoot fest arranged by PMA Class 94 to be held at the Scout Ranger. There was no other agenda. The meeting lasted for 2 hours and not 4 hours as stated in his previous affidavit.
He went to Fort Bonifacio in the evening of 23 Feb 06. He stayed at the FSRR Liaison Office until the 24th to monitor some developments regarding the alleged withdrawal of support. If the alleged plan will push through, he will give support to BGEN LIM by joining him. He did not inform his Commander GEN RAMOS on the alleged rumor of withdrawal of support.
No statement was made by GEN LIM that he intended to withdraw support from the government. He got the information from his classmates. There was already news that the Chief of Staff will withdraw support and that Scout Rangers will be joining the plan of the Chief of Staff.
Para sa Bayan is not an organization but a battle cry by the Scout Rangers. It is just a leaflet published in the magazine of the Scout Ranger making suggestions on what the government should do, not a movement against it.
He does not remember any presentation by MAJ AQUINO at FSSR.
In the evening of 23, only the Liaison Officer was present at the Liaison office. He was not in uniform but always brought it with him in his vehicle. In case the withdrawal of support would materialize, he would coordinate with his classmates.
He has served BGEN LIM for a long time. He believes in his cause re the news about the legality of the presidency, due to the accusations especially about the Garci scandal.
If the plan of withdrawal of support will push through, the go signal will come from the Chief of Staff, AFP. Coordination among the FSSR members will be through cell phone.
He communicated with CPT ALMODOVAR and CPT FONTIVEROS in the evening of 23 Feb 06.
Answer to the query on whether or not they were influenced by BGEN LIM or the other way around, “He followed the chain of command”. Although his chain is SOCOM, his heart still belongs to the Scout Ranger.
No sentiment from the younger officers or other classes to withdraw support from the government
If the Chief of Staff withdraws support, the Scout Rangers will support the decision.
CPT BARIZO is a classmate but he does not know anything about the plan and he is not among those who would withdraw support.
He knows that there is a violation of not reporting any movement (withdraw of support). He feels guilty of breaking the Chain of Command.
1LT JACON S CORDERO O-13434 PA (INF).
1LT CORDERO avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He vehemently denies both charges, the same is completely without factual basis and are absolutely not true.
He never had any communication whatsoever with the other respondents, much less conspired with any one of them “to begin or create any mutiny” and withdraw support from the President by urging the Chief of Staff and other officers and enlisted men.
He has absolutely no knowledge, previous or otherwise of any plot to withdraw support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
During the material period stated in the Amended Charge I, he has done nothing to include him in the Amended Charge I.
He had always been in Manila and went back to his CP only when he was ordered by his Battalion Commander LTC EDMUND D MALABANJOT.
It was his Ex-O, Ritchiemel C Caballes who dispatched twenty six (26) of their men per order of their Battalion Commander. The same twenty six (26) men were recalled by his Ex-O and him per order of Battalion Ex-O Allan AURINO.
He had nothing to do with the dispatch of the twenty six (26) men dispatched from Camp Anislag CP on the midnight of 23 February 2006 to commute to Manila without any firearm and in civilian clothes.
Since 22 Feb 06, he was in Manila on VOCO PASS to be with his son on his 1st birthday celebration and that on 23 Feb 06 at 1:00 in the afternoon, he was ordered by his Battalion Commander, to go back to Camp Anislag, Camarines Sur, which he did after attending the birthday celebration of his son and the blessing of his newly assigned quarters at Fort Bonifacio.
He arrived at 3:00 in the morning at 3rd SRB, Camp Canuto, Pili, Camarines Sur.
The said twenty six (26) members of his troops, who commuted by bus to Manila and who were later recalled, was apprehended at Sipocot, Camarines Sur by the 31st Ballaion personnel and brought to Headquarters at Pili, Camarines Sur, and then later detained up to the present at Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal.
The Sworn Statement of Cpl Dennis F Marzan is a faithful narration of what happened on 23 Feb 06.
He does not know anything about the alleged conversations between 1LT OLAJAY and LT EDUARDO LAMOSTE on 24 Feb 06 at 5:35 in the morning. It is true that while 1LT OLAJAY and LT LAMOSTE were conversing, he was busy on the telephone talking to his wife.
He affirms that LT OLAJAY came back to their CP at 8:45 in the morning but he has nothing to do with the admission of LT LAMOSTE that there were unauthorized troops movement since the night of 23 Feb 06.
The dispatch of the twenty six (26) men was not unauthorized as the same were instructions from his Battalion Commander.
He does not know anything about the alleged message from HFSPP regarding the withdrawal of support by the Chief of Staff from the AFP and the government and he had no information whatsoever that LT LAMOSTE allegedly told LT OLAJAY anything regarding the alleged message.
On 24 Feb 06 at about 9:00 in the morning, he was called by Brigade Commander, GENERAL ARUGAY and Supt Olitiquit of RS PNP and was asked if his troops were duly accounted for and he answered “YES”.
In the afternoon of the same day, 24 Feb 06, he was asked by GENERAL ARUGAY to proceed to their Headquarters which they did, together with 1LT ESTOLAS, Co, 9th SRC at Tiwi, Albay, to remain as guests and not detainees.
He intends to call the following as his witness to support the truth of each and every allegation of his Counter-Affidavit herein: LTC EDMUNDO D MALABANJOT; CPT ALLAN C AURINO; 1LT RITCHIEMEL C CABALLES; Sgt Rayland Lagunero; Sgt Gerald Adriano; Sgt Ronnie Juguilon.
1LT CORDERO gave his statement before CPT NAPOLEON G PABON JR (INF) PA at 901st, 9ID, PA on 28 Feb 06. He signed the statement. The statement contains the following:
He narrated what transpired on 23-24 February 2006, to wit;
a. 23 Feb 06.
a.1. At 1300H, he was at Market Market Taguig City. His Battalion Commander called him up and instructed him to proceed to his CP. However, he attended the birthday celebration of his son and house blessing at Fort Bonifacio.
a.2. At 1700H , he left for Bicol
b. 24 Feb 06
b.1. At 0300H, when he arrived at Hqs 3rd SRB, Camp Canuto, Brgy Sagurong, Pili, Cam Sur. his Battalion Ex-O, CPT AURINO, informed him that the latter’s troops, who were instructed not to bring firearms, had already left for Manila as instructed by their Battalion Commander, LTC MALABANJOT. Thereafter, he immediately proceeded to his coy CP.
b.2 Before 0500H, he arrived at his coy CP. He was briefed by his coy Ex-O, LT CABALLES and was informed that they were called for conference at Hqs 3SRB on or about 232000H Feb 2006 wherein they received instructions from their Battalion Commander to send troops to Manila as FSRR representative but must not bring their issued firearms and that his troops were released at around 232400H Feb 06. He was also informed by LT CABALLES that the latter was trying to reach him although affiant had never received any text message from LT CABALLES.
b.3 At 0500H, his battalion Commander called him up and instructed him to recall all his troops. Affiant and his EX-O immediately contacted all the troops who left for Manila and gave them instruction to return back to CP. He informed his battalion commander that his troops were apprehended by the 31st IB personnel allegedly at Sipocot Cam Sur. He gave instruction to his EX-O and Platoon Leader, LT LAMOSTE, to account his remaining troops especially those on their way back to CP.
b.4. At 0900H, he received a call from the Brigade Commander, GEN ARUGAY, asking if his troops were duly accounted for. He also received a call from SUPT OLITIQUIT of R5 PNP asking the same question. He then received later in the afternoon from the Brigade Commander, GEN ARUGAY, requesting him to proceed to HQs for some questions.
b.5 At 1700H, his Battalion Commander informed him that they may proceed to Hqs Brigade and that he had already spoken with GEN ARUGAY regarding the matter.
b.6 At 1800H, LT ESTOLAS came to his CP and they both decided to report to Hqs Brigade.
b.7. At 1900H, they arrived at 901st Brigade Hqs and reported to GEN ARUGAY. The latter then informed them that there are orders to detain them.
1LT HOMER A ESTOLAS O-13449 PA (INF).
He avers in his counter-affidavit the following:
He avers that he is the same 1LT HOMER A ESTOLAS charged with violation of AW 67 and 96.
He vehemently denies the charges because the same are without factual basis and is absolutely false.
There was no communication between him and the other respondents particularly to withdraw support from Pres Gloria Arroyo/urging the CSAFP and other officers and enlisted personnel.
During the material date stated in the Amended Charge 1, the only activity he attended was an emergency conference at the battalion headquarters in Pili, Camarines Sur, called by Battalion Commander LTC EDMUNDO D MALABANJOT at around 232000H Feb 06, wherein LTC MALABANJOT ordered them to send troops to augment the 10th Scout Ranger Company in Fort Bonifacio.
He then proceeded to his command post in Tiwi, Albay and informed his EX-O 1LT ANTONIO TIMBAL about the order of augmentation. He tasked 1LT TIMBAL to form 2 sections to augment the 10th SRC which were to report to the Liaison Office in Fort Bonifacio and supervise the movement of the troops.
The troops then left by bus to Tabaco, Albay on 24 Feb 06 at around 0400H. However, while in Tabaco, he received a call from LTC MALABANJOT ordering them to recall the troops and to return to barracks.
He immediately instructed the troops to go back to the command post.
The troops arrived at the command post at around 0500H of the same day.
He was placed under detention by GEN ARUGAY on the afternoon of 24 Feb 06.
He was merely obeying the orders of movement issued by LTC MALABANJOT. There was no intent on his part to commit mutiny or create collective insubordination.
His sworn statement given before the ADHOC committee is marked as Annex “II” of the ADHOC committee report. The statement is not signed by 1LT ESTOLAS but certified by the transcriber Maria Carla R Pineda CE and subscribed before CPT ARMANDO P PAREDES JAGS. The transcript of the statement contains the following:
He was assigned at the First Scout Ranger Regiment, Special Operations Command, Phil Army.
That in an emergency conference called by LTC MALABANJOT, he was ordered by LTC MALABANJOT to send representatives to report to Fort Bonifacio to augment the 10th Scout Ranger Company at Fort Bonifacio and stated that they might be used in EDSA.
They were told to bring black suit uniform and bandoleers but no firearms. He assumed that they will be laid up with 10th SRC
After the emergency conference he went back to his company post and ordered his troop to go to Manila. That before 5 in the morning of 24 Feb, LTC MALABANJOT called him on his cellular phone ordering the troops to go back to barracks since the augmentation was cancelled so he called someone from the troop to inform them of LTC MALABANJOT’s order.
He mentioned that they were given some funds by LTC MALABANJOT through the SDO of the Battalion during the emergency conference in the amount of PhP 30,000.00 but he does not know where it came from and he also gave the 2 sections PhP 2,000.00 from the company and support from the Battalion.
As regards to the emergency conference, He stated that the conference started 1700H of 23 Feb. Present during the conference were Battalion Staffs and the 7th Scout Ranger Company Executive Officer 1LT CABALLES who was also ordered to prepare troops to move to Manila. Aside from the augmentation they talked about the postponed Brigade and Battalion Operation in 901st Brigade.
He also stated that months before, there were already instructions from the Special Southern Luzon Command that they will be tasked as RDF in no specific area. There Battalion was alerted and has to be always ready with troops for Ready Deployment Force.
He learned of the development in Manila when he watched the news on TV.
That during this movement, he was not acting on his own but under the instruction or order of LTC MALABANJOT. He assumed that after they will be augmented with the 10th SRC with the on-going rally in EDSA, the SR Company might use troops as augmentation for the dispersal or any other order. When asked if he violated any regulations during 24 Feb, he said yes because he ordered his men to go to EDSA and did not elaborate to them what the mission would be. That he placed the lives of his men in grave danger.
He saw “Para sa Bayan” in their Anniversary Magazine and it was printed in a streamer as a theme during the anniversary.
1LT ERVIN C DIVINAGRACIA O-12742 PA (INF).
1LT DIVINAGRACIA avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He has no participation whatsoever in the charges leveled against him.
He was a Liaison Officer of the First Scout Ranger Regiment, PA holding office at First Scout Ranger Regiment Detachment, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila.
His records would show that he has never been involved or implicated in any destabilization against the government.
He denies the statement of CPT MALONES in his sworn statement where the latter stated: “There, MAJ SARAP, introduced me to a certain 1LT DIVINAGRACIA. 1LT DIVINAGRACIA mentioned that the Chief-of-Staff, AFP and CG, PA will withdraw their support from the government. And I returned back to my quarters to rest.”
He never mentioned to anyone such imminent withdrawal of support from the government of the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for reasons that he has no knowledge whatsoever regarding such impending withdrawal of support.
Assuming without admitting that he mentioned those words to CPT MALONES that would not per se tantamount to violation of AW67 and 96. “It is not enough to show suspicious circumstances. Suspicion is not enough proof” (page 33, Degree of Proof, Vol I, A Treatise on Facts or the Weight and Value of Evidence, by Charles C Moore.)
“Verdicts must stand upon evidence and not upon mere conjecture, however plausible, and if the situation be such that the plaintiff cannot furnish the requisite evidence, the misfortune is his”. (Babcock v Fitchburg R.Co., 140 N.Y. 308, 311, 35 N.E. Rep. 596 per Earl J.)
He does not have moral ascendancy and persuasion to tell that sensitive matter to other military officers with higher ranks than him (purportedly Major Paris and Cpt MALONES) for they should be the first one to know, if there will be such withdrawal of support of the Chief of Staff.
It should be considered that there are copious names of “DIVINAGRACIA” in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, consequently, they might be referring to other “DIVINAGRACIA”.
The statement of 1LT DIVINAGRACIA was taken by the ADHOC Investigating Committee and the same is attached as Annex “GG” of the ADHOC Committee report. He did not sign the statement but certified by the transcriber Maria Carla R Pineda and subscribed before CPT ARMANDO P PAREDES JAGS. The transcript contains the following:
He was assigned as liaison officer of FSRR in Fort Bonifacio in January 2005. His official task is the Deputy G1 and G4 of Regiment so he does the liaising for admin and logistics of the Regiment in Metro Manila.
He never encountered a group named “Para sa Bayan” but heard it as a name for one Ranger Class.
Since officers usually passed by their liaison office, he remembered the following officers from FSRR who were in Manila from Feb 22 or thereabouts: Maj Banua; Cpt Almodovar and Cpt Sales. He however, could not recall the exact time and date when Cpt Sales visited the liaison.
During the period February 20-24, 2006, there were no specific instructions from any of his Senior Officers to prepare his troops in connection with the alleged withdrawal of support of BGEN LIM.
On 23 Feb 06, he was at the liaison office. He did not go to Fort Bonifacio General Hospital on that same date. He was not able to leave the liaison office because he dispatched personnel to be picked up in ASCOM.
He does not know the reason why they were on a red alert status but he still informed the liaison that they will be wearing half BDA. He observed that there was no unusual incident that happened before 24 Feb 06.
He did not receive any call from G3 about the instruction that the 7SR is supposed to augment the 10SR Company. He was not informed that there will be movement of troops from Bicol to Bonifacio on the night of 23 Feb 06.
He stated that only Cpt Fontiveros and Cpt Almodovar visited his office during 23-24 of Feb 06.
He was just instructed by G3, Maj Pangcog to keep his men intact.
1LT RITCHIEMEL C CABALLES O-13686 PA (INF).
In lieu of a counter-affidavit, 1LT CABALLES submitted a consolidated motion, manifestation and statements. His arguments are as follows:
The PTI proceeding is null and void for violating the constitutional rights of the respondents. The AFP initiated this proceeding on the basis of written statements that respondents were coerced to make. These statements were also made without the assistance of counsel.
Sec 17 of the Art 3 of the constitution states that: “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself”. This right is not only available in criminal prosecutions but also on all other government proceedings including administrative investigations. (CRUZ, Constitutional Law p. 302; also Brown vs. Walker, 161 US 951).
There was no valid waiver of such constitutional rights. These rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Respondents were directed to appear before a fact finding committee investigating an alleged coup attempt. They were instructed to submit written statements. It is submitted that under RA 7438, custodial investigation has been defined by law as to include the practice of issuing an “invitation” to a person in connection with an offense that he is suspected to have committed. Thus, the investigation conducted by the Lopez committee was, in fact, a custodial investigation.
The charge sheets in the instant cases were the direct result of the findings made by the Lopez committee. And since the proceeding before the Lopez committee was constitutionally flawed, it is only but logical that the fruit of that committee (charge sheets) is equally infirm. The fruit of a poisonous tree is equally poisonous.
The first charge under AW67 includes the element of conspiracy. Thus, for all intents and purposes, evidence against one of the respondents will eventually be offered against all of the respondents. The flawed statements that respondents were coerced into making, by themselves, may not be used to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy must be proved by other evidence aliunde.
A case before the Supreme Court will soon be filed once no favorable action is taken by this Office with respect to this pleading.
Respondent maintains that his constitutional rights were violated and that these cases should therefore be dismissed.
1LT ANTONIO T TIMBAL O-13782 PA (INF).
1LT TIMBAL alleges the following in his counter-affidavit:
He was assigned with 9SRC since Jan 2004 and was designated as EX-O since July 2005. He explained his whereabouts from 15-24 Feb 06.
On 15 Feb 06, he went to Quezon City to celebrate his birthday with his family and to canvass for the spare parts of the Kennedy jeep. In fact, he secured a community tax certificate from the Quezon City Hall, a copy of which is attached to his counter-affidavit as Annex “1”.
He returned to their company command post on 19 Feb 06.
He denies that he traveled to Manila with LT CORDERO and LT SERENO on 21 Feb 06. When he returned to their company post on 19 Feb 06, he stayed in their CP on said date onwards as evidenced by the daily disposition of troops and morning report attached as Annexes “2” and “3” respectively of his counter-affidavit.
On or prior to 20 Feb 06, they were informed of the red alert status and that their battalion is the SOLCOM RDF re: Obtaining Internal Security Situation in NCR and other parts of the country and must be prepared to move on order, as evidenced by the transcript of said radio message attached as Annex “4” of the counter-affidavit. (note: the said document is not attached to the counter-affidavit)
Days thereafter, they were on standby alert and just continued with their sports fest activity while waiting for any deployment.
On 24 Feb 06 at around 0200H, 1LT ESTOLAS who just arrived from a conference at Battalion Headquarters informed him that there is an order that they shall send augmentation force to 10SRC in Fort Bonifacio. 1LT ESTOLAS also instructed him to supervise the boarding of the troops.
Thinking that the movement is related with the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), he followed the instructions of 1LT ESTOLAS.
When the troops were on their way to Tabasco City, they were recalled back by 1LT ESTOLAS and were instructed to return to the company command post as the movement had been cancelled by LTC MALABANJOT.
He had neither knowledge nor participation in any attempt to commit mutiny against the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP and President of the Republic.
He acted upon the instructions of 1LT ESTOLAS to supervise the boarding of the troops. He was not aware that the troop movement was unauthorized knowing that the order came from the Battalion Commander.
His actions were mainly in obedience to a lawful order of a superior officer and the troops reacted as a rapid deployment force for augmentation as what they were briefed of.
To support his counter-affidavit, he submitted the following exhibits:
[1] A copy of the Community Tax Certificate (CTC) he secured at the Quezon City Hall dated 17 Feb 06 (Annex “1” of his counter-affidavit)
[2] Daily Disposition of Troops dtd 21-23 Feb 06 (Annex “2” of his counter-affidavit)
Certified true copy of the original signed by 1LT EDUARDO P CAUSING JR PA
[3] Morning Report dtd 21-24 Feb 06 (Annex “3” of his counter-affidavit)
Certified true copy of the original signed by 1LT EDUARDO P CAUSING JR PA
The statement of 1LT TIMBAL was not taken by the ADHOC Committee but he executed a sworn statement before MAJ BERNARDO R FORTEZ and the same is marked as Annex “HHH” of the ADHOC Committee report. He signed the sworn statement. The sworn statement contains the following:
H was designated as Ex-O, 9SRC. 3SRB, SOCOM, PA and has been with 9SRC for more than two (2) years since Jan 2004.
There are two other Officers in 9SRC, CO, 1LT ESTOLAS and 2LT VALLESCAS who was on schooling.
He went to Manila on 15 Feb 2006 as it was his birthday and he had to procure parts of the Kennedy Jeep. He immediately came back a few days after.
He denies having asked permission together with 1LT CORDERO, 1LT SERENO and other EPs to go to Manila on 21 February 2006
He was aware of the conference called by his Battalion Commander, LTC MALABANJOT but did not attend the same as it was only his CO, 1LT ESTOLAS who attended the conference. After the said conference, 1LT ESTOLAS briefed them of the discussion and instructed them to prepare two (2) sections for augmentation to 10SRC in Fort Bonifacio and that the team is to report to Liaison Office in Fort Bonifacio and to wait for further instructions there. That the remaining personnel more or less three (3) sections will remain at Company CP for security and alert operations.
The sections under SSg Dacanay and SSg Quilapio were tasked to augment 10SRC. The sections under SSg Dacanay were to proceed to Tabaco, Albay to get a bus and that he accompanied this section. When the bus was already in Tiwi proper, another section under SSg Quilapio left CP and moved to Tiwi on board M35 trucks and linked with other sections. They moved to Manila with him as he was to go to Tabaco for personal purposes and that as soon as his purpose in Tobaco is accomplished he will return to CP.
Before reaching Tabaco, 1LT ESTOLAS called up thru cellular phone and ordered them to return to CP to which they immediately followed and they arrived at CP between 240500 to 0530H on that day.
Two Thousand Pesos (PhP 2,000.00) was given to every member and as far as he knew, it came from their “buffer savings” and from their MOE.
Prior to 23 and 24 Feb 2006, he did not notice nor observe any unusual event or information related to troop movements and they were just on standby focusing on impending operations as they usually do.
There was no coordination with 7SRC and they just based their action on the briefing given by 1LT ESTOLAS. He did not doubt the instructions that the troops will wear civilian attire, to bring their uniforms and use civilian vehicle as there were factors to be considered in using the M35 trucks, since the trip is long and risky.
Upon their return to CP, they conducted reveille and continued with their sports fest.
He does not consider the troop movement as illegal since they were briefed that it was for augmentation and considering that they are a rapid deployment force, they had to act immediately.
1LT SANDRO U SERENO O-131279 PA (INF).
1LT SERENO avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He strongly denies the above mentioned charges as the same are without factual basis and are absolutely false.
He never had any communication whatsoever with the other respondents, much less conspired with any one of them “to begin or create any mutiny” and withdraw support from the President by urging the Chief of Staff and other officers and enlisted men.
During the material date stated in the Amended Charge Sheet 1, he only sat in a conference at the Battalion Headquarters on Pili, Camarines Sur, which was called by Battalion commander LTC EDMUNDO D MALABANJOT.
During that conference, he heard LTC MALABANJOT order 1LT HOMER ESTOLAS to send troops to augment the 10th SRC in Fort Bonifacio. No reason was given in support of the order.
After the conference he went back to his quarters and slept. Around dawn, he was awakened by CPT ALAN AURINO, who asked if he had knowledge about the details of the order of augmentation issued by LTC MALABANJOT, and he replied that he had none.
He vehemently denies the charge contained in the Amended Charge Sheet, as the same is baseless and absolutely false.
He never attempted to begin or create a mutiny by moving to Manila with 1LT JACON CORDERO and 1LT ANTONIO TIMBAL and some enlisted personnel to support BGEN DANILO LIM
He was never in Manila on the material dates mentioned in Amended Charge Sheet 2.
Camp records at Camp Canuto, Pili, Camarines Sur, would show that he was inside the camp on the material dates mentioned in Charge 2; The Morning Report and Disposition of Troops from 21 February to 25 2005 clearly showed that he was accounted for in camp and thus never committed any acts constituting Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman as specified in Charge 2 of the Amended Charge Sheet.
1LT SERENO executed a sworn statement before MAJ BERNARDO R FORTEZ at the Office of the Army Inspector General at HPA, Fort Bonifacio on 24 June 06. He signed the statement and the same is attached as annex “III” of the ADHOC Committee report. The statement contains the following:
Assigned with 3rd SRB last 11 Jan 2006 and was relieved last 01 April 2006.
Prior to 23 February 2006, red alert status was declared and they received radio messages from FSRR and 9ID sometime 17 February 2006 and thereafter sent radio messages to their companies.
He was aware that his Battalion Commander, LTC MALABANJOT called for a conference, but could no longer recall the exact time and that he called the Company Commanders of 7th and 9th SRC.
During the conference, he gave administrative instructions to COs 7SRC and 9SRC to augment 10SRC at Fort Bonifacio and ordered the two (2) companies to prepare two (2) sections each for augmentation. As Battalion S3, he did not give specific instructions to the Company Commanders.
As Battalion S3, he is responsible in following up instructions when it pertains to combat operations or training. It was his Battalion Commander that monitored the movement.
On 24 February 2006, he was at Battalion Headquarters waiting for guidance from the Battalion Commander but no guidance was given. In the morning of 240800H February 2006, CO, 9MIB and Chief-of-Staff, 9MIB arrived at camp. It was then that he learned that there were troops who were intercepted at a checkpoint somewhere in Sipocot, Camarines Sur.
Upon learning about the information, he talked to Ex-O, 7SRC who admitted that the personnel intercepted were of 7SRC and thereafter reported the same to his Battalion Commander who replied “Sige, noted.”
He denies that he, together with 1LT CORDERO, 1LT TIMBAL and other EP asked permission from the Battalion Commander to go to Manila because all those time, he was in the vicinity of the camp doing routinary activities.
Upon learning the interception of 7SRC personnel, he called up and checked 9SRC and he was informed that they were intact.
In the augmentation of the 10SRC by 7SRC and 9SRC, there was no task organization submitted to the Battalion.
After the conference in the late evening of 23 Feb 2006, it never occurred to him that the order to move was unauthorized nor was it a violation of the Chain of Command.
1LT JERALD L REYES O-13257 PA (INF).
1LT REYES avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He denies the charges against him because he did not participate in any movement or organization whose purpose is to overthrow/destabilize the present democratic government nor made any attempt to perform any act that would start a mutiny or destroy the peace and order in the country.
He attended some conferences/meetings with MAJ JASON AQUINO and CPT DANTE LANGKIT and other co-officers in the military but he never agreed nor committed himself to their plot to overthrow/destabilize the government.
As a matter of fact, he did not follow the order the CPT LANGKIT to mobilize his troops for a special operation and he turned down that request.
He just attended the meetings called by MAJ AQUINO and CPT LANGKIT as a subordinate officer.
He did not inform his superior officers about the plan of MAJ AQUINO and CPT LANGKIT for fear that he will be killed by their group and he feared for the safety and security of his family.
When he learned that he was being implicated, he immediately submitted himself for investigation and he voluntarily executed as affidavit attached as Annex “A” of his counter-affidavit.
Annex A of his counter-affidavit is a copy of the “sinumpaang salaysay” of 1LT JERALD L REYES dtd 24 Mar 06 before SPO3 Reynaldo S Rolle of the NCR-CIDU CIDG, Camp Crame, Quezon City. The “sinumpaang salaysay contains the following:
He was the former Charlie Commander of 24IB, 7ID located at Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan.
He stated that he attended the following meetings: First, in the conference room of the 1st Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) at Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan in the first week of Nov 05; Second, at SM Pampanga in the first week of Dec 05; Third, at SM Pampanga in the first week of Jan 06; Fourth, at Raven Resort, Abucay, Bataan on the last week of Jan 06; Fifth, at the rest house of CPT ALMODOVAR inside Camp Tecson on the first week of Feb 06 and; the last, at the Campus View Restaurant at Brgy Poblacion, San Miguel, Bulacan on 16 Feb 06.
MAJ JASON AQUINO called these meetings where he presented a power point presentation of OPERATION GEMSTONE and NEW ORDER.
OPERATION GEMSTONE contains the steps on how to overthrow the government while NEW ORDER contains the orders and laws which should be changed.
During the meeting inside the conference room of FSRR, MAJ AQUINO was the most ranking officer. Other officers who attended the meeting are CPT ISAGANI CRISTE, CPT ROMERO, CPT ALMODOVAR, CAPT PAGAYON, CPT FONTIVEROS and others whose names he does not know.
He met CPT LANGKIT at SM Pampanga where CPT LANGKIT presented the steps to unite their troops for the take-over of Malacañang palace. CPT LANGKIT told them to wait for his go signal as to when the plan will push through. CPT LANGKIT will organize a battalion combat operation so that the movement to Malacañang will be legitimate.
On the fist week of February 06, CPT ISAGANI CRISTE fetched him at his Coy TCP. They fetched MAJ JASON AQUINO and CPT ALMODOVAR at their BOQ and they all proceeded to the latter’s rest house near the so-called tower area. At the rest house, CPT ALMODOVAR posted on the wall of the kitchen A SKETCH/LAY OUT OF Camp General Aguinaldo together with the camp defense plan of Camp Aguinaldo and CPT ALMODOVAR identified the strong and weak points of the camp defense plan of Camp Aguinaldo. CPT UPANO also arrived.
CPT SABABAN also arrived during the meeting with a woman who brought with her a sample of the vest which according to MAJ AQUINO will be used by the officers when they will attack.
He met CPT LANGKIT and 1LT CUARTEROS on 16 Feb 06. 1LT CUARTEROS asked him to bring with him his FSgt, TSg Angga. CPT LANGKIT talked to TSg Angga in private. 1LT CUARTEROS gave him a Nokia cell phone from CPT LANGKIT which the latter will be using to call him. Before they separated ways, CAP LANGKIT reiterated the troop organization which he had been asking.
1LT REYES executed two Statements, the first (Annex FF of the Ad Hoc committee report) which was taken by the ADHOC Committee on 09 June 2006 and another is a Supplemental Affidavit dated 11 Mar 06 (Annex NN of the Ad Hoc committee report). He did not sign the sworn statement but he signed the supplemental affidavit.
His supplemental affidavit contains the following:
Sometime on the fist week of Nov 05, he was invited by CPT CRISTE to attend their happy hour at FSRR Hqs. At about 0100H in the early morning of the next day, all officers who attended the happy hour were instructed to proceed to the conference room of the FSRR Hqs.
In the said conference room, MAJ AQUINO presented more or less a 2-hour presentation on the flows of the present government, the legal system of the country, the military establishment and the PNP. After which, MAJ AQUINO presented a 12-step operational plan dubbed as OPERATION GEMSTONE wherein an elaborate plan on what appears to be a power grab, including the arrest and/or ouster of PGMA, CSAFP, CG, PA, C, PNP, the take-over of vital communication installations, among others.
On the 2nd week of Nov 06, CPT LANGKIT contacted him to meet CPT LANGKIT at SM Pampanga purportedly for them to discuss an important matter. When they met, CPT LANGKIT discussed to him his gripes about what is happening in the chain of command and the corruption in the government.
Another meeting followed on the 1st week of December 2005 at SM Pampanga. 1LT CUARTEROS was also present. CPT LANGKIT instructed them to prepare their men, firearms, ammunitions for the conduct of a battalion operation which CPT LANGKIT intends to organize. Sometime in January 2006, CPT LANGKIT contacted him and required him to submit a tasked organization of his troops. The next day, they met at Raven Resort, Abucay, Bataan together with 1LT CUARTEROS and 1LT BAUTISTA. CPT LANGKIT asked them of the task organization he required them to do but they did not prepare one. CPT LANGKIT told them then they should not be like 1LT SAN JUAN who brought only 4 men during the Oakwood mutiny.
On or about 031900H Feb 06, CPT ISAGANI CRISTE fetched him at his Coy TCP. They fetched MAJ JASON AQUINO and CPT ALMODOVAR at their BOQ and they all proceeded to the latter’s rest house near the so-called tower area. At the rest house, CPT ALMODOVAR posted on the wall of the kitchen A SKETCH/LAY OUT OF Camp General Aguinaldo depicting a diagram of the water system of the camp. CPT ALMODOVAR also posted a copy of the camp defense plan of Camp Aguinaldo. CPT UPANO also arrived.
CPT ALMODOVAR presented the camp defense plan of Camp Aguinaldo and after his presentation, MAJ AQUINO then asked CPT ALMODOVAR if how many troops does he need and the latter replied to the effect that he needed around 200 men and 15 officers because his task is to take over camp Aguinaldo. CPT FONTIVEROS suggested to MAJ AQUINO that the troops of CPT LANGKIT will be augmented by his troops. 1LT REYES overheard CPT FONTIVEROS intimate to MAJ AQUINO that he does not yet have the exact number required he needs for his HPA tasking.
His sworn statement before the ADHOC Committee contains the following:
He talked about the meetings he had with MAJ AQUINO and other officers. The first meeting was held in the conference room of the First Scout Ranger Regiment on the 1st week of November 2005, during the happy hour of FSRR before their anniversary, with MAJ JASON AQUINO who presided the power point presentation and presented the Operation GEMSTONE and “The New Order” with the Company Commanders and G-Staff of the First Scout Ranger Regiment numbering twenty five (25) officers more or less with MAJ JASON AQUINO as the most senior.
A second meeting was held in SM Pampanga together with CPT LANGKIT wherein the latter told him about the leadership of their present Battalion Commander, LTC FELIPE G ANOTADO PA, his gripes in the present leadership and government, together with the plans that CPT LANGKIT has made though they were not yet final. CPT LANGKIT said that he will have a meeting with the Battalion Operations Officer and will give information that will make S3 conduct Battalion Initiated Operation in order that the troops (Charlie Company, 24IB) can move without being noticed by the Battalion Commander.
He believes that CPT LANGKIT can still influence 24IB because he was a former member. Among the guidance or issues to which they were not in favor of concerning the leadership of LTC ANOTADO were the changes implemented in his company, particularly as regards the relief of the First Sergeant without first asking for their opinion and comment, including all of the First Sergeants.
The third meeting was again at SM Pampanga with himself, CPT LANGKIT, 1LT CUARTEROS, and 1LT BAUTISTA where they discussed the same agenda: the leadership in the AFP and the leadership in government. It was during said meeting where CPT DANTE LANGKIT instructed the Company Commanders to prepare their troops.
The fourth meeting was held at the Raven Resort, Abucay, Bataan and the attendees were himself, CPT LANGKIT, 1LT BAUTISTA, 1LT CUARTEROS and 1LT PUBLICA wherein they were required to submit the task organizations they have.
The 5th meeting was held in the rest house of CPT ALMODOVAR, located inside FSRR held on the first week of February, again presided by MAJ JASON AQUINO, and the other officers present were CPT ISAGANI CRISTE, CPT WILLIAM UPANO, CPT MONTANO ALMODOVAR, CPT JAMES SABABAN, CPT JOEY FONTIVEROS, CPT ROMMEL PAGAYON, and an unidentified civilian lady. That while at the rest house, CPT MONTANO ALMODOVAR posted on the kitchen wall a sketch/lay out of Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo (GHQ, AFP) depicting a diagram of the water system and also posted on the wall a copy of the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo.
CPT WILLIAM UPANO also arrived. Thereafter, CPT ALMODOVAR presented the Camp Defense Plan of CGEA. After the presentation, MAJ AQUINO asked CPT CRISTE for his tasking and the latter said it is okay. CPT FONTIVEROS suggested to MAJ AQUINO that the troops of CPT LANGKIT will be augmented by his troops Thereafter, MAJ AQUINO asked CPT ALMODOVAR how many troops he needs and the latter replied that he needed around two hundred (200) men and about fifteen (15) officers as his task consisted of taking over Camp Aguinaldo. MAJ JASON AQUINO replied that one Marine Battalion will also join them.
On said occasion, he heard CPT FONTIVEROS mentioned that he does not have yet the exact number of required troops needed for his task of taking over Headquarters, Philippine Army (HPA).
The civilian lady who came with CPT SABABAN brought bandoleers to be used for the plan.
Operation GEMSTONE is a twelve (12) step plan that would be their tasking for ‘Para sa Bayan’ Movement and that the effectivity of the plan was to be 16 Feb 2006 and that D-Day would be 18 Feb 2006.
Further he was instructed to move his troops from Bulacan to Clark, Angeles in the morning of 18 Feb 2006. CPT LANGKIT will give cellular phones and an amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (PhP 15,000.00) to be used for expenses.
He did not commit his company to Operation GEMSTONE and did not prepare task organizations because he was not assigned at 24IB and they are not sure if CPT LANGKIT will manage to initiate a battalion operation. Similarly, Alpha and Bravo Companies, 24IB did not prepare task organizations.
The Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo was discussed in the meeting and it was presented by CPT ALMODOVAR in the 5th meeting.
He has no personal knowledge of the tasking of CPT UPANO.
During all those meetings they suspected the proposal to be fishy and illegal. As a precaution, he instructed the two (2) other Company Commanders, 1LT BAUTISTA and 1LT CUARTEROS to evaluate the proposals of CPT LANGKIT and to verify the legitimacy of the operation.
He did not report these meetings to higher headquarters, nor G2, nor to his Battalion Commander. In the meetings inside FSRR, he did not see BGEN DANILO D LIM AFP or LTC NESTOR FLORDELIZA. He only saw BGEN DANILO LIM on that occasion during the Happy Hour but not in the conference room.
MAJ JASON AQUINO informed them that there will be no civilian or political figure to be involved in the operation and further informed them that there will be a solid FSRR, Marines and including other IBs. It also included the SAF in during the fifth (5th) meeting. His tasking at that time was to augment the troops of CPT ALMODOVAR in sealing all the gates of Camp Aguinaldo, GHQ. That the main effort will be the Army, FSRR which will be supported by the Marines with two hundred (200) enlisted personnel and fifteen (15) officers.
It was also mentioned by MAJ JASON AQUINO that MGEN RENATO P MIRANDA AFP, will be leading the Marines.
The 6th meeting was held at Campus View Restaurant at San Miguel, Bulacan, attended by himself, CPT LANGKIT, 1LT CUARTEROS and TSg Angga, First Sgt, C Coy, 24IB.
During the said meetings, names of Senior Officers were mentioned such as BGEN LIM whom they called “DAD”, MGEN MIRANDA but did not mention any codename, the Director of SAF, whose name he could no longer recall. The only code names that he could recall was those of CPT ISAGANI CRISTE, CPT DANTE LANGKIT and 1LT CUARTEROS; That the codename of CPT LANGKIT was “Boses” and that code names were given to himself, 1LT BAUTISTA, and 1LT CUARTEROS. His handler is MAJ DULOY.
On the third meeting, CPT LANGKIT disclosed that the entire 24IB will be tasked to secure Malacañang together with other forces. That the rendezvous mentioned by CPT LANGKIT was Clark, Pampanga but did not divulge the actual plan. The takeover of HPA will be performed by CPT JOEY FONTIVEROS together with one (1) Marine Company.
The objective of Operation GEMSTONE was to get PGMA, CSAFP, and C, PNP.
During the 5th meeting, MAJ AQUINO mentioned that the intended CSAFP to be installed would be MGEN MIRANDA; CG, PA will be GEN LEDESMA; C, PNP will be the Director of SAF; That the intended position of BGEN LIM would be next in command of GEN LEDESMA; no particular mention as to who will be the President.
In the execution of Operation Gemstone, all of the steps will be executed at the same time. MAJ AQUINO instructed them that the first step would be the takeover of the government. Next is the implementation of the new orders that will become the rules and regulations inside the AFP, PNP and the Government.
No hard copies were provided during the presentation of Operation GEMSTONE.
He has no personal knowledge of CPT MALONES from the Light Armor Brigade.
He is prepared to become a government witness. As a precautionary measure, ISG is limiting him from going outside Camp and when he goes home, he is escorted by a Security.
He decided to cooperate and execute a Supplemental Affidavit incriminating other officers because at the time he was detained at ISG, CO 15ISU, MAJ GULOY showed him a document exploitation which they had captured from 1LT LAWRENCE SAN JUAN that showed several meetings with the communists even way back in 2004, the fact of which was never mentioned to them during the meetings with MAJ JASON AQUINO.
1LT MICHAEL L CUARTEROS O-13690 PA (INF).
1LT CUARTEROS avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
He is presently assigned at ISG, PA, Fort Bonifacio, Makati City.
He denies the charges against him. He did not participate in any movement or organization whose purpose is to overthrow/destabilize the present government.
He never agreed to conspire with any person particularly CPT LANGKIT to rise up in arms for the purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the present democratic government.
He was not aware of any illegal activity that was being planned by any of his superior officers. As a military subordinate, he just attended conferences, meetings and socials with them.
He came to know that he was being implicated in the alleged conspiracy to overthrow the government when he was informed by Bn Comdr LTC FELIPE ANOTADO JR.
Attached as annex A of his counter-affidavit is a copy of “sinumpaang salaysay ni 1LT CUARTEROS issued to SPO3 Reynaldo Rolle at the Intelligence and Security Group, PA on 24 Feb 06. The “sinumpaang-salaysay” contains the following:
He met CPT LANGKIT on 16 Feb 06 at Farmers Plaza, Araneta Center, Cubao. They went to Bataan but they first stopped by at San Miguel, Bulacan. CPT LANGKIT talked to 1LT JERALD REYES and TSg Angga. CPT LANGKIT talked about their comrades who died and later he discussed the corruption in the organization and in the government. CPT LANGKIT advised them to be always prepared and to prepare 3 sections and for them to wait for his go signal.
He perceived that CPT LANGKIT was trying to recruit them for a destabilization plot against the government.
The statement of 1LT CUARTEROS was taken by the ADHOC Committee and the same is marked as Annex “HH” of the Ad Hoc committee report. He did not sign the statement but certified by the transcriber Maria Carla R Pineda and subscribed before CPT ARMANDO P PAREDES JAGS. The transcript contains the following:
He was assigned as Alpha Company Commander, 24IB stationed at Dinalupihan, Bataan.
He previously executed a sworn statement on 28 Feb 2006 during the Army IG investigation.
On 16 Feb 06, he met with CPT DANTE LANGKIT in the vicinity of Farmers Plaza, Cubao where he was asked by the latter to go with him to Dinalupihan, Bataan Thereafter, they both proceeded to San Miguel, Bulacan to see 1LT JERALD REYES at a gasoline station. When 1LT REYES arrived with TSg Angga, they went to have lunch.
CPT LANGKIT disclosed to him about his comrades that were gunned down in Bataan, the experiences they had when they were together at 24IB and his sentiments about the corruption in government.
After relating his sentiments, they were asked to organize for an operation, particularly to organize three (3) sections. It was not directly mentioned for what specific purpose these three (3) sections will be utilized. CPT LANGKIT instructed them “to wait until told to go or no go”
He was asked to commit and organize one (1) section together with 1LT REYES. The exact target was not specifically disclosed. CPT LANGKIT committed that he will provide the civilian vehicle to be used for the operation and a designated pick up point in Bataan.
He went up to Baguio in 17 Feb 06 to attend the alumni homecoming and again saw CPT LANGKIT there.
He was aware that should he comply with the demands of CPT LANGKIT, the troops will be compromised so that he did not submit the names as required.
The last time that CPT DANTE LANGKIT contacted him was when the latter inquired if he was going to Baguio.
He had an idea that the purpose of the section required would be used in a destabilization plot.
He was not inducted to the group “Para sa Bayan” nor was he issued a dog-tag and did not attend any meetings in Manila.
He has no knowledge of any other officers from 24IB who are attending such activities other than 1LT JERALD REYES. His Battalion Commander is LTC FELIPE G ANOTADO JR PA.
He, together with 1LT REYES and CPT LANGKIT met once at San Miguel, Bulacan on 16 Feb 2006. They met again at Abucay, Bataan with CPT LANGKIT, 1LT PUBLICO and 1LT REYES.
CPT LANGKIT gave him a cell phone, a blue Nokia 1100 and a prepaid SIM to be used in contacting each other. The cell phone is now with his relatives.
Operation GEMSTONE was never mentioned to him. 1LT REYES has not mentioned anything about the meeting at the rest house in FSRR.
During that time that he was making contacts with CPT DANTE LANGKIT, he admits not having reported the fact to his superiors because of a gap between the officers and the Battalion Commander and due to the fact that instructions were directed through the First Sergeant and they felt that they were being bypassed;
That CPT DANTE LANGKIT did not give assurance that they will win except that “Don’t worry, marami tayo”.
He entertained CPT LANGKIT purely out of ‘pakikisama’ because they were both assigned at 24IB. He knows that CPT LANGKIT is of the Magdalo.
He was never asked to return the cell phone given to him by CPT LANGKIT.
1LT MARIO D BAUTISTA O-13376 PA (INF).
1LT BAUTISTA avers the following in his counter-affidavit:
Presently assigned at OCG, 71D, PA, Fort Magsaysay, Palayan, Nueva Ecija.
He admitted that he was recruited by the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) but after his initiation as a member and upon learning its purpose, he immediately withdrew his membership.
He did not inform the proper authorities or his superior about the existence of the Group (MKP) for fear of being killed by its members and for the security and safety of his family.
When he learned that he was implicated in the alleged conspiracy to overthrow the present government, he voluntarily submitted himself for investigation and he voluntarily executed an affidavit before the ISG, PA.
Attached as annex “A” of his counter-affidavit is a copy of the “sinumpaang salaysay” he executed on 24 February 2006 at ISG, PA. The “sinumpaang salaysay” contains the following:
On the 1st quarter of 2005, he was recruited by the Makabayang Kawal Pilipino (MKP). (he did not mention who recruited him)
They conducted a “ceremony” in a hotel at Makati City which was led by Ret Col Jake Malajacan. Present during the ceremony were 1LT SAN JUAN, 1LT GAY and 2LT BALDONADO.
He was given a stainless dog tag with the engraving “PRO DEO, PATRIA, ET POPULI”, MEANING “For God, Country and People.”
He was informed that the objective of the group is to have reform in the country and this could be achieved if the present administration will be changed. He attended the meeting only once.
V. DISCUSSIONS/FINDINGS:
The Collateral Issues.
Save for certain motions and applications that had been granted or denied by the panel in the course of the proceedings (e.g., motions for extension to file counter-affidavits, change of venue, subpoena witness/es, etc), an examination of the issues presented borders on the regularity in the procedure adopted during the Ad Hoc Committee Investigation. The matter does not become so consequential considering that the questioned procedure merely laid down the basis for the Chief of Staff to refer the matter to a full blown investigation with the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP and eventually to this panel, for the purpose of assessing the existence of prima facie case against these respondents. With the approval by the Chief of Staff of the recommendation embodied in the pertinent Committee Report and reflected in a Memorandum from CSAFP to TJAG, Subject: AFP Ad Hoc Investigating Committee Report and its eventual affirmation upon having been initially passed upon by the Chief, Military Justice Division, OTJAG, in a Memorandum coursed to The Judge Advocate General, AFP, Subject: Cases Against MGEN RENATO P MIRANDA AFP, et al as to the existence of probable cause to refer the matter further for Pre-Trial Investigation, these issues appear to have been mooted.
Accordingly, over and above the protestations as to alleged irregularity of the procedure at the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee level, there exists adequate basis to conduct further proceedings before this panel in order to determine the existence of prima facie evidence to warrant trial by the general court-martial against implicated respondent military Officers. The prevailing mandate of the PTI panel under Section 35 (e) of the Manual for Courts-Martial and Article 71 of the Articles of War merely requires the respondents to answer the charges and specifications leveled against them, the merits of which may stand or fall apart dependent upon the evidence adduced on record and/or the strength of countervailing evidence the respondents may have opted to present, if any, in the proceedings at hand.
Nevertheless, although there is now the necessity to assess the central issue presented for this purpose, the panel finds it necessary to address the following issues raised by some of the respondents during the pre-trial investigation proceedings and which are formally presented in their respective pleadings seeking the dismissal of the cases against them:
Whether or not the charges and specifications against the respondents are invalid on the ground that the Charge Sheets were signed by the accuser, CPT ARMANDO PAREDES JAGS, who has no personal knowledge of the acts or specifications set forth in the Charge Sheets.
Whether or not there is a violation of due process when the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses by respondents during the pre-trial investigation proceedings was not granted.
Whether or not the statements given by respondents before the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee are inadmissible in evidence and therefore, should be stricken out from the case records on the ground that it violated the Constitutional rights of the accused to counsel and against self-incrimination and the Rules on Custodial Investigation.
Whether or not the statements of co-respondents can be used as evidence as against the other respondents to prove conspiracy.
Whether or not the detention of Army Officers at Tanay, Rizal and the Philippine Marines Officers at their Headquarters at Bonifacio Naval Station violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
First Issue: We do not find the quantum of merit in the contention that the charges and specifications against the respondents are invalid on the ground that that the accuser, CPT ARMANDO PAREDES JAGS, who signed the Charges and Specifications, has no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances set forth in the Charge Sheets considering that he is not a member of the Board which conducted the investigation on the alleged withdrawal of support.
Under Articles of War 71, it provides that “Charges and specifications must be signed by a person subject to military law, and under oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief x x x.” Contrary to respondents’ contention, there was substantial compliance with the foregoing requirements. The accuser, CPT PAREDES is a person subject to military law who had actually participated in the investigation of the instant case conducted by the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee. He had also signed the Charge Sheets after he had investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records gathered by the Committee, including the results of separate investigations conducted by the Philippine Army and Philippine Navy, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The Charge Sheets were sworn to by CPT PAREDES in accordance with and in the manner provided under AW 71 before an administering officer, MAJ ERWIN VICTORIANO MACHICA JAGS.
Second Issue: As regards to the issue concerning the opportunity given to the respondents to cross examine witnesses against them, the provisions of AW 71 regarding the conduct of pre-trial investigation by giving the accused the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him is not mandatory. This provision of AW 71 is procedural and merely directory and a failure to follow the procedures set forth in AW 71 such as the opportunity to cross examine witnesses against him is not fatal.
In the conduct of pre-trial investigation, the procedures prescribed in PD 77, as amended by PD 911 is being followed by giving the respondent the chance to controvert the evidence against him by requiring him to submit his counter-affidavit and other evidence to refute the allegations against him. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is given the opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the Bill of Rights. There is substantial compliance of Articles of War 71 in the conduct of pre-trial investigation by following the provisions of PD 77 as amended by PD 911.
Third Issue: As regards to the issue concerning the admissibility of the statements made by the respondents during the investigation conducted by the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee, respondents (LTCs FLORDELIZA, MALABANJOT, and PARCON, MAJs PANGCOG and FERNANDEZ, and 1LTs ESTOLAS, CABALLES and FERRER) contend that their statements were taken in violation of the Constitutional rights against self-incrimination and the right to have a competent and independent counsel of their own choice and that there is no valid waiver of such Constitutional rights. Hence, their statements are inadmissible in evidence and therefore must be stricken off the record.
As a rule, the privilege against self incrimination may be invoked only when the incriminating question is asked, since the witness has no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the question to be put to him. This is true, however, only of the ordinary witness. In the case of the accused himself, it is settled that he can refuse at the outset and altogether to be a witness for the prosecution, on the reasonable assumption that the purpose of his interrogation will be to incriminate him.
Nevertheless, however, the right against self-incrimination may be waived, either directly or by failure to invoke it, provided the waiver is certain, unequivocal, intelligently, understandingly and willingly made.
This right may be waived
by the failure of the accused to invoke the privilege at the proper time, that is, after the incriminating question is asked and before his answer.
In this case, there is a valid waiver of the right against self-incrimination when respondents failed to invoke it at the time any incriminating question was asked by the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee.
As to the Constitutional rights of the respondents to counsel and remain silent, it is true that any extrajudicial confession made in violation of the Constitutional provisions on the rights of the accused during custodial investigation is inadmissible in evidence. The absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused makes them invalid.
In this case, the question involves the statement of the respondent taken by the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee without counsel. Although the investigations conducted by the Committee were akin to the investigations conducted by the police and other investigative agencies to gather facts to support the subsequent filing of the appropriate charges against the culprits, it must be noted however that the questioned statement of the respondent does not contain a confession or an express and categorical acknowledgment of guilt of the respondent, but a plain statement of fact made by him against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him.
Under Section 26 of the New Rules on Criminal Procedures, it provides that “The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.” And to be admissible, such an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) knowingly and voluntary made; and (d) adverse to the admitter’s interest, otherwise, it would be self-serving and inadmissible. If the accused admits having committed the act in question but alleges a justification therefore, the same is merely an admission which is admissible in evidence.
Hence, in the case at bar, the extra-judicial statements given by the respondents to Ad Hoc Investigation Committee are statements of the facts and circumstances surrounding the incidents without any confession or acknowledgment of guilt and the same are admissible in evidence against them.
Nevertheless, irregardless of the admissibility or inadmissibility of the subject statements, there are other pieces of evidence under consideration by the panel in the determination of the existence of prima facie evidence against them.
Fourth Issue: Anent respondents’ contention that the statements of his co-respondents can not be used as evidence against them to prove conspiracy under the principle of “res inter alios act”, it is doctrinal that the extrajudicial statements of co-accused may be taken into consideration in judging the testimony of a witness if the statements are made by several accused, the same are in all material respects identical, and there could have been no collusion among said co-accused in making such statements.
Fifth Issue: As regards to the issue regarding alleged inequality in the treatment of respondents as to their place of detention, AW 70 confers upon the Commanding Officers of the respondents serving under their immediate command the authority and discretion to determine the type and manner of restraint to be imposed upon military personnel who are facing charges under the Articles of War. The purpose of such restraint is to enable the proper military authority to put an end to criminal or unmilitary conduct, and to impose such restraint as may be necessary upon the person of a military offender, with a view to his trial by court martial. This is also to insure the presence of the accused at the trial and prevent him from committing other offenses in the meantime.
The Central Issue:
I. Violation of the 67th Articles of War.
A. The Facts Charge:
The respondent-officers are generally charged for violation of the 67TH Article of War (Attempting to Create or Begin Mutiny). The Amended Charge Sheets read as follows:
CHARGE 1: Violation of the 67th Article of War (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny)
SPECIFICATION: In that Major General RENATO P MIRANDA O-6728 Armed Forces of the Philippines, Brigadier General DANILO D LIM O-7665 Armed Forces of the Philippines, Colonel ARIEL O QUERUBIN O-7901 Philippine Navy (Marines), Colonel ORLANDO E DE LEON O-8600 Philippine Navy (Marines), Colonel JANUARIO G CARINGAL O-8580 Philippine Navy (Marines), Lieutenant Colonel ACHILLES S SEGUMALIAN O-116089 Philippine Navy (Marines), Lieutenant Colonel MARTIN G VILLASAN O-9722 Philippine Navy (Marines), Lieutenant Colonel REYNALDO C OCSAN O-8751 Philippine Navy (Marines), Lieutenant Colonel COL ARMANDO V BAÑEZ O-8592 Philippine Navy (Marines), Lieutenant Colonel VALENTINE T HIZON O-9476 PN(M), Lieutenant Colonel CUSTODIO J PARCON O-9702 Philippine Navy (Marines), Lieutenant Colonel ROMULO L GUALDRAPA O-113766 Philippine Navy (Marines), Lieutenant Colonel LTC NESTOR T FLORDELIZA O-109684 (Quarter Master) Philippine Army, Lieutenant Colonel EDMUNDO D MALABANJOT O-115217 (Infantry) Philippine Army, Major FRANCISCO DOMINGO R FERNANDEZ O-10530 Philippine Navy (Marines), Major JASON LAUREANO Y AQUINO O-10503 (Infantry) Philippine Army, Major ORIEL L PANGCOG O-10563 (Infantry) Philippine Army, Major JOSE LEOMAR M DOCTOLERO O-10124 (Infantry) Philippine Army, Captain JAMES C SABABAN O-11581 (Infantry) Philippine Army, Captain RUBEN B GUINOLBAY O-11957 (Infantry) Philippine Army, Captain MONTANO B ALMODOVAR O-11572 (Infantry) Philippine Army, Captain JOEY T FONTIVEROS O-11713 (Infantry) Philippine Army, Captain ISAGANI O CRISTE O-11549 (Infantry) Philippine Army, WILLIAM F UPANO O-11876 (Infantry) Philippine Army, DANTE D LANGKIT O-11957 (Infantry) Philippine Army, GEORGE M MALONES O-128634 (Cavalier) Philippine Army, Captain ALLAN C AURINO O-128459 (Finance Service) Philippine Army, Captain FREDERICK M SALES O-11686 (Infantry) Philippine Army, First Lieutenant HOMER A ESTOLAS O-13449 (Infantry) Philippine Army, First Lieutenant JACON S CORDERO O-13434 (Infantry) Philippine Army, First Lieutenant JERALD L REYES O-13257 (Infantry) Philippine Army, First Lieutenant ERVIN C DIVINAGRACIA O-12742 (Infantry) Philippine Army, First Lieutenant MICHAEL L CUARTEROS O-13690 (Infantry) Philippine Army, First Lieutenant MARIO D BAUTISTA O-13376 (Infantry) Philippine Army, First Lieutenant ANTONIO T TIMBAL O-13782 (Infantry) Philippine Army, First Lieutenant SANDRO U SERENO O-131279 (Infantry) Philippine Army, First Lieutenant BELINDA R FERRER O-132579 Philippine Navy (Marines) Second Lieutenant RITCHIEMEL S CABALLES O-13686 (Infantry) Philippine Army, persons subject to military law, did, or before February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City and Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, together with several John Does, conniving, confederating, and mutually helping one another, each committing individual acts towards a common design or purpose, attempted to begin or caused a mutiny by withdrawing their support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, urging the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other officers and enlisted men to likewise withdraw their support from the President, and attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions calling for the President’s resignation, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority. [Underscoring Supplied]
B. The Offense Charge:
The material provision of the organic law of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Commonwealth Act Nr 408, as amended) states:
Article 67. Mutiny or Sedition. – Any person subject to military law who attempts to create or who begins excites, causes, or joins in any mutiny or sedition in any company, party, post, camp, detachment, guard or other command shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.
For purposes of the afore-quoted Articles of War, an attempt includes all acts done with specific intent to commit the particular crime and proximately tending to, but failing short of, its consummation.
The modality of proof requires the concurrence of the following elements:
a. An act or acts of the accused which proximately tended to create a certain intended (or actual) collective insubordination;
b. A specific intent to create a certain intended (or actual) collective insubordination; and
c. The insubordination occurred or was intended to occur in a company, party, post, camp, detachment, guard or other command in the Army of the Philippines.
C. The Facts Proven:
[I] The Alleged Involvement of the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) of the Philippine Navy.
Circumstances prior to, contemporaneous with and subsequent to the development that took place on the 23rd to 26th of February 2006 fairly disclose that:
a) Sometime on 22 February 2006, MGEN RENATO P MIRANDA 0-6728 AFP, then Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps, Philippine Navy, was visited by BGEN DANILO D LIM 0-7665 AFP and COL ARIEL O QUERUBIN 0-7901 PN (M). They talked about the restiveness of junior military officers.
b) In the afternoon of the following day, 23 February 2006, BGEN LIM AFP and COL QUERUBIN PN (M) met at Rustan’s Supermarket, Makati City, and they decided to see J2, MGEN RODRIGO MACLANG AFP at GHQ. When they met at the Office of J2, they informed the latter of the development regarding the plan of junior Officers to join the mass protest action on the following day, 24 February 2006. The plan consists of a march from their Headquarters by the Marines and later on to be joined by the Special Action Force (SAF) of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Other participants include the Bishops and other multi-sectoral groups. MGEN MACLANG AFP decided to seek audience with GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA AFP, then Chief of Staff, AFP.
c) From the Office of the Chief of Staff, AFP (OCSAFP), MGEN MACLANG AFP was directed to go to the “Gazebo” inside the CSAFP Quarters whereas BGEN LIM AFP and COL QUERUBIN AFP remained at the OCSAFP. CSAFP likewise called the Major Service Commanders to a meeting at the “Gazebo”. VADM MATEO M MAYUGA AFP, FOIC PN, in the company of MGEN MIRANDA AFP, arrived later. P/CSUPT MARCELINO FRANCO of SAF PNP was also present. At about 232330H February 2006, BGEN LIM AFP and COL QUERUBIN PN (M) were summoned to join the group.
d) Then CG PA, LTGEN HERMOGENES ESPERON and others who were present at that time were informed by the CSAFP that BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN were in his office earlier. The CSAFP allegedly told them that these two Officers planned to lead their officers and men in joining mass the protest actions on 24 Feb 06 which was supposed to be spearheaded by multi-sectoral groups including elements/leaders of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, Iglesia ni Cristo, El Shaddai and business groups.
e) GEN SENGA AFP also informed the group that as per information from BGEN LIM AFP and COL QUERUBIN PN (M), elements from Special Action Force PNP, Phil Marines and First Scout Rangers Regiment (FSRR) of the Philippine Army will join the said mass protest action.
f) The disclosure of intention of P/CSUPT FRANCO PNP, BGEN LIM AFP and COL QUERUBIN PN (M) to join the rally in order to avoid bloodshed and for them to be better organized was confirmed by FOIC PN. BGEN LIM AFP allegedly mentioned about the existence of a previously recorded video about his stand on the political situation and his alleged withdrawal of support from the President, to be aired on the day of the rally. MGEN MIRANDA AFP will be forced to join the rally in the event that he may not be able to stop COL QUERUBIN PN (M) and the group.
i) Before the group adjourned, CSAFP issued instructions to do everything to stop the plan.
k) MGEN MIRANDA AFP, BGEN LIM AFP and COL QUERUBIN PN (M) proceeded to Headquarters Philippine Marines where a conference was called at the Office of the Commandant on or about 240100H. BGEN LIM AFP begged leave to go home and sleep upon sensing that he, an Army Officer, was out of place.
l) Attendees to the conference called were the staff officers and some Unit Commanders of the Philippine Marines, namely: LTC VILLASAN PN (M), LTC OCSAN PN (M), LTC BANEZ PN (M), LTC FERRER PN (M), LTC PARCON PN (M), COL RAPANAN PN (M), LTC GUALDRAPA PN (M), LTC HIZON PN (M), COL MARTIR PN (M), COL GUERRERO PN (M), MAJ FERNANDEZ PN (M), LTC CARDEL PN (M), LTC SEGUMALIAN PN (M), COL QUERUBIN PN (M), the PMC Sergeant Major CMS Generoso Bagorio, BGEN ALLAGA AFP and FOIC PN, himself who arrived during the session. The meeting was a directive from CSAFP conducted to provide informal forum within the confines of the Marine HQ where Officers and key personnel can ventilate their personal views and sentiments.
The Commandant, however, declared that he will not allow any Marine personnel to get involved in anything that they have no knowledge of and would not go to the extent of sacrificing lives.
m) The meeting was a free-wheeling discussion about issues including rumors on withdrawal of support from the government. Some attendees were noted to be silent whereas others very vocal on certain issues raised. COL DE LEON PN (M) acted as the moderator during the conference. FOIC PN gave a lengthy situation brief on the current issues faced by the country, mentioning, in general terms, the existence of the destabilization plan, and he enjoined the Marines not to do anything that is illegal and to remain united.
n) Topics discussed include the possibility of some lawless elements that might disrupt the EDSA Revolution celebration, housing, morale and welfare issues, the infamous “Garci tape” viz, promotion, and current situation of the country.
o) After FOIC PN left, discussion shifted back to the issue of withdrawal of support where opinions were elicited. Some Officers registered opposition whereas others were of the opinion that it would push through provided the critical mass could be reached.
PMC Command Sergeant Major declared “Ayaw ng mga bata” which in effect negate support for the mass action.
No consensus to withdraw support was reached after the opinion of those present was heard. The corps was united to follow the chain of command.
p) MGEN MIRANDA told the group of his position that they will not do anything and further disallowed anybody to go to EDSA, with the emphasis that there should be no movement.
q) To avert untoward situation and ensure unity of the corps, MC3G-0206-262 was issued upon instructions of COL DE LEON PN (M) activating the Philippine Marine Ready Force (PRMF), an anti-coup command under COL MARTIR PN (M) and subsequently other directives were handed down, such as, MC3G-0206-269 dated 250110H Feb 06 holding all scheduled movements of MBLT2, MC3-9296-272, re: Accounting of Personnel Down to the Lowest Level, and MC3G-0206-125, re: Reminder to the Adherence to the Chain of Command.
r) On 26 February 2006, MGEN MIRANDA AFP, in the company of BGEN ALLAGA AFP who just arrived from HPN, informed the Officers that he has been relieved. The Chief of Staff, PMC called for a conference at the Brown Hall of HPMC in the evening of that day. The meeting at the Commander’s Lounge was presided by BGEN ALLAGA AFP who had confirmed his assumption to the position as the new Commandant viz MGEN MIRANDA AFP whom he replaced in a turn-over rites earlier conducted before FOIC PN at Hqs, PN. The announcement caused a lot of confusion and heightened emotions, to the extent that some of them expressed their desire to resign.
Certain Marine Officers questioned the sudden relief of MGEN MIRANDA AFP as Commandant, an action perceived to be dishonorable and unceremonious, considering that it was hastily done on a Sunday without a formal turn-over ceremony.
s) There was tension outside of the Hall where civilians and the media congregated. LTC SEGUMALIAN PN (M) and COL QUERUBIN PN (M) were surrounded by the media and civilians while comments on the relief of MGEN MIRANDA AFP were sought by members of the media. COL QUERUBIN PN (M) asked the people to attend the vigil mass to support their relieved Commandant, the Marines, and prevent violence.
Senator Rodolfo Biazon and other former Marine Commandants arrived.
Force Recon Battalion was deployed by COL MARTIR PN (M) outside of Brown Hall. 2nd Marine Bn under LTC SEGUMALIAN PN (M) followed a few minutes later, and then two more other companies, allegedly stopped by COL MARTIR PN (M) and MAJ HERNANDEZ PN (M), arrived later. The idea of forming his troops outside of the Brown Hall was to give the relieved Marine Commandant a chance to address the troop for the last time.
t) After having been assured of the support of the four (4) major units save for the 1st Marine Brigade under COL QUERUBIN PN (M), BGEN ALLAGA AFP talked to his Officers in the conference room and went out to talk to members of the media.
On or about 262330H Feb 06, the meeting that was convened cleared the issue of relief and the corps stood united under the leadership of BGEN ALLAGA AFP.
[II] The Alleged Involvement of the First Scout Ranger Regiment of the Philippine Army.
Significantly, the noted participation of elements of the FSRR, Philippine Army, is chronicled in evidence as follows:
u) On or about the first week of November 2005, a power point presentation of Operation GEMSTONE and New Order were claimed to have been presented before attendees at the FSRR Conference Room, FSRR, Camp Tecson, Bulacan by MAJ JASON AQUINO. Attendees of this meeting included CPT CRISTE (INF) PA, CPT ROMERO (INF) PA, CPT ROMERO (INF) PA, CAPT ALMODOVAR (INF) PA, CPT PAGAYON (INF) PA, CPT FONTIVEROS (INF) PA, and 1LT REYES (INF) PA. Operation GEMSTONE contains an elaborate 12-step plan to grab power/overthrow the government effective 16 February 2006 with D-Day on 18 February 2006 whereas New Order contains list of laws which need be changed.
v. A meeting that followed sometime on the first week of December 2005, ILT REYES (INF) PA and 1LT CUARTEROS (INF) PA were directed by CPT LANGKIT (INF) PA to prepare their men, firearms and ammunitions for the conduct of battalion operations. In subsequent meetings on January 2006, CPT LANGKIT (INF) PA further required ILT REYES (INF) PA, 1LT CUARTEROS (INF) PA and ILT BAUTISTA (INF) PA to submit task organization of troops but were not able to prepare one.
w. Another meeting took place during the birthday celebration and despedida party of LTC FAUSTINO S DANTES PA (Ret.) at his residence at the so-called Tower Area, HFSRR, Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan. A sketch/layout of Camp Aguinaldo, together with its Camp Defense Plan, was posted on the kitchen wall. CPT ALMODOVAR (INF) PA identified the strong and weak points of the Camp Defense Plan.
Allegedly present during the affair were CPT UPANO (INF) PA, MAJ AQUINO (IN) PA, MAJ PANGCOG (INF) PA, CPT FONTIVEROS (INF) PA, CPT CRISTE (INF) PA. Gripes were aired and there was discussion about “The New Order” and “Para Sa Bayan”.
Apparently, “Para Sa Bayan” is not an organization but was used as a class motto of SRTS Class 156.
x) There were other meetings held on different instances and in different places with CPT LANGKIT (INF) PA. He met with 1LT CUARTEROS (INF) PA on 16 February 2006 at the vicinity of Farmers Plaza, Cubao, Quezon City and the former invited the latter to go with him to Dinalupihan, Bataan. 1LT CUARTEROS (INF) PA, together with 1LT REYES (INF) PA, were directed to organize three (3) sections for an operation though no specific target was disclosed. CPT LANGKIT (INF) PA will be providing a private vehicle and a pickup point in Bataan. No names of personnel for the required sections to be formed were submitted or committed.
y) As early as January of 2006, heightened security measure in the FSRR became manifest. A radio message sometime on 18 January 2006 emanating from CG, SOCOM was coursed to G3 FSRR for this unit to organize and form two companies to be made part of the Contingency/Reaction Force due to prevailing security situation.
z) On 22 February 2006, MAJ DOCTOLERO (INF) PA, then Commandant of SRTS, FSRR was advised by G3, FSRR, MAJ PANGCOG (INF) PA that the 1st and the 2nd Special Operations Bn had been activated and deployed . To put his men on alert, this Officer ordered his students at SRTS under Class 161-06 to be on alert because of the series of rallies in Manila and to withdraw ammunitions from the supply room for possible deployment.
aa) On 23 February 2006, members of PMA Class 94 consisting of CPT GUINOLBAY (INF) PA, CPT TOLENTINO (INF) PA, CPT DAIZ (INF) PA, CPT ROSALES (INF) PA, CPT CABARLOC (INF) PA, CPT ALMODOVAR (INF) PA and CPT SALES (INF) PA met at the Seoul Restaurant along Eastwood, Katipunan Road, Quezon City. The meeting lasted for two hours and the topic discussed focused on the Bantay Laya ‘94/FSRR Shootfest.
The Troop Movement.
bb) Radio message from FSRR and 91D PA had been dispatched and received on 17 February 2006 by the Battalion S3 of the 3rd SRBn and relayed to the Company Commanders of 9th and 7th SRC relative to the declaration of red alert status.
In view of the obtaining internal security situation in the National Capital Region and other parts of the country, 3rd SRBn was designated as the rapid deployment force (RDF) of SOLCOM.
cc) On or about 232000H Feb 06, an emergency conference was called by the Battalion Commander of the 3rd SRBn LTC MALABANJOT (INF) PA at its headquarters based at Camp Canuto, Sagurong, Pili, Camarines Sur. An order was issued by the Battalion Commander for the 9th and 7th SRC to send troops to augment 10th SRC based at Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City.
Present during the meeting were ILT ESTOLAS (INF) PA, CO of the 9th SRC and 1LT CABALLES (INF) PA as Company Ex-O of 7th SRC.
dd) The SDO of 3rd SRBn, CPT AURINO (FS) PA, acting on orders from LTC MALABANJOT (INF) PA, gave Php30,000.00 to 1LT ESTOLAS (INF) PA of the 9th SRC chargeable to the unit’s MOOE.
ee) On or about 232300H Feb 06, the Company Ex-O, 7th SRC 1LT CABALLES (INF) PA, ordered some of his men numbering about 26 to prepare their uniform, proceed to Manila in civilian clothes without firearms. They were dispatched on board a Philtranco bus at about midnight. They were given Php2, 000.00 each for food and fare. However, before the party could reach Gumaca, Quezon, the Company Ex-O recalled them back to the Company’s Command Post by way of text message on orders of the Bn Ex-O. On their way back, the members of the group were intercepted at a check point manned by elements of the 31st 1Bn, 9ID PA and brought to the Bn HQ for questioning.
ff) On the other hand, the Company Ex-O, 9th SRC, ILT TIMBAL (INF) PA, was tasked by his CO, 1LT ESTOLAS (INF) PA, to form two sections (2) to augment 10th SRC and supervise movement of troop. The men were ordered to bring their BDA, beret, and combat boots and given Php2, 000.00 each for their food by their CO. One (1) section was earlier dispatched and later on joined by another section with a total of 30 persons on board the bus, which left at about 240400H February 2006. Before reaching Tabaco City, Albay, however, the group was recalled back to their Company’s Command Post by their CO.
gg) The alleged troop movements in the 9th SRC and 7th SRC, both belonging to 3rd SRBn based in Camp Canuto, Sagurong, Pili, Camarines Sur has been reported to CG, 9ID PA.
D. Conspiracy as a Mode to Commit the Offense Charge.
Respondents, together with others who were neither identified nor named (John Does), are being charged for conniving, confederating, and mutually helping one another, each committing individual acts towards a common design or purpose, by attempting to create or begin mutiny through the following imputed acts (Underscoring supplied):
The withdrawal of support from the President;
Urging the Chief of Staff, AFP and other Officers and Enlisted Personnel to likewise withdraw their support from the President; and
Attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions calling for the resignation of the President.
A scrutiny of the facts established by evidence reveal that these imputed acts before, during and after the commission of the offense do not establish the existence of concurrence of will or unity of action on the part of respondent Officers. Neither was a commonality of design or purpose was established.
Elements of the Philippine Marines Corps (PMC) on one hand and the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) on the other hand never entered into an agreement with the view to performing the above imputed acts. There is no appreciable proof that respondent Officers involved in the reported meetings or conferences that took place within the ranks of the FSRR of the Philippine Army had gone to the extent of crossing Major Services lines in order to forge an agreement with their Philippine Navy counterparts, particularly the PMC. These meetings and conferences were conducted and limited in patronage among few elements of the FSRR. No parallel proof can be appreciated with respect to the existence of planning sessions by the respondent Marine Officers. A plan hatched to task organize, breach security/camp defense plans or capture personalities are certainly different from the plan to join mass actions, the withdrawal of support or even urging commanders to withdraw support unless shown to be part of a common grand design. To the logical sense of the Investigating Panel, there is no such common purpose.
The agreement and/or the decision of these respondent Officers to commit the imputed acts could not have been done at the last minute on the 23 February 2006 immediately preceding the EDSA Day celebration for which the plan of junior officers to join mass protest action on the following day, 24 February 2006 was disclosed. The plan consists of a march by the Marines from their Headquarters and later on be joined by the Special Action Force (SAF) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) with the other participants that include the multi-sectoral groups.
For the conspiracy to be appreciated, it must be shown that herein respondent Officers entered into an agreement, spontaneously or pre-planned, with one another for the purpose of attempting to create mutiny.
The possibility of the respondent MGEN MIRANDA AFP, BGEN LIM AFP and COL QUERUBIN PN (M) having initially entered into an agreement to join the mass action is not remote. However, the records disclose that there was never any decision by any one or all of them to pursue the same.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
The arranged meeting by BGEN LIM AFP and COL QUERUBIN PN (M) with J2 and eventually CSAFP on that evening of 23 February 2006 was for the purpose of informing the latter of the situation, particularly the brewing restiveness of certain units in the armed forces and the plan to join the civilian-led protest march on 24 February 2006. The matter partakes of an extremely serious concern that has to be brought to the immediate attention of J2 as the proper staff and thence to CSAFP who, upon having been apprised of the situation, instructed them to do everything to stop the plan.
To prove that no decision was taken to pursue any illegal action, MGEN MIRANDA AFP, acting pursuant to the instructions of CSAFP, immediately summoned his MC Staff and some Unit Commanders to an emergency conference where a free-wheeling discussion on issues ensued that included getting the consensus on the issue of withdrawal of support from the government.
In fact, the informed decision was to disallow anybody to go to EDSA with emphasis that there should be no troop movement and with COL QUERUBIN PN (M) affirming this himself.
On the part of BGEN LIM AFP, his having called J2 submitting himself to the custody of CSAFP on 240430H February 2006, removes any and all doubt that there was no decision to commit the offense charged in conspiracy with any other military personnel.
Neither can it be inferred that there has been any spontaneous agreement entered into by the respondents at the projected moment of the commission of the offense charged. No troop movement linked to the plan to withdraw support on the part of the respondent Officers or their respective units on the very day that the planned mass action took place was pursued.
Divergence and not confluence of events that could have led to the perpetration of the offense charged and the absence of any agreement and resolution to perpetrate any of the acts imputed in the specification of this charge against these respondent Officers must negate joint and/or collective criminal responsibility. As such, there is no conspiracy to speak of.
E. Findings.
Setting the facts charged as against the facts proven, there is no adequate basis for appreciating the existence of a prima facie case to indict or prosecute any and all of the respondent Officers charged for violation of the 67th Article of War.
The developments of event do not show indication that the following elemental requirements had been satisfied or, at least, approximated, by the degree of proof needed:
1. An act or acts of accused which proximately tended to create a certain intended (or actual) collective insubordination.
2. A specific intent to create a certain intended (or actual) collective insubordination.
The insubordination occurred or was intended to occur in a company, party, post, camp, detachment, guard or other command in the Army of the Philippines.
Primarily, there is clear absence of overt acts of respondent Officers which proximately tended to create a certain intended (or actual) collective insubordination.
What has been charged against the respondent Officers is clearly an attempt offense. This category of offense presupposes the commission of a certain overt act with a specific intent. The mathematical formula, so to speak, is simply the combination of a specific intent to commit the offense plus the commission of an overt act directly tending to accomplish the same.
Such being the premise, mere preparation and planning to commit the offense charged as shown by the evidence do not make out a case of an attempt to create mutiny absent demonstration of overt acts tending to the execution of the attempt. This overt act should amount to more than a mere preparation.
This is particularly so when what have been demonstrated are purely internal acts. Purely internal acts, such as planning and the determination to commit the crime are beyond the sphere of the penal law.
The chronicled meetings and conferences of certain elements of the FSRR are generally not punishable in a sense that they are purely preparatory acts without any showing that they have direct connection with the offense charged which is that of an attempt to create mutiny.
The preparations may consist in the devising or arranging of means and measures necessary for the commission of the offense. The overt acts, on the other hand, go beyond the preparatory steps and are a direct movement toward the commission of the offense. Local textbook definition of an overt act states that:
“An overt act is some physical activity or deed indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.”
Furthermore, in order to constitute the attempt that is punishable under the Articles of War, there must be specific intent to commit the offense accompanying the overt act which directly tends to accomplish the unlawful purpose.
The reported troop movement in 3SFBn could have been a demonstration of an overt act to a certain degree in respect to the respondent Officers involved. However, to the military personnel who were about to be deployed, the ordered movement was for a specific purpose, i.e., to augment 10th SRC based at Fort Bonifacio. Over and above the fact that the movement was unauthorized by reason of its not having been properly cleared by Higher Headquarters, the purpose of the movement does not seem to bear a direct link to that of the offense charged.
In other words, not all overt acts can be made punishable assuming that they are present in the commission of the offense. “The overt acts leading to the commission of the offense are not punishable except when they are aimed directly at its execution, and therefore they must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.”
Without this relation of the overt act and its link to the offense charged, there can be no offense of attempt to create mutiny.
Secondly, there is no showing of a specific intent to create a certain intended (or actual) collective insubordination.
Save for BGEN LIM AFP and COL QUERUBIN PN(M) who signified plan to join the civilian-led mass actions on 24 February 2006, the intention to create collective insubordination among other Officers implicated had not been demonstrated at all.
The intent may be openly declared in words, or it may be implied from the acts done. It thus may consist simply in a persistent refusal or omission with the intent to obey orders or do duty.
No such circumstance had been proven. In fact, not one from the respondent Officers defied the instructions of CSAFP to do everything to stop the plan on joining the mass actions.
In the case of the excepted respondent Officers, mere intention to commit a misdemeanor is not criminal. An overt act tending to accomplish the commission of the offense is still required. What has been proven so far are internal and preparatory acts sans concrete overt acts tending to accomplish the commission of the offense charged.
While the intent indicated is essential to the offense, the latter is not completed unless the opposition or resistance is manifested by some overt act or acts, or specific conduct. Mere intention however deliberate and fixed, or conspiracy however unanimous, will fail to constitute mutiny. Words alone, unaccompanied by acts, will not suffice.
Thirdly, no satisfactory proof of act of insubordination that was committed or was intended to be committed in a company, party, post, camp, detachment, guard or other command had been established.
In military law, mutiny is defined as concerted insubordination, or concerted opposition, defiance of, or resistance to, lawful military authority by two or more persons subject to such authority, with the intent to usurp, subvert, or override such authority or neutralize it for the time being.
As above discussed, there are no overt acts other than mere preparatory acts that did not develop into a situation tending to produce the eventual commission of an attempt to create mutiny. It is concluded that there can be no concerted insubordination or defiance to lawful military authority. Seemingly, the briefing on the situation that took place at the “Gazebo” on that evening of 23 Feb 06 is appreciably a consultative session with the hierarchy in the presence of no less than the Service Commanders which resulted in the issuance of an official guidelines from the CSAFP.
In sum, what apparently can be extracted from the aggregate evidence are indications of the existence of planning, consultative sessions and academic discussions of certain crucial issues on security matter, and conjectural inferences of what can be deduced from summing up these pieces of evidence. At most, the interpretation of these obtaining circumstances result in the accommodation of dual interpretation; that is, creating an inclination to both sides casting serious doubt that negates an approximation of the required prima facie case against the respondent Officers for an attempt offense to stand trial. At this point in time, where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scale in favor of the accused.
In the final analysis, it will still be the prosecution that should rely on the strength of its evidence and may not be allowed to draw advantage on the weakness of the respondents’ evidence.
For failure of the evidence adduced to support a prima facie case for violation of the 67th Article of War, the respondent Officers cannot be made amenable to further prosecution of this particular offense charged. This is without prejudice to other conduct violation/s and/or other violations of the Articles of War that each individual respondent may be held clearly accountable.
II. Violation of the 63RD ARTICLE of War
1. BGEN DANILO D LIM 0-7665 AFP
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 63rd Article of War (Disrespect Toward the President…)
SPECIFICATION : In that Brigadier General DANILO D LIM 0-7665 Armed Forces of the Philippines, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, or on dates prior or subsequent thereto, uttered the following contemptuous and disrespectful words against the President which was recorded on a video and aired in a television evening program (“Bandila”) of ABS CBN television network on July 3, 2006, to wit: “MRS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO HAS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN PROMOTING CORRUPTION TO ITS PRESENT LEVELS. IN HER MAD DESIRE FOR POWER, SHE HAS CORRUPTED AND DESTROYED ALL INSTITUTIONS, SHE HAS PROMOTED A POLICY OF LOOT AND PLUNDER WHILE HYPOCRITICALLY ANNOUNCING A WAR AGAINST CORRUPTION. SHE HAS CORRUPTED THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, THE ENTIRE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MASS MEDIA, SOME MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY, POLICE AND THE CLERGY AND COUNTLESS TEACHERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE COUNTING OF THE VOTES IN THE LAST ELECTIONS. SHE’S NOT ONLY THE MOST CORRUPT OFFICIAL IN THE COUNTRY TODAY; SHE IS ALSO ITS NO. 1 CORRUPTOR. WE CANNOT STAND IDLY BY WHILE THE RULE OF LAW, THE MORAL ORDER AND THE INTEGRITY OF OUR INSTITUTIONS, THE VERY FUTURE OF OUR COUNTRY AND PEOPLE AND OUR OWN PROFESSIONAL CAREERS ARE DESTROYED BY THIS BOGUS PRESIDENT. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO DO NOTHING WHILE SHE AND HER COHORTS TURN OUR GOVERNMENT INTO A CRIMINAL SYNDICATE.” [Underscoring Supplied]
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold subject General Officer with a view to trial by court-martial for this particular specification of the offense charged. The evidence offered before the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee consisting of a transcript of video tape
and upon which the charge is predicated partakes of the nature of an excluded evidence. Subject General Officer himself denies to have given authorization to ABS CBN to broadcast the same or release the video tape to the people.
For the purpose of appreciating contents of this piece of evidence with the view to establishing a possible violation of the Articles of War, there is a need to establish proper authentication of this particular proof. For it to be admissible, the same must be duly authenticated as an accurate portrayal of the words and actions of the subject respondent.
The requirements of admissibility as pre-requisite to the assessment of the contents/transcript submitted simply demands authentication of this real evidence with the means established by the applicable rules of evidence. There is nothing on record that would indicate that the video tape has been properly identified by any relevant testimony nor its correctness and accuracy established as being a faithful reproduction of the person subject of the video clip and that of his alleged insubordinate action or words thereby captured by the recording device.
III. Violation of the 65th Article of War
1. BGEN DANILO D LIM 0-7665 AFP
CHARGE 3: Violation of the 65th Article of War (WILLFULLY DISOBEYING SUPERIOR OFFICER
SPECIFICATION 1: In that Brigadier General DANILO D LIM 0-7665 Armed Forces of the Philippines, person subject to military law, having received a lawful order from the Commanding General, Philippine Army as well as the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines to follow the chain of command, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, willfully disobeyed the same by going directly to Chief of Staff, AFP to talk about the various issues affecting the military, particularly about the restiveness among some officers and soldiers of the First Scout Ranger Regiment, without first submitting such grievances to his immediate superior commander (Commanding General, Special Operation Command, Philippine Army. [Underscoring Supplied]
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold subject General Officer to trial by court-martial for this particular specification of the offense charged. The alleged orders emanating from the Commanding General, Philippine Army, VOCO or written, was not established by competent evidence. On the other hand, the act of seeking audience with the Chief of Staff was an offshoot of a decision by J2, the particular staff that was approached by respondent Officer and COL QUERUBIN PN (M), to convey the information and elevate the discussion to CSAFP.
Evidence on record points to the fact that J2 was informed of the development regarding the plan of junior Officers to join mass protest action on the following day, 24 February 2006. The plan consists of a march from their Headquarters by the Marines and later on to be joined by the Special Action Force (SAF) of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Other participants include Bishops and multi-sectoral groups. MGEN MACLANG AFP decided to seek audience with GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA AFP, then Chief of Staff, AFP.
The decision of both respondent General Officer and COL QUERUBIN PN (M) to inform the matter to J2 does not appear to have violated the chain of command considering the urgency and sensitivity of the information to be relayed. The information which consists of a planned action to join the civilian-led mass action on the day immediately following the time that the audience with J2 was sought is a critical and serious report. Without belaboring the obvious, time is of the essence and the subject of the information to be relayed is not only time-sensitive but is a vital and serious security concern. The propriety of taking this information directly for the assessment of J2 is certainly beyond question, the matter falling within his defined competence as lead Intelligence Staff of the CSAFP. The decision, however of J2 to elevate the matter to CSAFP is beyond the control of both respondent Officers.
SPECIFICATION 2 (of Charge 3, AW65 – Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer): In that Brigadier General DANILO D LIM 0-7665 Armed Forces of the Philippines, person subject to military law, having received a lawful order from the Commanding General, Philippine Army as well as the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines to coordinate and/or clear troop movement with appropriate offices and higher headquarters, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, willfully disobeyed the same by instructing MAJOR ORIEL L PANGCOG (INF0 PA, his Deputy for Operation (G3) at First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) to send troops to Manila without coordinating or clearing the movement of his troops from higher headquarters. [Underscoring Supplied]
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold subject General Officer to trial by court-martial for this particular specification of the offense charged. The matter of issuing orders, written or VOCO, at the instance of BGEN LIM AFP relative to troop movements has not been proved by the evidence on record. The alleged instructions given to G3 FSRR are negated by the claim of that officer (G3) that he received his orders on 23 February 2006 from LTC NESTOR FLORDELIZA (INF) PA.
2. COL ARIEL O QUERUBIN 0-7901 PN (M)
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 65th Article of War (WILLFULLY DISOBEYING SUPERIOR OFFICER)
SPECIFICATION : In that Colonel ARIEL O QUERUBIN 0-7901 Philippine Navy (Marines), person subject to military law, having received a lawful command from then Brigadier General now MAJOR GENERAL NELSON N ALLAGA AFP, Commandant, Philippine Marine Corps, his superior officer, to get inside the Headquarters, Philippine Marines to talk about his grievances he was then presenting to the media, did, on or about February 26, 2006, in Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, willfully disobeyed the same.[Underscoring supplied]
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold subject Officer with a view to trial by court-martial for this particular specification of the offense charged. BGEN ALLAGA himself revealed the following in his sworn statement, to wit:
62. A – Outside the building already. At that time nung malapit na siya and we had an eye contact, I told him to report to me, “Ariel you report to me. I am now the new Commandant.” And he answered, “Saan ang orders?”. I think that was his words. And I said nasa loob. Halika muna dito and I saw already that he was surrounded by civilians and media people whom I don’t even know. And so he answered back, “yes Sir.” I was waiting for him to come near me and we were already near the main door of the main building when he was pulled back again by the crowd of civilians and the media followed. So I lost him again at that time and I remember talking to COL MARTIR saying, “John I think we cannot make things orderly by force. We might just be falling into their trap and I remember I was also surrounded by media people with their microphones… And parang may nagsubo pa ata sa akin, telling me kausapin ka ni Arnold Clavio. Pakisabihan mo nga itong reporter mo dito na makulit baka masipa ko and then he answered back. “Naku huwag mong sipain at magagalit yan. So I have to extricate myself again and go back to the building.
This statement of BGEN ALLAGA negates the allegation that COL QUERUBIN willfully disobeyed him.
IV. Violation of the 97th Article of War
1. BGEN DANILO D LIM 0-7665 AFP
CHARGE 5: Violation of the 97th Article of War (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE)
SPECIFICATION 1: In that Brigadier General DANILO D LIM 0-7665 Armed Forces of the Philippines, person subject to military law, having received a lawful order from the Commanding General, Philippine Army as well as the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines to follow the chain of command, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, willfully disobeyed the same by going directly to Chief of Staff, AFP to talk about the various issues affecting the military, particularly about the restiveness among some officers and soldiers of the First Scout Ranger Regiment, without first submitting such grievances to his immediate superior commander (Commanding General, Special Operation Command, Philippine Army, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.[Underscoring supplied]
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold subject General Officer to trial by court-martial for this particular specification of the offense charged. The previous findings under the First Specification in Charge 3 for violation of 65th AW (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer) are incorporated by way of a discussion with respect to this particular charge.
SPECIFICATION 2 (of Charge 5 [AW 97] – Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline): In that Brigadier General DANILO D LIM 0-7665 Armed Forces of the Philippines, person subject to military law, having received a lawful order from the Commanding General, Philippine Army as well as the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines to coordinate and/or clear troop movement with appropriate offices and higher headquarters, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, willfully disobeyed the same by instructing MAJOR ORIEL L PANGCOG (INF0 PA, his Deputy for Operation (G3) at First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) to send troops to Manila without coordinating or clearing the movement of his troops from higher headquarters, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.[Underscoring supplied]
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold subject General Officer to trial by court-martial for this particular specification of the offense charged. The previous findings under the Second Specification in Charge 3 for violation of 65th AW (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer) are also incorporated by way of a discussion with respect to this particular charge.
2. COL ARIEL O QUERUBIN O-7901 PN (M)
CHARGE 4: Violation of the 97th Article of War (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE)
SPECIFICATION: In that Colonel ARIEL O QUERUBIN 0-7901 Philippine Navy (Marines), person subject to military law, did, on or about February 26, 2006, at Headquarters, Philippine Marines, Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, then and there, willfully, wrongfully, and maliciously violated the normal channel of communication in the chain of command when he appeared before the media and submitted his grievances against the relief of MGEN RENATO MIRANDA AFP as Commandant of the Philippine Marines and issued an unauthorized statements to the media calling the people to support the Marines, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline. [Underscoring Supplied]
There is prima facie evidence that COL QUERUBIN PN (M) violated AW97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for violating the normal channel of communication in the chain of command when he appeared before the media on 26 Feb 06 submitting his grievances therein. He issued the following statements to TV PATROL WORLD AND ANC WITH MS. PIA HONTIVEROS. He was interviewed by the media while walking from the BNS Chapel towards HPMC Building, Marine Barracks.
TV PATROL WORLD
When asked by an unidentified reporter whether they were really joining the “Kilos Protesta” that Saturday or they had plans then, COL QUERUBIN PN (M) replied: “Yun ang plano namin, napakiusapan lang kami. So sabi nila for us to swallow our pride, yung prinsipyo mo inano mo na lahat”.
When asked further that “so dapat sasama kayo, napakiusapan lang kayo? He answered that: “Napakiusapan kami. Ang pakiusap nga ay di kami gumalaw, pero wala ring gagalawin dapat, e ginalaw nila ang Commandant namin, anong gagawin namin? Wala akong na-violate non. Hindi po totoo na nag-resign siya, kasi po bago naghiwa-hiwalay last time, nasabi niya na kapag ni-relieve ka, ni-relieve tayo, ni-relieve ako, mag ano tayo, we have to go. Nanawagan lang kami na eto para suportahan ninyo ang aming Commandant at Organization kasi after this pagnagwatak-watak na kami, the Marines is no longer relevant. Sibakin nila yung Commandant namin, hindi namin susuportahan, e ano na lang kami, para kaming ano.. Nakikiusap po ako kung may pupunta dito para mag-attend ng vigil mass, yun lang po ang gusto namin na samahan nyo kami para suportahan yung na-relieve namin na Commandant, MGEN MIRANDA.”
COL QUERUBIN PN (M) was then asked what kind of support was he asking, to which he replied: “Vigil mass, para lang dumami yung tao na makita naman nila na ganito yung suporta ninyo sa Marines, okey na kami.”
When finally asked “Is that tantamount to the withdrawal of the Marines?”, he answered: “I don’t know wala kami. We will cross the bridge when we are there. I must tell you frankly, we do not have us yet. We just want people to support us, for our Commandant, for the Marines. If you want to support your Marines, the protector of the people and the State, please come.”
ANC INTERVIEW WITH PIA HONTIVEROS
When asked why MGEN MIRANDA AFP was relieved or why did he asked to be relieved, COL QUERUBIN PN (M) said: “I really don’t know, I don’t know the circumstances. But before we parted ways last time ang sabi nya sa akin “Ariel, if you’re going to be relieved, ako na lang ang i-sacrifice nila, willing ako. Ikaw, may anim na taon ka pa, samantalang ako, dalawang taon na lang, pwede akong mag-sacrifice. Sabi ko “Sir, wag naman at ikaw lang yung nakikita namin na puwedeng mag-unite ng Marines. Kapag ginawa mo yan, magwawatak watak na kami.
Asked to confirm that there will be any withdrawal of support and that MGEN MIRANDA AFP just wants to show solidarity with him and that is why he asked to be relieved, he replied: “Yes we are just showing solidarity to MGEN MIRANDA.” But when asked that isn’t it GEN MIRANDA wants to be relieved because COL QUERUBIN was about to be relieved, he answered “Well, that was the case, pero hinde ko na alam kung ano nang nangyari ngayon dahil bigla na lang siyang ni-relieved”.
Asked about his plans, he said that he will join MGEN MIRANDA AFP at Headquarters and that: “I will wait for all the people to really come here and protect us and we will cross the bridge when we are there”. Pressed to answer “You are calling the people to protect you on what?, He replied “Agression”. “Have you been receiving threats or warnings?. He said, “I do not know kung meron ngayon but I expect that to happen”. “At this point, are you withdrawing support?, Pia Hontiveros asked. COL QUERUBIN said, “As I have said, we are doing this to support my Commandant, that is all.”
3. LTC ACHILLES S SEGUMALIAN 0-116089 PN (M)
CHARGE 4: Violation of the 97th Article of War (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE)
SPECIFICATION: In that Lieutenant Colonel ACHILLES S SEGUMALIAN 0-116089 Philippine Navy (Marines), person subject to military law, did, on or about February 26, 2006, at Headquarters, Philippine Marines, Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, then and there, willfully, wrongfully, and maliciously violated the normal channel of communication in the chain of command when he appeared before the media without authority and uttered seditious remarks such as, “KAWAWA NAMAN ANG MARINES. BINABASTOS NIYO SILA. X X X LAHAT GINAWA NAMIN SIMULA SA LANAO, SE ELEKSIYON. GUSTO NAMIN MALINIS NA ELEKSIYON. AYAW NINYONG MAGULO ANG PILIPINAS. GINUGULO NINYO X X X ALAM NINYO YAN. ALAM NINYO YAN KUNG SINO”, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline. [Underscoring Supplied]
There is prima facie evidence that LTC SEGUMALIAN violated AW97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for violating the normal channel of communication in the chain of command when he appeared before the media on 26 Feb 06 submitting his grievances therein.
V. Violation of the 96th Article of War
1. MGEN RENATO P. MIRANDA 0-6728 AFP
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION : In that Major General RENATO P MIRANDA 0-6728 Armed Forces of the Philippines, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City and Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, together with Brigadier General Danilo Lim AFP, Commanding General of the First Scout Ranger Regiment, Philippine Army and Colonel Ariel Querubin Philippine Marines and other military personnel and several John Does, attempted to begin or create a mutiny by withdrawing their support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, declaring that the Marines would join the protest actions against the President, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
Under AW96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman), the conduct had in view may not consist in conduct unbecoming an officer only, or in conduct unbecoming a gentleman only, but must in every case be unbecoming the accused in both these characters at once. To constitute therefore the conduct here denounced, the act which forms the basis of the charge must have a double significance and effect. Though it need not amount to a crime, it must offend so seriously against law, justice, morality or decorum as to expose to disgrace, socially, or as a man, the offender, and at the same time must be of such a nature or committed under such circumstances as to bring dishonor or disrepute upon the military profession which he represents.
In this case, MGEN MIRANDA is liable for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) not for attempting to create or begin a mutiny, but for declaring to his men that he would join the protest actions at EDSA and for encouraging the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the other Major Services Commanders to support their plan to join the protest actions. These were confirmed by the affidavits of witnesses.
LT GEN HERMOGENES C ESPERON AFP, stated in his affidavit,
“GEN SENGA also told us per information from BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN elements from Special Action Force PNP, Philippine Marines and First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) will join the mass protest action. The move to join the mass protest action has the blessings of CSUPT MARCELINO FRANCO of SAF, PNP and MGEN RENATO MIRANDA AFP, Commandant Philippine Marines.”
MGEN MIRANDA and CSUPT FRANCO asked us to support them of their plans. I asked why we should support them. The two replied that there are already many commanders who are joining and that they did not want bloodshed.
“When asked if he could stop his men from joining, MGEN MIRANDA replied that he is pro constitution but stated in the vernacular that, “WE MUST NOW LISTEN TO THE PEOPLE.” According to him, they have attained a critical majority and therefore their desire must be followed. He kept on saying that he is for the constitution and for the chain of command but will follow the will of the people.”
This was corroborated by LT GEN JOSE L REYES AFP in his affidavit where he stated that,
“xx Miranda also stated that the Marines are on the go and that they cannot hold them anymore, and that they will lead the troops on the planned march and joining protest”.
VADM MATEO M MAYUGA AFP likewise stated in his affidavit that,
“xx Lim mentioned that that he had an earlier recorded video or tape interview about his stand on the political situation and his withdrawal of support from the President to be aired during the day of the rally. Lim and Querubin also mentioned that they see Oscar Orbos as the leader to replace President Arroyo after the successful conslcusion of the protest march. At this point, MGEN MIRANDA said that he may not be able to stop COL QUERUBIN and group from joining the protest rally and if that happens then he will be forced also to join the mass protest action. xx”
COL JONATHAN MARTIR PN (M), also stated in his sworn statement that,
“Initially sir the Commandant invited FOIC and that we waited for a time and people were still coming in. He gave a statement that we’re going to move to EDSA with the troops together with the other units.”
“Yes sir. While waiting for him he was giving statements. “In my conviction is I would like to go but I will not force that on you. We will decide here.” That was his statement. BGEN ALLAGA was not around yet and I was quite surprised and hurt what MGEN MIRANDA said. So I was always asking the Chief of Staff, COL DE LEON where BGEN ALLAGA was. He said, “His coming.”
“After FOIC left, we started voting procedures on “go” or “no go”. If we will march off to EDSA or not. That was when the voting started. Although the voting did not finish, we did not talk about it. I asked the Commandant that it is something illegal and I would like to talk to my people at least my unit commanders regarding this proposed activity. He denied and said, “It has to be decided here. They will follow.”
“Sabi ko Sir it is an illegal act. He answered, “This is not a coup. Pupunta lang tayo doon to protect the demonstrators. We are not going to overthrow the government. I answered, “Sir, it is still Mutiny”. He did not answer anymore.”
The above statements of COL MARTIR were corroborated by CMS GENEROSO BAGORIO, who in his sworn statement, stated that when he was questioned by the ADHOC Investigating Committee, he gave the following answers:
45. Q – There was a consensus and decision made to join the other groups. How was that message conveyed to the group?
A – Ang pagkakabangit sir kinukuha iyong opinion ng bawat isa Sir, “Ano gusto ninyo gagalaw ba tayo or kikilos ba tayo?”
46. Q – Sino ang nagsabi niyon?
A – Former Commandant, MGEN MIRANDA Sir.
2. BGEN DANILO D LIM 0-7665 AFP
CHARGE 4: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION 1: In that Brigadier General DANILO D LIM 0-7665 Armed Forces of the Philippines, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City and Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, together with several other military personnel and several John Does, attempted to begin or create a mutiny by withdrawing their support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, urging the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other officers and enlisted personnel to likewise withdraw their support from the President, and attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions calling for the President’s resignation, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold subject General Officer with a view to trial by court-martial for this particular specification of the offense charge.
There is no established act of urging CSAFP to join withdrawal of support. CSAFP himself insisted that subject General Officer never tried to convince him to join a coup attempt.
The allegation that they urged the Chief of Staff was negated by MGEN RODRIGO F MACLANG in his sworn statement where he stated that:
39 Q – Going back to the question of offering CSAFP the leadership, who or from whom?
A – xxx Not necessary na “io-offer ko sa iyo Sir.” Iba rin yon. In the course of the discussion, to avert violence “kung magkaisa tayo, magkasama tayo, you provide the leadership para wag tayong magkagulo” ang sabi nina BGEN LIM at COL QUERUBIN. Sabi naman ni CSAFP “Hindi naman mangyayari yon.” Yun ang sagot don sa violence na sinasabi. I just have to clarify that kasi iba rin yung sabihin mo na “Sir I’m offering you the leadership.” Ako ang authority non, I know that when I offer something, I’m firm na sigurado mong makuha yon. Hindi ganon Sir, para magkaisa tayo, pagkaisahin natin yung AFP. It’s an idea that came out in the course of discussion.
For the purpose of this charge, however, although BGEN LIM cannot be held liable under the Specifications set forth in the charge for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman, he may be charged or pursued for conduct violation for his act of planning to join the civilian-led rally on 24 February 2006 and for declaring that he will lead his men in joining the protest action and will withdraw support from the President. This act constitutes conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman.
Hence, the Specification of AW 96 under which BGEN LIM was charged must be amended to include the aforementioned acts committed by subject officer as will constitute Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
SPECIFICATION 2 (of Charge 4 – Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) : In that Brigadier General DANILO D LIM 0-7665 Armed Forces of the Philippines, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, or on dates prior or subsequent thereto, uttered the following contemptuous and disrespectful words against the President which was recorded on a video and aired in a television evening program (“Bandila”) of ABS CBN television network on July 3, 2006, to wit: “MRS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO HAS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN PROMOTING CORRUPTION TO ITS PRESENT LEVELS. IN HER MAD DESIRE DFOR POWER SHE HAS CORRUPTED AND DESTROYED ALL INSTITUTIONS, SHE HAS PROMOTED A POLICY OF LOOT AND PLUNDER WHILE HYPOCRITICALLY ANNOUNCING A WAR AGAINST CORRUPTION. SHE HAS CORRUPTED THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, THE ENTIRE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MASS MEDIA, SOME MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY, POLICE AND THE CLERGY. AND COUNTLESS TEACHERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE COUNTING OF THE VOTES IN THE LAST ELECTIONS. SHE’S NOT ONLY THE MOST CORRUPT OFFICIAL IN THE COUNTRY TODAY; SHE IS ALSO ITS NO. 1 CORRUPTOR. WE CANNOT STAND IDLY BY WHILE THE RULE OF LAW, THE MORAL ORDER AND THE INTEGRITY OF OUR INSTITUTIONS, THE VERY FUTURE OF OUR COUNTRY AND PEOPLE AND OUR OWN PROFESSIONAL CAREERS ARE DESTROYED BY THIS BOGUS PRESIDENT. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO DO NOTHING WHILE SHE AND HER COHORTS TURN OUR GOVERNMENT INTO A CRIMINAL SYNDICATE”, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold subject Officer with a view to trial by court-martial for this particular specification of the offense charged. The previous findings under the Specification in Charge 2 for violation of 63rd AW (Disrespect towards the President, Vice President, Congress of the Philippines or Secretary of National Defense) are incorporated by way of a discussion with respect to this particular charge.
SPECIFICATION 3 (of Charge 4 – Conduct unbecoming and Officer and Gentleman): In that Brigadier General DANILO D LIM 0-7665 Armed Forces of the Philippines, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, at Headquarters, First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR), Special Operation Command (SOCOM), Philippine Army, Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, excited and/or caused a mutiny by urging his staff officers at FSRR, SOCOM, PA as well as other officers and enlisted personnel of said unit to concertedly defy standing and lawful orders of the Commanding General, Philippine Army as well as the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines to follow the chain of command, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful military authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold subject Officer with a view to trial by court-martial for this particular specification of the offense charge.
There is no evidence offered on record to show that BGEN LIM AFP issued directives, orders, guidance or verbal instructions to defy higher authorities. Contrariwise, FSRR at Camp Tecson was intact with the standing order of BGEN LIM to close ranks and not to entertain invitations of coup. This is affirmed by his Officers at FSRR which can be deduced from the affidavit jointly executed by LTC FLORDELIZA (INF) PA together with other Officers of FSRR.
On record, the affidavit jointly executed by LTC FLORDELIZA (INF) PA with other Officers of FSRR affirms that during their staff conferences, BGEN LIM AFP has always advised them not to be misled by those who advocated violence as a means of change. BGEN LIM also told these Officers that all grievances could be brought to and addressed by the AFP Chain of Command in peaceful and rational manner. BGEN LIM further barred outsiders from recruiting members of the Regiment.
3. COL ARIEL O QUERUBIN 0-7901 PN (M)
CHARGE 3: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION 1: In that Colonel ARIEL O QUERUBIN 0-7901 Philippine Navy (Marines), person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City and Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, together with other military personnel and several John Does, attempted to begin or create a mutiny by withdrawing his support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, his Commander-in-Chief, urging the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other officers and enlisted personnel to join their cause, calling on the civil society to join them at Headquarters, Philippine Marines during the so-called “Stand-Off” on 26 February 2006, and to likewise withdraw their support from the President, and attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions calling for the President’s resignation, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
There is nothing in the affidavits and sworn statements of witnesses as well as other evidence which would show that he urged the Chief of Staff or other officers to withdraw support from the President. There is nothing in the affidavits of LTGEN HERMOGENES C ESPERON, LTGEN JOSE L REYES and VADM MATEO M MAYUGA which would show that COL QUERUBIN urged GEN GENEROSO S SENGA, former Chief of Staff and other Officers to withdraw support from the President. Their affidavits uniformly state that COL QUERUBIN together with BGEN LIM approached the Chief of Staff and discussed their plan to lead their officers and men in joining mass protest actions on 24 Feb 06.
The allegation that they urged the Chief of Staff was negated by MGEN RODRIGO F MACLANG in his sworn statement where he stated that:
39 Q – Going back to the question of offering CSAFP the leadership, who or from whom?
A – xxx Not necessary na “io-offer ko sa iyo Sir.” Iba rin yon. In the course of the discussion, to avert violence “kung magkaisa tayo, magkasama tayo, you provide the leadership para wag tayong magkagulo” ang sabi nina BGEN LIM at COL QUERUBIN. Sabi naman ni CSAFP “Hindi naman mangyayari yon.” Yun ang sagot don sa violence na sinasabi. I just have top clarify that kasi iba rin yung sabihin mo na “Sir I’m offering you the leadership.” Ako ang authority non, I know that when I offer something, I’m firm na sigurado mong makuha yon. Hindi ganon Sir, para magkaisa tayo, pagkaisahin natin yung AFP. It’s an idea that came out in the course of discussion.
However, he is still liable for the following acts which constitute a violation of AW96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman).
[a] For calling on the civil society to join them at Hqs, Phil. Marines during the so-called “Stand-ff on 26 Feb 06;
[b] For declaring that the Marines will withdraw their support from the President and that he will lead other officers and men in joining the mass protest actions on 24 Feb 06. These were established by the following evidence:
VADM MATEO M MAYUGA AFP stated in his affidavit that: BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN were called to join us at the Gazebo. The same issues were asked of CSUP FRANCO as to the group’s intention, the type of government they intent to put up and the President’s replacement and the other issues. The two officers (Lim and Querubin) had the same line of answers as CSUPT Franco in that: their junior offices have been for sometime airing their gripes against the prevailing political situation in the country; that they cannot stop anymore these junior officers from joining the mass protest rally and; that to avoid trouble and bloodshed they will join them so that can better organized during the rally. Lim mentioned that that he had an earlier recorded video or tape interview about his take on the political situation and his withdrawal of support from the President to be aired during the day of the rally. Lim and Querubin also mentioned that they see Oscar Orbos as the leader to replace President Arroyo after the successful conclusion of the protest march
LT GEN HERMOGENES C ESPERON AFP, stated in his affidavit, “GEN SENGA also told us per information from BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN elements from Special Action Force PNP, Philippine Marines and First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) will join the mass protest action.”
GEN SENGA then asked BGEN LIM and COL QUERUBIN to explain their plans to join the mass protest action. They stated to wit:
a. They can no longer hold their men and they have opted to join them so that they (BGEN LIM AFP & COL QUERUBIN PN (M)) could provide leadership to their men;
b. They will march with their uniforms and with their weapons’ muzzles down;
c. They will be joined by other military men when the marching groups will en route to a rendezvous area.
d. Lim confirmed he has already made a taped message to withdraw support from PGMA.
LTGEN JOSE L REYES AFP likewise stated in his affidavit the following:
“We all ask them to stop their plans. Lim and Querubin stated many reasons: their men are determined to move and are all uneasy already; they (Lim and Querubin) have signed and might have already reach the media their announcement of withdrawal of support from the President; they cannot have face-saving act anymore. xxx”
The above facts were confirmed by no other than COL QUERUBIN PN (M) in his interview with ANC and TV PATROL. Portions of the said interview are quoted below:
When asked by an unidentified reporter whether they were really joining the “Kilos Protesta” that Saturday or they had plans then, COL QUERUBIN replied “Yun ang plano namin, napakiusapan lang kami. So sabi nila for us to swallow our pride, yung prinsipyo mo inano mo na lahat”.
COL QUERUBIN PN (M) confirmed in the said interview that they will be joining the protest rally at EDSA that Friday and that they will be marching without arms from Fort Bonifacio around 10 or 11AM. They were however allegedly prevailed by their Commandant, and since they followed him, COL QUERUBIN PN (M) asked “ano ang ikakaso nila sa amin?”
Q: “When you are going to join the protest rally, you are saying that it was not a coup de etat. Anong plano ninyo? Were you going to withdraw support?” He replied:
A: “I really do not know. The Junior officers were so agitated so I told them para hindi na lang kayo makipag-away o makipag-barilan, mag march na lang tayo para walang madugo.” What made them so agitated?” COL QUERUBIN replied “Of course, what’s happening now, nakikita naman natin kung anong nangyayari ngayon.”
COL QUERUBIN likewise confirmed that he and some other officers were actually planning to march along with the people in the protest rally. When asked if he can tell how many officers was he talking about, he replied that a majority of the officers of the marines were joining the protest rally. Asked how many marine officers and what is the majority thereof, he replied that there are 400 officers and that 50% thereof plus 1 will join the rally.
However, there is no evidence to support the charge under specification 2, charge 3 of the Charge Sheet which states:
CHARGE 3: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION 2: In that Colonel ARIEL O QUERUBIN 0-7901 Philippine Navy (Marines), person subject to military law, having received a lawful command from then Brigadier General now MAJOR GENERAL NELSON N ALLAGA AFP, Commandant, Philippine Marine Corps, his superior officer, to get inside the Headquarters, Philippine Marines to talk about his grievances he was then presenting to the media, did, on or about February 26, 2006, in Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, willfully disobeyed the same, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
The previous findings under the Specification in Charge 2 for violation of 65th of the Articles of War (Disrespect Towards Superior Officer) are incorporated by way of a discussion with respect to this particular charge.
3. COL ORLANDO E DE LEON O-8600 PN(M)
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Colonel ORLANDO E DE LEON 0-8600 Philippine Navy (Marines), person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, together with other Marine officers and enlisted personnel, attempted to begin or create a mutiny by withdrawing their support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and to likewise withdraw their support from the President, and attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions calling for the President’s resignation, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold subject Officer with a view to trial by court-martial for this particular specification of the offense charged. There is nothing in the affidavits and sworn statements of witnesses as well as other evidence which would show that he withdrew his support from the President.
However, he is liable for the following acts which constitute a violation of AW96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman):
[a] For chanting withdrawal of support from the President and for declaring also his withdrawal of support from then BGEN ALLAGA (now MGEN ALLAGA) during the conference on 26 Feb 06 at the commander’s lounge at the PMC Headquarters;
[b] For supporting the proposal of MGEN MIRANDA for the Marine Corps to join the mass action protest.
5. LTC CUSTODIO J PARCON O-9702 PN(M)
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Lieutenant Colonel CUSTODIO PARCON 0-9702 Philippine Navy (Marines), person subject to military law, did, on or about February 24, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, together with other Marine officers and enlisted personnel, attempted to begin or create a mutiny by withdrawing their support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions calling for the President’s resignation, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold subject Officer with a view to trial by court-martial for this particular specification of the offense charged.
However, he is liable for chanting withdrawal of support from the President and for declaring also his withdrawal of support from then BGEN ALLAGA (now MGEN ALLAGA) during the conference on 26 Feb 06 at the commander’s lounge at the PMC Headquarters. A conduct which constitute violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
6. LTC ACHILLES S SEGUMALIAN O-116089 PN (M)
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Lieutenant Colonel ACHILLES S SEGUMALIAN 0-116089 Philippine Navy (Marines), person subject to military law, did, on or about February 24, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, together with other military personnel and several John Does, attempted to begin or create a mutiny by withdrawing their support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, forming his men in full battle gear in front of the Brown Hall of Headquarters, Philippine Marines during the so-called “Stand-Off” on 26 February 2006, and attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions calling for the President’s resignation, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold subject Officer with a view to trial by court-martial for this particular specification of the offense charged. There is nothing in the affidavits and sworn statements of witnesses as well as other evidence which would show that he withdrew his support from the President. There is likewise no evidence that he attempted to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions calling for the President’s resignation.
However, LTC SEGUMALIAN is liable for supporting the proposal of MGEN MIRANDA for the Marine Corps to join the mass action protest. He is also is liable for questioning the authority of MGEN ALLAGA when the latter was designated as the new commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps. These acts constitute conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
7. MAJ FRANCISCO DOMINGO R FERNANDEZ O-10530 PN (M)
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Major FRANCISCO DOMINGO R FERNANDEZ 0-10530 Philippine Navy (Marines), person subject to military law, did, on or about February 24, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, together with other military personnel and several John Does, attempted to begin or create a mutiny by withdrawing their support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions calling for the President’s resignation, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
8. 1LT BELINDA R FERRER 0-132579 PN (M)
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that 1LT BELINDA R FERRER 0-132579 Philippine Navy (Marines), person subject to military law, did, on or about February 24, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, together with other military personnel and several John Does, attempted to begin or create a mutiny by withdrawing their support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions calling for the President’s resignation, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
The pieces of evidence on hand do not sufficiently support the above charges against MAJ FERNANDEZ and 1LT FERRER.
However, both subject officers are liable for chanting withdrawal of support from the President during the conference at the PMC Headquarters on 26 Feb 06. They were positively identified by COL JONATHAN MARTIR in his sworn statement dated 11 April 06 before the ADHOC Investigating Committee as among those junior officers who chanted withdrawal of support from the President, conduct unbecoming of an Officer and a Gentleman.
9. COL JANUARIO G CARINGAL O-8580 PN(M)
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Colonel JANUARIO G CARINGAL 0-8580 Philippine Navy (Marines), person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, together with other military personnel and several John Does, attempted to begin or create a mutiny by joining Brigadier General Danilo Lim when the latter delivered his message withdrawing support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, their Commander-in-Chief, imputing malicious statements to the President and calling for their comrades-in-arms to support their cause, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
A careful perusal of the evidence on hand reveals that there is no sufficient evidence which warrants his indictment for violation of the Articles of War. Affidavits of witnesses did not mention him as one of those present during the conference called by the then Commandant, MGEN MIRANDA in the early morning of 24 Feb 06. Neither was he present during the conference at the PMC Headquarters on 26 Feb 06 as he was at the 2nd Marine Brigade, Philippine Marine Corps, based at Camp Ditucalan, Maria Cristina, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte on the said date. Likewise, nothing on the records shows that he connived with other officers in an attempt to begin or create mutiny.
The allegation that in the video tape of the withdrawal of support of BGEN LIM aired by ABS-CBN, COL CARINGAL was one of the three officers who stood behind BGEN LIM while the latter was delivering his message of withdrawal of support from the President, has no leg to stand on. In the said video tape, the face of the person with the name plate CARINGAL was not shown. Therefore, the person with the name plate CARINGAL in the said video tape cannot be established. There are other individuals, military men or civilian, with the surname CARINGAL and the possibility that the person in the video tape refers to another person has not been ruled out. Respondent, therefore, cannot be prosecuted based on mere suspicion and conjectures.
10. COL ARMANDO V BAÑEZ O-8592 PN(M)
11. LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN O-9722 PN(M)
12. LTC REYNALDO C OCSAN O-8751 PN(M)
13. LTC VALENTINE T HIZON O-9476 PN(M)
14. LTC ROMULO L GUALDRAPA O-113766 PN(M).
Under a common charge:
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that ___________________________________ Philippine Navy (Marines), person subject to military law, did, on or about February 24, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, together with other military personnel and several John Does, attempted to begin or create a mutiny by withdrawing their support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Commander- in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions calling for the President’s resignation, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold subject Officers with a view to trial by court-martial for this particular specification of the offense charged.
The pieces of evidence on hand do not sufficiently support the charges against them. They are uniformly charged for allegedly attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions and to call for the President’s resignation, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority.
A review of the records and evidence show that they are being indicted because they were present during the conference at the PMC Headquarters on 24 and 26 Feb 06. However, their mere presence thereat, unsupported by other evidence, does not in any way establish that they connived with the other respondents to withdraw support from the President. Affidavits of witnesses show that they have not in any way committed any act nor utter mutinous words which constitute a violation of the 96th Article of War or any of its provisions.
It is not enough to show suspicious circumstances. Suspicion is not enough proof.”
“Verdicts must stand upon evidence and not upon mere conjecture, however plausible, and if the situation be such that the plaintiff cannot furnish the requisite evidence, the misfortune is his.”
15. LTC NESTOR T FLORDELIZA O-109684 (QMS) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Lieutenant Colonel NESTOR T FLORDELIZA 0-109684 (Quartermaster) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, together with other military personnel and several John Does, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by ordering Lieutenant Colonel Edmundo Malabanjot, Commanding Officer of 3rd Scout Ranger Battalion to dispatch four and five sections from the 7th and 9th Scout Ranger Company in the evening of 23 February 2006 and ordering Major Ariel Pangcog, G3 of First Scout Ranger Regiment to direct LTC Malabanjot to mobilize nine sections to EDSA, for the protest mass action and the withdrawal of support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
Subject Officer is liable for ordering LTC Edmundo Malabanjot, Commanding Officer of 3rd Scout Ranger Battalion to dispatch four and five sections from the 7th and 9th Scout Ranger Company in the evening of 23 February 2006 and ordering Maj Ariel Pangcog, G3 of First Scout Ranger Regiment to direct LTC Malabanjot to mobilize nine sections without clearance from higher headquarters. Such act is a violation of the 97th Articles of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline.
16. LTC EDMUNDO D MALABANJOT O-115217 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Lieutenant Colonel EDMUNDO D MALABANJOT 0-115217 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, at Camp Francisco J Canuto, Barangay Sugarong, Pili, Camarines Sur, being the Commanding Officer of 3rd Scout Ranger Batallion, First Scout Ranger Regiment, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by ordering the Company Commanders of 7th and 9th Scout Ranger Company, both of 3rd SRB, FSRR to send augmentation troops to Manila for the protest mass action and the withdrawal of support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. [Underscoring Supplied]
Subject Officer is liable for ordering the Company Commanders of 7th and 9th Scout Ranger Company, both of 3rd SRB, FSRR to send augmentation troops to Manila without clearance from higher headquarters, a violation of the 97th Articles of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline).
17. MAJ JASON LAUREANO Y AQUINO O-10503 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Major JASON LAUREANO Y AQUINO 0-10503 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 3, 2006 at the rest house of Captain Montano B Almodovar PA at Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, together with Major Leomar Jose Doctolero PA, Captain Dante Langkit PA, Captain Joey T Fontiveros, Captain Montano Almodovar PA Captain Isagani Criste PA, Captain William Upano PA, Major James Sababan and ILT Gerald Reyes PA, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by planning how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army, and joining Col Ariel Querubin and BGen Danilo Lim and other Army and Marine officers numbering about ten (10) in a meeting at Century Park Sheraton Hotel in Manila where they discussed the plan to talk with CSAFP GEN GENEROSO SENGA about the withdrawal of support from President Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
Subject Officer is liable for violation of the Articles of War for leading the planning on how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over of Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army. Whether the plan was formally presented or was just casually discussed among the officers, such act constitutes a violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline).
Moreover, he is also liable for joining Col Ariel Querubin and BGen Danilo Lim and other Army and Marine officers numbering about ten (10) in a meeting at Century Park Sheraton Hotel in Manila where they discussed the plan to talk with CSAFP GEN GENEROSO SENGA about the withdrawal of support from President Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo. Such act constitutes a violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman).
18. MAJ ORIEL L PANGCOG O-10563 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Major ORIEL L PANGCOG 0-10563 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, being the then G3, First Scout Ranger Regiment, PA, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by ordering/advising LTC Edmundo Malabanjot PA, Commanding Officer, 3rs Scout Ranger Battalion, to send augmentation troops to EDSA, Manila for the protest mass action and the withdrawal of support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
Subject Officer is liable for instructing LTC EDMUNDO MALABANJOT (INF) PA, Commanding Officer, 3rd Scout Ranger Battalion, to send augmentation troops to EDSA, Manila without clearance from higher headquarters, a violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline).
19. CPT JAMES C SABABAN O-11581 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Major JAMES C SABABAN 0-11581 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 3, 2006 at the rest house of Captain Montano B Almodovar PA at Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, together with Major Jose Leomar Doctolero PA, Major Jason Laureano Aquino, Captain Dante Langkit PA, Captain Joey T Fontiveros, Captain Montano Almodovar PA Captain Isagani Criste PA, Captain William Upano PA, and ILT Gerald Reyes PA, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by planning on how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
20. CPT MONTANO B ALMODOVAR O-11572 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Captain MONTANO B ALMODOVAR 0-11572 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 3, 2006 at his rest house at Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, together with Major Jose Leomar Doctolero PA, Major Jason Laureano Aquino PA, Captain Dante Langkit PA, Captain Joey T Fontiveros, Captain Montano Almodovar PA Captain Isagani Criste PA, Captain William Upano PA, Major James Sababan PA and ILT Gerald Reyes PA, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by planning how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
21. CPT ISAGANI O CRISTE O-11549 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Captain ISAGANI O CRISTE 0-11549 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 3, 2006 at the rest house of Captain Almodovar at Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, together with Major Jose Leomar Doctolero PA, Major Jason Laureano Aquino PA, Captain Joey Fontiveros PA, Captain Montano Almodovar PA, Captain Dante Langkit PA, Captain Montano Almodovar PA, Captain William Upano PA, Major James Sababan PA and ILT Gerald Reyes PA, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by planning how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
22. CPT JOEY T FONTIVEROS O-11713 INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Captain JOEY T FONTIVEROS 0-11713 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 3, 2006 at the rest house of Captain Almodovar at Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, together with Major Jose Leomar Doctolero PA, Major Jason Laureano Aquino PA, Captain Montano Almodovar PA, Captain Dante Langkit PA, Captain Montano Almodovar PA Captain Isagani Criste PA, Captain William Upano PA, Major James Sababan PA and ILT Gerald Reyes PA, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by planning how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman
23. CPT WILLIAM F UPANO O-11876 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Captain WILLIAM F UPANO 0-11876 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 3, 2006 at the rest house of Captain Almodovar at Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, together with Major Jose Leomar Doctolero PA, Major Jason Laureano Aquino PA, Captain Montano Almodovar PA, Captain Dante Langkit PA, Captain Montano Almodovar PA Captain Isagani Criste PA, Captain Joey Fontiveros PA, Major James Sababan PA and ILT Jerald Reyes PA, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by planning how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
24. 1LT JERALD L REYES O-13257 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that First Lieutenant JERALD L REYES 0- 13257 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 3, 2006 at the rest house of Captain Almodovar at Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, together with Major Jose Leomar Doctolero PA, Major Jason Laureano Aquino PA, Captain Montano Almodovar PA, Captain Dante Langkit PA, Captain Montano Almodovar PA Captain Isagani Criste PA, Captain Joey Fontiveros PA, Major James Sababan PA and Captain William Upano PA, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by planning how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
CPTs SABABAN, ALMODOVAR, CRISTE, FONTIVEROS, and UPANO are liable for violation of the Articles of War 96 for joining the planning on how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over of Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army. Whether the plan was formally presented or was just casually discussed among the officers, such act constitutes a violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline).
1LT REYES will be used as state/government witness against the aforementioned army officers.
25. MAJ JOSE LEOMAR M DOCTOLERO O-10124 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Major JOSE LEOMAR M DOCTOLERO O-10124 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 3, 2006 at the rest house of Captain Montano B Almodovar PA at Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, together with Major Jason Laureano Aquino PA, Captain Dante Langkit PA, Captain Joey T Fontiveros, Captain Montano Almodovar PA Captain Isagani Criste PA, Captain William Upano PA, Major James Sababan PA and ILT Gerald Reyes PA, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by planning how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army, and ordering the students of the Scout Ranger Training School Class 161`-06 to withdraw ammunition for possible utilization in EDSA, Manila during the protest mass action, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
26. CPT RUBEN B GUINOLBAY O-11957 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Captain RUBEN B GUINOLBAY 0-11675 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, at Seoul Restaurant, Libis, Quezon City, attempted to begin a mutiny by joining a meeting regarding the plan of BGen Danilo Lim to withdraw support from the Commander in Chief, Armed Forces of the Philippine, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
There is no evidence on record which warrants the indictment of MAJ DOCTOLERO and CPT GUINOLBAY for violation of the Articles of War. Their names were never mentioned in the affidavits or sworn statements of witnesses as one of those who planned the breach of the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over of Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army. Likewise, nothing on the records show that they connived with other officers in an attempt to begin or create mutiny as previously passed upon.
27. CPT DANTE D LANGKIT O-11957 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Captain DANTE D LANGKIT 0-11957 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 16, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, at Campus View Restaurant, Poblacion, San Miguel, Bulacan, attempted to begin or create a mutiny by advising ILT JERALD A REYES PA, 1LT MICHAEL CUARTEROS, and TSg Reynaldo S Angga PA to form or organize three (3) sections each for deployment to Manila, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
CPT LANGKIT is liable for directing ILT JERALD A REYES PA, 1LT MICHAEL CUARTEROS, and TSg Reynaldo S Angga PA to form and organize their men, firearms, ammunitions for the conduct of a battalion operation which he intends to organize with the help of other officers without the knowledge of the Battalion Commander which is a violation of the 97th Articles of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline).
28. CPT GEORGE M MALONES O-128634 (CAV) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Captain GEORGE M MALONES 0-128634 (Cavalier) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about the fourth quarter of 2005 and 23 February 2006, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by meeting with COL REYNALDO CABAUATAN PN (Ret) and ILT DIVINAGRACIA discussed about the plan of some elements of Scout Rangers, Marines and PNP-Special Action Force to withdraw support from President Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo, Commander in Chief, Armed Forces of the Philippines, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
29. CPT ALLAN C AURINO O-128459 (FS) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Captain ALLAN C AURINO 0-128459 (Finance Service) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 24, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Canuto, Pili, Camarines, Sur, being the Executive Officer/SDO of 3rd Scout Ranger Battalion, FSRR, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by providing 1LT HOMER ESTOLAS PA the amount of thirty thousand pesos to be used for food and travel expenses of their troops in going to Manila for their planned action in withdrawing support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
30. CPT FREDERICK M SALES O-11686 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Captain FREDERICK M SALES 0-11686 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, at Seoul Restaurant, Libis, Quezon City, attempted to begin a mutiny by joining a meeting regarding the plan of BGen Danilo Lim to withdraw support from the Commander in Chief, Armed Forces of the Philippine, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
31. 1LT ERVIN C DIVINAGRACIA O-12742 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that First Lieutenant ERVIN C DIVINAGRACIA 0-12742 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 23, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, being the liaison officer of First Scout Ranger Regiment, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by talking with CAPT MALONES PA, the Battalion S3 of 1st Mechanized Infantry Battalion and discussed about the plan regarding the withdrawal of support from President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Commander in Chief, Armed Forces of the Philippines, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
32. 1LT JACON S CORDERO O-13434 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that First Lieutenant JACON S CORDERO 0-13434 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 24, 2006, at Headquarters, 7th Scout Ranger Company, 3SRB, FSRR in Barangay Anislag, Daraga, Albay, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by moving to Manila together with his four section leaders and attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions calling for the President’s resignation, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
33. 1LT HOMER A ESTOLAS O-13449 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that First Lieutenant HOMER A ESTOLAS 0-13449 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 24, 2006, at Headquarters, 9th Scout Ranger Company, 3SRB, FSRR in Tiwi, Albay, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by ordering his troops to move to Manila using civilian vehicle to augment the 10th SRC in Fort Bonifacio and attempting to join the protest actions of the so-called civil society groups and political oppositions calling for the President’s resignation, with the intent to usurp, subvert and/or override lawful authority, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
34. 1LT SANDRO U SERENO O-131279 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that First Lieutenant SANDRO U SERENO 0-131279 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, did, on or about February 21, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Tiwi, Albay participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by moving to Manila together with 1Lt Jacon Cordero and 1LT ANTONIO TIMBAL PA and some enlisted personnel to support BGEN DANILO LIM AFP, Commanding General of the First Scout Ranger Regiment, who has withdrawn support from President Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief Armed Forces of the Philippines, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
35. 1LT MARIO D BAUTISTA O-13376 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that First Lieutenant MARIO D BAUTISTA 0-13376 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about the first week of December 2005, at Shoe Mart, Pampanga, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by meeting with Captain Dante Langkit PA, together with 1LT MICHAEL CUARTEROS PA and 1LT JERALD REYES PA, who gave them instruction to organize and prepare their men with their firearms and ammunition, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
36. 1LT MICHAEL L CUARTEROS O-13690 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that First Lieutenant MICHAEL L CUARTEROS 0-13690 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on several occasions from November 2005 to February 2006, participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by meeting with CAPTAIN DANTE LANGKIT PA, together with 1LT MARIO BAUTISTA PA and 1LT JERALD REYES PA, who gave them instruction to organize and prepare their men with their firearms and ammunition, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
37. 1LT RITCHIEMEL S CABALLES O-13686 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that Second Lieutenant RITCHIEMEL C CABALLES 0-13686 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, being then the Executive Officer of 7th Scout Ranger Company (SRC), 3rd Scout Ranger Battalion (3SRB), First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR), Philippine Army, did, on or about February 23, 2006, at Headquarters, 7SRC, 3SRB, FSRR in Barangay Anislag, Daraga, Albay, ordered the troops of 7SRC to move to Manila in civilian attire bringing with them their uniforms and bandoleers with ammunition to augment the 10th SRC to support BGEN DANILO LIM AFP, Commanding General of the First Scout Ranger Regiment, who has withdrawn support from President Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief Armed Forces of the Philippines, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
38. 1LT ANTONIO T TIMBAL O-13782 (INF) PA
CHARGE 2: Violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman)
SPECIFICATION: In that First Lieutenant ANTONIO T TIMBAL 0-13782 (Infantry) Philippine Army, person subject to military law, did, on or about February 21, 2006, and on dates prior or subsequent thereto, in Tiwi, Albay participated in an attempt to begin or create a mutiny by moving to Manila together with 1Lt Jacon Cordero and 1LT Sandro Sereno PA and some enlisted personnel to support BGEN DANILO LIM AFP, Commanding General of the First Scout Ranger Regiment, who has withdrawn support from President Arroyo, Commander-in-Chief Armed Forces of the Philippines, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. (Underscoring Supplied)
The evidence on record is not sufficient to hold CPTs MALONES, AURINO, SALES, 1LTs DIVINAGRACIA, CORDERO, ESTOLAS, SERENO, BAUTISTA, CUARTEROS, CABALLES and TIMBAL to trial by court-martial for their aforementioned charges and specifications.
There is no sufficient evidence on record to warrant their indictment for violation of the Articles of War. Likewise, nothing on record shows that they connived with other officer-respondents in an attempt to begin or create mutiny as earlier established in this report.
CPT MALONES (CAV) PA, S3 of 1MIB, LABde, is being charged for admitting in his sworn statement that he had been in frequent contact with COL REYNALDO CABAUATAN PC (Ret) since the 4th quarter discussing, among others, the destabilization plans with hints of the probable role of the LABde. That COL CABAUATAN mentioned to CPT MALONES that Rangers, Marines, SAF and SPOW will withdraw their support from the current administration. He was later introduced to 1LT DIVINAGRACIA who informed him that Chief of Staff has actually withdrawn support. CPT MALONES confirmed all these information in his sworn statement before the ADHOC Committee, his affidavit which he submitted to the Inspector General of the Philippine Army and in his own counter-affidavit… In fact, he adopted the sworn statement and the affidavit as his own evidence.
He admitted the above circumstances but an analysis of these circumstances would show that these acts do not violate any provision of the Articles of War. In fact, he had been reporting all these information to his Commanding Officer. The fact that he had been communicating with COL CABAUATAN does not necessarily show that he agreed or committed himself in the planning of any destabilization plot. Neither is there evidence to show that he conspired with COL CABAUATAN in the commission of mutiny or coup d’etat or to make him liable for violation of the 96th Article of War or its other provisions.
CPT AURINO (INF) PA, the Bn Ex-O/SDO, 3SRB is being charged because he was the one who instructed 1LT CORDERO (INF) PA to recall his troops and he was the one who handed the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (PhP30,000.00) to 1LT ESTOLAS to be used for food and travel expenses.
It is worthy to note that CPT AURINO (INF) PA was the Disbursing Officer and Special Disbursing Officer of the 3rd Scout Ranger Battalion. He disbursed the amount of P30,000.00 to 1LT HOMER ESTOLAS (INF) PA representing cash advance for MOOE because he was ordered by his battalion commander LTC EDMUNDO MALABANJOT (INF) PA to disburse said amount. He asked 1LT ESTOLAS (INF) PA to sign the petty cash voucher which is attached as annex 1 of his counter-affidavit. It was also LTC MALABANJOT (INF) PA who called and instructed him to contact the commanding officer of the 7th company to return his men to their company post. He then contacted 1LT CORDERO (INF) PA and relayed the order of LTC MALABANJOT (INF) PA.
1LT CORDERO (INF) PA, ILT ESTOLAS (INF) PA, 1LT CABALES (INF) PA, 1LT TIMBOL (INF) PA and 1LT SERENO (INF) PA were shown to have been caught in the same dilemma, having taken orders from their Battalion Commander, 3rd SRBn which had not been demonstrated to be unlawful or defective upon its face and implemented the same. The movement of troops to Manila was for the purpose of augmentation which is legitimate in nature and was tackled in an emergency conference called by LTC MALABANJOT (INF) PA. It never occurred to these respondents that the order to move was unauthorized nor was it made in violation of the chain of command.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS:
Based on the findings above discussed, respectfully recommend the following:
1. Dismissal of the charge and specification for violation of the 67th Article of War (Attempting to Create or Begin Mutiny) against all of the respondent Officers for lack of factual and legal bases without prejudice to its re-opening when the evidence warrants;
2. Referral to trial by court-martial of the individual Charge for violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer and a Gentleman), as amended, against the following respondent Officers:
MGEN RENATO P MIRANDA 0-6728 AFP – for declaring to his men that he would join the protest actions at EDSA and for encouraging the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the other Major Services Commanders to support their plan to join the protest actions.
BGEN DANILO D LIM 0-7665 AFP – for his act of planning to join the civilian-led rally on 24 Feb 06; and, for declaring that he will lead his men in joining the protest action and will withdraw support from the President.
COL ARIEL O QUERUBIN 0-7901 PN(M) – for calling on the civil society to join them at Hqs, Phil. Marines during the so-called “Stand-ff on 26 Feb 06; and, for declaring that the Marines will withdraw their support from the President and that he will lead other officers and men in joining the mass protest actions on 24 Feb 06.
COL ORLANDO E DE LEON 0-8600 PN (M) – for chanting withdrawal of support from the President; for declaring also his withdrawal of support from then BGEN ALLAGA (now MGEN ALLAGA) during the conference on 26 Feb 06 at the commander’s lounge at the PMC Headquarters; for supporting the proposal of MGEN MIRANDA for the Marine Corps to join the mass action protest; and, for chanting withdrawal of support from the President.
LTC CUSTODIO J PARCON 0-9702 PN(M) – for chanting withdrawal of support from the President and for declaring also his withdrawal of support from then BGEN ALLAGA (now MGEN ALLAGA) during the conference on 26 Feb 06 at the commander’s lounge at the PMC Headquarters.
LTC ACHILLES S SEGUMALIAN 0-113766 PN(M) – for supporting the proposal of MGEN MIRANDA for the Marine Corps to join the mass action protest and for questioning the authority of MGEN ALLAGA when the latter was designated as the new commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps.
LTC NESTOR F FLORDELIZA 0-109684 (QMS) PA – for ordering LTC Edmundo Malabanjot, Commanding Officer of 3rd Scout Ranger Battalion to dispatch four and five sections from the 7th and 9th Scout Ranger Company in the evening of 23 February 2006 and ordering Maj Ariel Pangcog, G3 of First Scout Ranger Regiment to direct LTC Malabanjot to mobilize nine sections without clearance from higher headquarters.
LTC EDMUNDO D MALABANJOT 0-115217 (INF) PA – for ordering the Company Commanders of 7th and 9th Scout Ranger Company, both of 3rd SRB, FSRR to send augmentation troops to Manila without clearance from higher headquarters.
MAJ JASON LAUREANO Y AQUINO 0-10503 (INF) PA – for leading the planning on how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over of Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army and for joining Col Ariel Querubin and BGen Danilo Lim and other Army and Marine officers numbering about ten (10) in a meeting at Century Park Sheraton Hotel in Manila where they discussed the plan to talk with CSAFP GEN GENEROSO SENGA about the withdrawal of support from President Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo.
MAJ ORIEL L PANGCOG 0-10563 (INF) PA – for instructing LTC EDMUNDO MALABANJOT (INF) PA, Commanding Officer, 3rd Scout Ranger Battalion, to send augmentation troops to EDSA, Manila without clearance from higher headquarters.
MAJ FRANCISCO DOMINGO R FERNANDEZ 0-10530 PN (M) – for chanting withdrawal of support from the President during the conference at the PMC Headquarters on 26 Feb 06.
CPT JAMES C SABABAN 0-11581 (INF) PA – for involvement in the plan on how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over of Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army.
CPT MONTANO B ALMODOVAR 0-11572 (INF) PA – for involvement in the plan on how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over of Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army.
CPT JOEY T FONTIVEROS 0-11713 (INF) PA – for involvement in the plan on how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over of Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army.
CPT ISAGANI O CRISTE 0-11549 (INF) PA – for involvement in the plan on how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over of Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army.
CPT WILLIAM F UPANO 0-11876 (INF) PA – for involvement in the plan on how to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp Aguinaldo and take-over of Camp Aguinaldo and Headquarters, Philippine Army.
CPT DANTE D LANGKIT 0-11957 (INF) PA – for directing ILT JERALD A REYES PA, 1LT MICHAEL CUARTEROS, and TSg Reynaldo S Angga PA to form and organize their men, with firearms, ammunitions for the conduct of a battalion operation which he intends to organize with the help of other officers without the knowledge of the Battalion Commander.
1LT BELINDA R FERRER 0-132579 PN (M) – for chanting withdrawal of support from the President during the conference at the PMC Headquarters on 26 Feb 06.
3. Referral to trial by court-martial of the individual Charge for violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) against the following respondent Officers:
COL ARIEL O QUERUBIN 0-7910 PN (M) – for violating the normal channel of communication in the chain of command when he appeared before the media on 26 Feb 06 submitting his grievances therein.
LTC ACHILLES S SEGUMALIAN 0-113766 PN(M) – for violating the normal channel of communication in the chain of command when he appeared before the media on 26 Feb 06 submitting his grievances therein
4. Dismissal of the charges and specifications against the following respondents without prejudice to its re-opening when evidence warrants:
BGEN DANILO D LIM AFP – for violations of AW 63 (Disrespect Towards the President); AW 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer) – Specifications 1 & 2; AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) – Specifications 2 & 3; and, AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) – Specifications 1 & 2.
COL ARIEL QUERUBIN PN (M) – for violations of AW 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer); and AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) – Specification 2.
COL JANUARIO G CARINGAL 0-8580 PN (M) – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
COL ARMANDO V BANEZ 0-8592 PN (M) – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN 0-9722 PN (M) – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
LTC REYNALDO OCSAN 0-8751 PN (M) – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
LTC VALENTINE T HIZON 0-0476 PN (M) – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
LTC ROMULO L GUALDRAPA 0-113766 PN (M) – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
MAJ JOSE LEOMAR M DOCTOLERO PA – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
CPT RUBEN B GUINOLBAY PA – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
CPT GEORGE M MALONES PA – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
CPT FREDERICK M SALES PA – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
CPT ALLAN C AURINO PA – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
1LT ERVIN C DIVINAGRACIA PA – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
1LT JACON S CORDERO PA – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
1LT HOMER AN ESTOLAS PA – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
1LT SANDRO U SERENO PA – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
1LT JERALD L REYES PA – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
1LT MARIO D BAUTISTA PA – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
1LT MICHAEL L CUARTEROS PA – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
1LT ANTONIO T TIMBAL PA – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
1LT RICHIEMEL S CABALLES – for violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
AL I PERRERAS
Colonel Jags (Gsc)
Chairman
AGUSTIN G MATAVIA ERWIN VICTORIANO A MACHICA
Major Jags Major Jags
Member Member
(On Foreign Schooling)
Respondent BGEN DANILO LIM’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative Motion to Implead Accuser as Respondent, dtd 22 Aug 06; Respondent CPT JAMES SABABAN’s Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss the Charge and Specification of the 67th and 96th Articles of War, dtd 24 Aug 06; Respondent CPT MONTANO ALMODOVAR’s Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss the Charge and Specification of the 67th and 96th Articles of War, dtd 24 Aug 06;
Respondent MAJ ORIEL PANGCOG’s Omnibus Motion dtd 23 Aug 06; Respondent CPT RUBEN GUINOLBAY’s Motion for Reconsideration (with prayer to subpoena witnesses).
Consolidated Motions, Manifestations and Statements of Respondents LTC NESTOR FLORDELIZA, LTC EDMUNDO MALABANJOT and 1LT RITCHIMEL CABALLES, dtd 24 Aug 06; Manifestation with Motion for Early Resolution of 1LT BELINDA FERRER PN(M), dtd 09 Aug 06; Motion for Early Resolution Re: Exclusion of Parcon’s Sworn Statement dtd 04 May 06 of LTC CUSTODIO J PARCON PN(M) dtd 14 Aug 06; Manifestation with Motion for Early Resolution of Respondent MAJ FRANCISCO R FERNANDEZ PN(M) dtd 09 Aug 06; Respondent 1LT HOMER ESTOLAS’s Motion to Dismiss; and, Respondent MAJ ORIEL PANGCOG’s Omnibus Motion dtd 23 Aug 06; Respondent CPT RUBEN GUINOLBAY’s Motion for Reconsideration (with prayer to subpoena witnesses).
Consolidated Motions, Manifestations and Statements of Respondents LTC NESTOR FLORDELIZA, LTC EDMUNDO MALABANJOT and 1LT RITCHIMEL CABALLES, dtd 24 Aug 06.
Respondent MAJ ORIEL PANGCOG’s Omnibus Motion dtd 23 Aug 06; Respondent CPT RUBEN GUINOLBAY’s Motion for Reconsideration (with prayer to subpoena witnesses).
Commendador et al vs. Gen Renato De Villa et al, GR No.; 93177, dtd 01 August 1991.
98 CJS Witnesses, Sec. 456.
Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637
Beltran vs. Samson, etc., et al., 53 Phil. 570; Gonzales vs. Sec. of Labor, et al., 94 Phil 325
U.S. vs. Tolosa, 5 Phil 616.
People vs. Badilla, et al., 48 Phil. 718; People vs. Ola, L-47147, July 3, 1987.
Executive Order Nr 178, Series of 1938 also known as the Manual for Courts-Martial of the Armed Forces of the Philippines at Section 136 (a).
Section 136 a, Manual for Courts-Martial, supra.
Sworn statements of MGEN MIRANDA AFP, BGEN LIM AFP and COL QUERUBIN PN (M).
Sworn Statements of MGEN RODRIGO F MACLANG AFP, BGEN DANILO D LIM AFP and COL ARIEL O QUERUBIN PN (M).
Sworn Statement of LTGEN HERMOGENES C ESPERON, JR AFP.
Sworn Statement of LTGEN JOSE L REYES AFP.
Sworn Statement of VADM MATEO M MAYUGA AFP.
Sworn Statement/Counter-Affidavit of COL ARIEL QUERUBIN PN (M).
Counter-Affidavit of MGEN RENATO MIRANDA AFP.
Sworn Statements of LTC MARTIN VILLASAN PN (M).
Counter-Affidavits of LTC REYNALDO G OCSAN PN (M) and LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN PN (M).
Sworn Statement of LTC ACHILLES SEGUMALIAN PN (M).
Sworn Statement of LTC WILLIAM CARDEL PN(M).
Counter-affidavit of VALENTINE T HIZON PN (M).
Sworn Statement/Counter-Affidavit of COL ARIEL QUERUBIN PN (M).
Counter-Affidavit of COL ARMANDO BANEZ PN (M) and its Annexes.
Sworn Statement of COL ARMANDO BANEZ PN (M).
Sworn Statement of LTC CUSTODIO J PARCON PN(M)
Counter-Affidavit of COL ARIEL QUERUBIN.
Sworn Statement of LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN PN (M).
Sworn Statements of LTC ACHILLES SEGUMALIAN PN (M) and COL ORLANDO DE LEON PN(M).
Sworn Statement of LTC REYNALDO G OCSAN PN (M).
Counter-Affidavit of COL ARMANDO BANEZ PN (M).
Sworn Statement of 1LT JERALD REYES PA dtd 24 Mar 06.
Sworn Statement of CPT MONTANO ALMODOVAR PA.
Sworn Statement of MAJ LEOMAR JOSE DOCTOLERO PA.
Sworn Statement of 1LT MICHAEL L CUARTEROS PA.
Annex “E” of the Counter-Affidavit of MAJ LEOMAR JOSE DOCTOLERO PA.
Sworn Statement of 2LT HAROLD S CAMAZO (INF) PA and 2LT MARK STEVE T CIMINI PA.
†††††††ȍ†睓
Sworn Statement of 1LT SANDRO SERENO (INF) PA [include doc evidence].
Sworn Statement of 1LT ANTONIO TIMBAL PA.
Sworn Statement of1LT HOMER ESTOLAS PA.
Sworn Statement of CPT ALLAN AURINO PA.
Sworn Statement of 1LT RITCHIEMEL CABALLES (INF) PA, 1LT JACON CORDERO (INF) PA and Cpl Dennis Marza PA
Sworn Statement of SSg Rodelio D Quilapio (INF) PA
STL dtd Feb 06 to CG, 9ID PA from 9MIBn, PA, Subject: Special Report re: Unauthorized Movement of 3SRBn Elements
Sworn Statement of MGEN RODRIGO F MACLANG AFP, BGEN DANILO D LIM AFP and COL ARIEL O QUERUBIN PN (M)
Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
Counter-Affidavit of LTC VALENTINE HIZON PN(M)
Sworn Statement/Counter-Affidavit of COL ARIEL QUERUBIN PN(M)
Sworn Statement of MGEN RODRIGO F MACLANG AFP
SANGCO, J Cesar S., Criminal law, Vol. I, p. 387 (1979)
REYES, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, pp. 98-99 (1981).
See Art. 80 C(1), Manual for Courts martial of the United States, p. IV-4 (2002)
Viada
Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, p.581
Winthrop’s, supra.
U.S. vs. Morrison, 1 Summer 450.
People vs. Mataro, G.R. Nr. 130378, 08 Mar 01.
Annex “FFF” of the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee Report.
Counter-Affidavit of BGen DANILO LIM AFP.
Pandolfo vs U.S. 286 Fed. 8; Commonwealth vs Roller, 100 Pa. Sup Ct., 125
Sworn Statement of MGEN RODRIGO F MACLANG AFP, BGEN DANILO D LIM AFP and COL ARIEL O QUERUBIN PN (M)
Sworn Statement of MAJ ARIEL PANGCOG PA.
Para 62, page 9 of the sworn statement of BGEN NELSON ALLAGA dtd 30 Mar 06 (annex E of the AHIC Report)
Transcribed statement of COL QUERUBIN with TV Patrol and ANC (annexes x-1 and x-2 of the ADHOC Investigating Committee)
Winthrop’s pp.711-712
Para 4 of the affidavit of LTGEN HERMOGENES C ESPERON JR AFP dtd 25 May 06 (annex B of the AHIC Report)
Para 10 of the affidavit of LTGEN HERMOGENES C ESPERON JR AFP dtd 25 May 06
Para 9 of the affidavit of LTGEN HERMOGENES C ESPERON AFP dtd 25 May 06
Para 4 of page 2 of the affidavit of LT GEN JOSE L REYES dtd 03 May 06 (annex C of the AHIC Report)
Sub para 3, page 1 of the affidavit of VADM MATEO M MAYUGA dtd 30 May 06 (annex D of the AHIC Report)
Para 42, page 7 of the sworn statement of COL JONATHAN MARTIR dtd 11 April 06 (annex K of the AHIC Report)
Para 44, page 7 of the sworn statement of COL JONATHAN MARTIR dtd 11 April 06
6 Para 53, page 8 of the sworn statement of COL JONATHAN MARTIR dtd 11 April 06
7 Para 54, page 8 of the sworn statement of COL JONATHAN MARTIR dtd 11 April 06
Page 29 of the sworn statement of CMS GENEROSO BAGORIO dtd 17 April 06 (annex W of the AHIC Report)
Printed copy of the National/Stories re: “Senga denies discussing withdrawal of support” , downloaded from http//: www. news.inq7.net; Annex “5” Counter-Affidavit BGEN DANILO LIM AFP
Sworn Statements of LTGEN HERMOGENES ESPERON, LTGEN JOSE REYES, VADM MATEO M MAYUGA and MGEN RODRIGO MACLANG.
See Joint Affidavit of LTC FLORDELIZA (INF) PA with other FSRR Officers as ANNEX “XX” of the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee Report, jointly corroborated by CPT SABABAN (INF) PA, CPT CRISTE (INF) PA, CPT GUINOLBAY and CPT FONTIVEROS (INF) PA.
Para 39 of the sworn statement of MGEN RODRIGO F MACLANG dtd 10 April 2006 ( annex G of the AHIC Report)
Sub para 3 of page 1 of the affidavit of VADM MATEO M MAYUGA AFP
Para 4, page 1 of the sworn statement of LTGEN HERMOGENES C ESPERON JR AFP, dtd 25 May 06
Para 13, of the sworn statement of LTGEN HERMOGENES C ESPERON JR AFP dtd 25 May 06
Sub para 1 of para 2 of page 2 of the affidavit of LTGEN JOSE L REYES dtd 3 May 06
Transcribed statement of the Interview of COL QUERUBIN with ANC and TV PATROL (annexes x-1 and x-2 of the AHIC Report)
Sworn Statements of COL JONATHAN MARTIR PN (M), LTC WILLIAM CARDEL PN (M) & CMS Generoso Bagorio PN (M).
Sworn Statements of COL JONATHAN MARTIR PN (M), LTC WILLIAM CARDEL PN (M) & CMS Generoso Bagorio PN (M).
Sworn Statements of COL JONATHAN MARTIR PN (M), CMS Generoso Bagorio PN (M).
MOORE, Charles C., Degree of Proof, A Treatise on Facts or the Weight and Value of Evidence, Vol. 1, p.33)
Babcock v Fitchblurg R.Co., 140 N.Y. 308, 311, 35 N.E. Rep. 596 per Earl J.
Special Report of MAJ MARC ERNEST ROSAL re: Unauthorized Movement of 3SRBn elements.
Special Report of MAJ MARC ERNEST ROSAL re: Unauthorized Movement of 3SRBn elements.
Sworn statement and affidavit of 1LT JERALD L REYES.
Sworn Statement of 1LT JERALD REYES PA.
PAGE
NUMPAGES
sfsfY–PD:
~u~k~u~b\b
pŽbYPGPGP>P
y…Ï´pf\RH\f
si[M@3
{q{k{k{k{k{k{a{k{X{
ziXiH< wmfmw\wV
|u|kakWkPkPkPkWkCk
ui]iuL
wj]j]j]
x›xgS›xA2A2A
u²u²dÃZQHQZQ
l€l€°€îcZPZGZ
|†s†j†aWNaEa
xk[J[xkxkxkxk
}se}s}W}J}Š}
ziU@U6zi
|l|lšl|‹|‹|‹|‹|‹|\|‹|‹lšlšl
wnwdwnwZwKw
|m[QG=
{„{u{l{lb„
~m\RH?
~‰~v~v~o
~
od
Normal
Normal
Heading 1
Heading 1
Default Paragraph Font
Default Paragraph Font
Table Normal
Table Normal
No List
No List
Table Grid
Table Grid
Footer
Footer
Header
Header
Comment Text
Comment Text
Body Text
Body Text
Footnote Text
Footnote Text
Footnote Reference
Footnote Reference
Body Text 2
Body Text 2
Body Text 3
Body Text 3
Block Text
Block Text
!"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`
!”#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;< =>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`
OLE_LINK1é
OLE_LINK1ש
*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags
Street
*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags €PlaceName
http://www.5iantlavalamp.com/=
*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags €PlaceType
*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags
€address
*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags
*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags
http://www.5iantlavalamp.com/h
*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags
City0€http://www.5iamas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags_
*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags
country-region
http://www.5iantlavalamp.com/8
*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags
*€urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags
Minute
£崇¯崇³崇Ã崇Å崇È崇
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
]|%OX*|»
Unknownÿ！
Times New Roman
Times New Roman
Symbol
Symbol
Tahoma
Tahoma
Bookman Old Style
Bookman Old Style
Garamond
Garamond
Courier New
Courier New
Wingdings
Wingdings
$ PHILIPPINE NAVY (MARINES):
$ PHILIPPINE NAVY (MARINES):
PHILIPPINE NAVY
PHILIPPINE NAVY
PHILIPPINE NAVY (MARINES):
PHILIPPINE NAVY
Normal
Microsoft Word 10.0
PHILIPPINE NAVY (MARINES):
Root Entry
1Table
1Table
WordDocument
WordDocument
SummaryInformation
SummaryInformation
DocumentSummaryInformation
DocumentSummaryInformation
CompObj
CompObj
Microsoft Word Document
MSWordDoc
Word.Document.8
8 Comments